In what has been widely hailed as a breakthrough, U.S. President Donald Trump hosted the leaders of Armenia and Azerbaijan at the White House on Aug. 8 for what was termed a “peace summit.” The ceremonial summit featured separate bilateral meetings between Trump and Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan as well as Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev and then moved on to the main event—the signing of a “joint declaration” by all three.
The actual results of this meeting were both more than expected and less than they seemed. The summit offered two practical outcomes: the initialing of a bilateral peace treaty by the Armenian and Azerbaijani foreign ministers and the signing by the three presidents of a preliminary document on the establishment of a “connectivity project.”
The signing of a declaration on road and rail connections, both supported and signed by Trump, reflected an agreement that broke through several years of problematic negotiations between the two sides. But at the same time, the Armenian and Azerbaijani leaders failed to finalize the signing of the bilateral peace treaty. Deferring the signing of the treaty, the two leaders instead had their foreign ministers “initial” the document, with a later signing to come only when Armenia meets conditions imposed by Azerbaijan.
Welcome as the treaty is, it also does little to address the root causes of their long-standing conflict.
The first document, a bilateral Armenian-Azerbaijani peace treaty, was actually ready to be signed back in March, when nearly 10 rounds of negotiations culminated to help hammer out a 17-point agreement. Now, the draft treaty has been formally initialed by the two foreign ministers. But Azerbaijan remains adamant that the final signing is conditional on further Armenian concessions, most notably centering on Baku’s demand that Armenia must amend its constitution to remove any reference to the disputed Nagorno-Karabakh region.
Nevertheless, both the conclusion of the negotiations over the text and the initialing of the treaty represent an important move closer to peace. And just as every postwar peace treaty short of total surrender fails to fully satisfy either side, this Armenian-Azerbaijani agreement offers each party a combination of diplomatic retreat and political reward.
For Azerbaijan, military victory in the 2020 Karabakh war enabled it to impose terms on a weakened Armenia—and so the treaty treats the territorial dispute over Nagorno-Karabakh as a done deal. This is the most controversial point, as the Karabakh conflict actually predates the independence of both countries, erupting during the waning days of the Soviet Union and sparking a destructive war in the 1990s that Armenia won.
Notably, the treaty makes no mention of the 100,000 Armenians who were forcibly expelled from Nagorno-Karabakh after Azerbaijan’s victory. Instead, it commits both parties to reject any “separatism” or “violent extremism” and dictates that Armenia will refrain from any legal challenge over Nagorno-Karabakh’s status.
At the same time, it contains no mention of the two dozen or more Armenian prisoners of war and detainees now in Azerbaijani custody. Arrested on dubious charges and under questionable legal standing, this group of prisoners includes several former democratically elected leaders of Nagorno-Karabakh, whose fate is now even more uncertain.
As a preconditions for signing a lasting peace treaty, Azerbaijan has also required Armenia to renounce the mandate of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe’s Minsk Group, which was previously empowered to mediate the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.
Armenia, whose diplomatic strategy is based on a recognition of its own weakness, has accepted the need to compromise. In return, however, the treaty offers two significant achievements for the Armenian side. First, Azerbaijan has now recognized Armenia’s current borders and dropped its irredentist claims on Armenian territory, including inflammatory statements labeling Armenian territory as “western Azerbaijan.” This will aid in ongoing border delineation and demarcation talks, which have virtually stalled since early 2025.
A second important component of the treaty for Armenia is the mutual promise to “combat intolerance” and refrain from the “threat of use of force.” Additional constructive elements include an announcement that a bilateral commission will be empowered to oversee the implementation of the terms of the treaty, a reference to the need for “mutually agreed security and confidence-building measures,” and the planned establishment of diplomatic relations.
Despite this progress, however, uncertainty remains about how the treaty terms will be implemented. With no international guarantee and no international guarantor, there is far too little investment in ensuring a lasting and durable peace. Even Trump’s hosting of the ceremony did little to assuage these concerns. Tellingly, the U.S. president simply signed as a “witness” to the Armenian-Azerbaijani declaration.
This uncertainty is particularly dangerous for a peace treaty that is based on a premise of rewarding and recognizing the results of the use of force by Azerbaijan. Whatever promises Azerbaijan makes, the treaty creates a precedent that validates Baku’s aggression—both during its decision to wage war in 2020 as well as in its 2023 seizure of Nagorno-Karabakh and expulsion of the Armenian population—and endorses a win for an authoritarian state over a struggling democracy.
