Europe’s vision for ending the war in Ukraine might fairly be summed up as “peace through strength.” The question now is whether that’s anything more than a mere vision.
For years, Europe has deemed Russia’s war in Ukraine to be an existential threat to European security. To that end, it has provided Ukraine with military assistance and foreign aid in hopes of transforming its neighboring state into a hardened country capable of defending itself.
But that transformation was always a long-term goal. And the Trump administration’s acceleration of the timeline for a peace deal with Russia means that it’s crunch time for Europe: Is it ready to personally provide the strength to secure the necessary peace? Will the Europeans part with their cautious approach and provide troops to Ukraine as a security guarantee, even at the risk of losing personnel and facing political ire at home?
“That is the core question,” said Rafael Loss, a fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations.
“Europeans don’t want to die for Ukraine,” Gérard Araud, a former French ambassador to Washington, told me over the phone, summing up the sentiment expressed by several other diplomats and experts.
“The man on the street considers Ukraine a faraway place and believes Europe has already paid enough,” Araud added. “He doesn’t want to get physically involved. Tomorrow, if Ukraine was defeated and Kyiv was taken, Europeans will say: ‘oh, too bad, too bad,’ but then resume their lives as normal.”
Since the onset of the war, Europe’s policy has been far too reticent, far too scared of how the Russian president might respond, and far too selfish even as Ukrainians form the first line of defense for the whole continent.
Over the past three years, Europe has imposed economic sanctions, drastically reduced purchases of Russian energy, and aided Ukraine by providing defense equipment. It has come up with several programs—ranging from temporary protection for Ukrainian refugees to recovery funds and duty-free trade regimes to billions in arms and training.
But European leaders have often been accused of engaging half-heartedly—refusing to provide critical weapons such as Taurus missiles, doing little to discourage third-party circumvention of sanctions, and refusing to touch the principle of nearly 200 billion euros worth of Russian cash lying in a Belgian bank, which many have argued could be put toward aid for the embattled nation.
And they still intend to do more of the same. Last week, as Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky landed in Brussels to meet up with allies and board a plane to Washington, European Union leaders announced their determination to keep up the economic pressure and issue their 19th anti-Russia sanctions package early next month. European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen said the allies will help Ukraine become a “steel porcupine” in reference to building up the country’s defense industry complex.
The clue to the effectiveness of this approach perhaps lies in the number of the sanctions package. There is no reason to believe that another round of punitive economic measures could discourage Russia from occupying even more Ukrainian land. Strengthening Ukraine’s domestic arms industry would help with longer-term containment, but it could take years and is insufficient to compel Moscow to end the war in the short term.
Experts who spoke with Foreign Policy believe that if Europe wants to effectively contain Russia, deploying troops in Ukraine has become a necessary safeguard.
At the White House on Aug. 18, some of the Europeans seem to have whispered in U.S. President Donald Trump’s ears that they would be willing to deploy troops in Ukraine, but at home those plans are still firming up, with a hushed debate continuing on exactly what kind of troops, how many, and specifically from which nations they could potentially be deployed, and under what kind of U.S. backstop provisions.
“When it comes to security, they’re willing to put people on the ground,” Trump told Fox News, referring to Europeans as he ruled out participation of American soldiers in any such force on the ground. “We’re willing to help them with things, especially, probably, if you talk about by air, because no one has the kind of stuff we have, really, they don’t.”
There has been a flurry of meetings since the return of the entourage of European leaders from Washington, with a goal of deciding the future of Europeans security guarantees to Ukraine.
France and the United Kingdom have been at the forefront of what’s called the “coalition of the willing”—a grouping of 30-plus countries that will participate in monitoring any future peace deal between Russia and Ukraine, with only a handful considering potential troop deployment. The idea remains riddled with challenges, and none of the giants feel strong enough to go in before the Kremlin signs a cease-fire. Most expect some form of U.S. involvement.
Paris and London have maintained that an end to hostilities is a necessary condition, while French President Emmanuel Macron, who first proposed the idea, said European troops would be deployed only in “strategic locations” in Ukraine, and not along the contact line with the Russians.
