China’s Sept. 3 military parade, held to mark the 80th anniversary of the end of the War of Resistance Against Japan, will be the fourth such event since President Xi Jinping came to power. Yet the context today is strikingly different. At home, the country faces economic headwinds, but its military strength continues to grow. Abroad, ties with the West—particularly the United States—are increasingly tense, while the postwar international order is being reshaped under the pressure of the Russia-Ukraine war.
This year’s parade, therefore, is not simply a ceremonial display of troops and weaponry. It is a carefully orchestrated act of strategic communication, weaving together messages of military strength, diplomatic positioning, and historical narratives, directed at audiences both at home and abroad.
The military element, in particular, is designed as much for the United States, Japan, Taiwan, and China’s maritime neighbors as it is for a domestic audience.
As in past parades, Beijing will showcase newly commissioned or soon-to-be-commissioned systems—but not weapons still in testing or the most secretive projects. Yet given the surge of military modernization in recent years, the 2025 parade is expected to feature more advanced equipment than ever before.
Briefings suggest that the focus will be on fourth-generation tanks, carrier-based aircraft, and fighter jets. Also prominently featured may be new capabilities in cyber and electronic warfare, including drones, directed-energy weapons, and jamming technologies, along with hypersonic missiles, missile defense, and strategic strike systems.
For a domestic audience, this reinforces the message that a once-weak China is now a superpower—a key part of the Chinese Communist Party’s claim to legitimacy. For foreign audiences, it sends a signal that the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is no longer simply preparing for future wars but, rather, is combat-ready today. The parade will underline the PLA’s ability to project power, deter adversaries, and enforce China’s security claims in the region.
The parade is also an opportunity for diplomatic theater. It may break records for foreign attendance, with reports emerging in particular that high-level leaders from most Southeast Asian countries—excluding only the Philippines—will be present. This contrast is deliberate. By assembling leaders from Southeast Asia, the Middle East, Central Asia, Africa, and Latin America, Beijing seeks to cast itself as the representative of the “global south” rather than an isolated rival of the West. The guest list itself serves as a diplomatic vote of confidence.
The absences are equally telling. Manila’s choices are constrained by its ties with Washington; frequent clashes at sea with the Chinese navy; and the closeness of the Duterte family, rivals of the ruling Marcos clan, to Beijing, while Singapore, which is sending only its deputy prime minister, leans strategically toward neutrality or pro-U.S. positions. The attendance of Vietnam, Malaysia, Indonesia, Cambodia, and Myanmar, by contrast, allows Beijing to claim that most Southeast Asian states prefer cooperation over confrontation despite the ongoing disputes over territory in the South China Sea.
Thus, the parade will present two performances: missiles and formations in Tiananmen Square and a circle of friends on the reviewing stand. The diplomatic centerpiece will be Vladimir Putin’s visit. The Russian president will attend the parade and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation summit being held in the days beforehand, and he will meet Xi for bilateral talks. For Putin, still isolated by the Ukraine war, Beijing offers legitimacy. For Xi, Putin’s presence underscores China-Russia strategic trust. The two leaders sitting side by side, as Xi did for Russia’s own World War II anniversary parade in May, will be one of the most striking images of the event.
The timing is particularly noteworthy. As Washington brokers a trilateral U.S.-Russia-Ukraine dialogue, Xi and Putin are expected to quietly discuss postwar arrangements, including peace prospects and the shape of a new global order. Such talks will not be publicized, but their significance lies in the fact that Beijing and Moscow are coordinating beyond immediate wartime concerns. For Beijing, this is a chance to project itself as a responsible power; for Moscow, it’s a path out of isolation.
Still, expectations should be modest. No major new agreements are likely, nor will there be a public declaration of joint opposition to the West. Instead, Xi and Putin will likely stick to the long-familiar pattern of “strategic ambiguity”—emphasizing cooperation while leaving room for flexibility.
Xi’s speech commemorating the 80th anniversary of victory in the War of Resistance will be another focal point. For decades, the global narrative of World War II has privileged the contributions of the United States and the Soviet Union while minimizing China’s sacrifices. The parade provides Xi with a stage to retell that story.
He is expected to argue that China played a “decisive role” in defeating Japan and shaping the outcome of the war in Asia, reinforcing both nationalist pride at home and Beijing’s claim that it was a founding architect of the postwar order. Toward Japan, Xi is likely to strike a careful tone—insisting on historical responsibility while avoiding inflammatory rhetoric and pivoting instead to a vision of a “Asia-Pacific community with a shared future.”
More broadly, Xi will link the legacy of World War II to China’s aspirations for the future order. He is likely to stress an end to global U.S. hegemony, multipolarity, and greater representation for developing states.
The overarching message is that China is not merely flaunting strength. It is presenting an integrated narrative: It was a decisive actor in the past, is a formidable power in the present, and it aspires to shape the future. Xi Jinping seeks to consolidate his domestic authority while signaling to the world that China intends to be both the just inheritor of history and the architect of tomorrow’s order.
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