Alongside the bilateral peace treaty, the Armenian and Azerbaijani leaders signed a separate document concerning transport “connectivity,” with a focus on new road and rail projects. Also signed by Trump, this joint declaration committed the two sides to a framework for the creation of a “Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity” (TRIPP).
Despite the grandiose name, the TRIPP agreement offers an important incentive for postwar peace and stability. The emphasis on post-conflict connectivity also provides a much-needed opening and opportunity for overcoming the economic constraints of the isolation of Armenia, which has suffered from the long-standing closure of its borders with Turkey and Azerbaijan since the early 1990s.
The TRIPP agreement offers both an endorsement of Armenian sovereignty and clear support for territorial integrity. This is an especially important point given Azerbaijan’s previous maximalist demand for an extraterritorial “corridor” through Armenia. The TRIPP framework repudiates any reference to such a corridor, instead creating a road and rail connection under complete and unquestioned Armenian sovereign control.
A second important breakthrough for Armenia stems from the reciprocal nature of the project. The road and rail links will involve more than simply Azerbaijani access, also providing Armenia with an essential route to overcome its relative isolation. Over the longer term, Armenia’s reciprocal use will also encourage greater trade and increased exports and imports from more distant markets while further lessening Armenian overdependence on Russia.
At the same time, the TRIPP project grants Azerbaijan its long-desired direct connection to its exclave of Nakhchivan. This is important to Baku not only to overcome its prior dependence on Iranian territory and airspace to access the exclave, but also to fulfill its broader strategic desire to serve as a gateway to Central Asia.
Notably, the agreement also calls for involvement in the TRIPP project from “third parties,” specifically from U.S. private interests. The investment from U.S. corporations conforms to the Trump administration’s business-orientated approach to brokering peace in the region as well as Trump’s personal interest in a “real estate” deal for Armenia and Azerbaijan. Such U.S. engagement also further sidelines both Russia and Iran, challenging decades of Russian dominance and thwarting Iranian hopes for exerting regional influence.
Despite this, Moscow has been uncharacteristically passive and even unusually supportive in its response to the TRIPP project, seemingly perceiving more opportunity than threat. Russia is now hoping to restore its lost power and influence in the region after it failed to guarantee Armenia’s security. TRIPP creates the opportunity for Moscow to rebuild its presence, not through a return to hard power but through leveraging its own role in managing regional road and rail transport. Even if the TRIPP project progresses as planned, Russia can still exert its influence through Armenia’s membership in the Moscow-dominated Eurasian Economic Union and by virtue of the fact that Russia operates the Armenian railway network.
Turkey, too, hopes to benefit from the arrangement. For Ankara, these agreements provide long-awaited political cover to normalize relations with Armenia, with less risk of angering Azerbaijan. This also paves the way for Turkey to regain its regional role in the South Caucasus, especially as Russia remains distracted and overwhelmed by its failed invasion of Ukraine. Turkey’s direct military support for Azerbaijan in the 2020 war failed to produce the results that Ankara had hoped for, as it was denied a promised postwar peacekeeping presence in Azerbaijan and was excluded from the trilateral Armenian-Azerbaijani-Russian working group empowered to negotiate the restoration of trade and transport.
Yet all the potential benefits of the two agreements hinge on long-term engagement in the region, and here, serious questions exist. The South Caucasus has never been seen as a direct U.S. national interest. As a result, it is often subsumed under broader considerations about U.S.-Russian relations as well as U.S policy toward Turkey, Iran, and even Central Asia.
Trump’s approach raises further concerns. The U.S. administration’s involvement in the early August talks was directed by the president himself through the White House, with little involvement from either the State Department or the National Security Council and even less preparation or study in the formulation of this policy initiative. Now, with U.S. corporate interests supposedly taking the lead in the TRIPP project, there is an increased likelihood that U.S. engagement could flag if profits don’t follow.
Yet despite such concerns, the breakthrough in talks is undeniable. The question is whether it is also unsustainable. More work is needed to ensure a lasting but limited so-called peace, defined more by the absence of open hostilities than by genuine reconciliation. The agreement on connectivity may do just that by creating a degree of economic interdependence that can serve as a deterrent to future war and restore regional security.
The post A Trump-Brokered Peace Deal in the South Caucasus Is Hopeful but Incomplete appeared first on Foreign Policy.