Since the meeting in the White House, only Estonia’s premier has confirmed that the Baltic nation was willing to “contribute with boots on the ground.” Denmark and Sweden have expressed interest in the past, contingent on a cease-fire being reached, and the United Kingdom-led Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF)—a non-NATO group of 10 countries that can be deployed in support of NATO—may also be willing participants.
Finland, a part of the JEF, is reluctant, however, and wants to keep its soldiers home instead to guard its 1,340 kilometer (835 mile) border with Russia. Even Poland, which could be next in line unless Russia’s advances are halted effectively now, has so far refused to send armed troops to protect Ukrainians.
Araud, the French diplomat, suggested that there is “bad blood” between the Poles and the Ukrainians.
“European history is very complicated. What is now western Ukraine was taken by the Soviets from Poland. Lviv was largely a Polish city before the Second World War, and [the] Polish far right claims these territories,” Araud said. Russia is playing on these divides, he added.
Even biggies such as Italy and Germany appear to be the more unwilling members of the coalition.
“The idea to send troops isn’t well thought through. I don’t think the German parliament would agree to it,” said André Härtel, a Brussels manager and Russia expert at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs.
Germany has repeatedly cited a shortage of soldiers and said it is already struggling to meet its existing NATO commitments. Becoming a soldier has no glorious connotations in Germany, where pacifism lingers and many are war averse.
But Germany’s main objection to sending troops to a war zone is the absence of their American counterparts, who could provide a superior military force in case things get out of hand with Russians.
Italy has suggested a NATO-like guarantee including the United States, but suggested that it should be one that doesn’t require deployment inside Ukraine or makes allies party to the current fighting. The idea would be to offer a collective security clause that only kicks in if Russia invades again. “This would make it more acceptable to [Russian President Vladimir] Putin,” Giovanbattista Fazzolari, a cabinet undersecretary, reportedly told Italian media.
Julian Popov, a Bulgarian British politician and a senior fellow at Strategic Perspectives, said he was quite certain that European troops would not be deployed on the Ukrainian battlefield but added that it was not even required.
“The nature of war, and the technology with which it is fought, is changing so much that it is no longer about sending tanks and planes and soldiers, but much more about high-end technologies,” he said, pointing to how the use of drones have changed the battlefield in Ukraine.
“Ukraine is fast becoming one of the leading producers of new generation defense technologies. And I think there is interest in European companies and governments, and the U.S. as well, to financially support the production of Ukrainian weapons.”
Stationing trainers in Ukraine as a reassurance force, especially if they are accompanied by U.S. contingent, would be a much easier sell for European governments, experts said.
“Now, deploying a couple of hundred or 1,000 soldiers is one thing; monitoring the contact line is another. That would require more than 100,000 soldiers, and no one in Europe has such a large number of soldiers to spare,” Härtel said.
“Even the French and the British have downsized their proposal—instead of monitoring the cease-fire line, they now want the troops to be present in the Ukrainian backyard, somewhere simply to offer confidence to Ukrainians.”
Loss, the European Council on Foreign Relations fellow, added that Germany will participate in some manner. But instead of thousands of combat troops, Europeans were more at ease with sending trainers.
“It is more likely that Europe’s training mission—from Germany, Poland, and elsewhere—could move to Ukraine,” he said.
Europeans may consider a bad deal—one that ends the fighting in Ukraine but emboldens Russia to attack other Eastern European states—to be worse than an end to the war. But it’s increasingly clear that they have few ideas on how to achieve a good deal before Trump loses patience.
For better or for worse, Ukraine is turning into a front-line state for Europe, and its fate remains precarious. Though the Trump administration is reportedly considering continued support on intelligence sharing and air cover, Washington’s involvement remains suspect under a whimsical and moody president. And yet Trump’s standoffishness—and Putin’s disingenuousness—are poor excuses for some of the biggest economies in the world to abdicate their own responsibilities when it counts the most.
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