U.S. President Donald Trump’s fixation with securing access to rare earth minerals is creating the conditions for a poor strategic decision in Myanmar. According to a recent report, the Trump administration is considering a range of options to access rare earths in Myanmar—the world’s third-largest producer of such—despite the ongoing civil war, including supporting the rebel Kachin Independence Army (KIA) and engaging in direct peace talks with the military junta led by Senior Gen. Min Aung Hlaing.
Neither of those options are intrinsically bad, and both may even be necessary to end the conflict that has been raging in Myanmar for more than four years. But the Trump administration has shown, by its early actions, that it’s willing to soften its stance on the regime, which the Biden administration accused of genocide and crimes against humanity. Although this could be the opening salvo of peace negotiations, Washington’s repeated emphasis on accessing critical minerals suggests a singular purpose for these talks. What’s more, recent shifts by the U.S. State Department to downplay democracy and human rights concerns going forward make it difficult to give Washington the benefit of the doubt.
In July, the Trump team relieved sanctions against several of the junta’s top allies and military-linked businesses. Even more worrisome, the U.S. Treasury Department dropped the sanctions soon after Min Aung Hlaing wrote a letter to Trump, praising the “strong leadership” shown by his crackdown on government-funded U.S. media that had been critical of the junta and its activities. A senior White House official denied there was any link between the fawning letter and Trump’s decision, but the administration has not given any explanation as to why the sanctions were lifted.
Sensing that this could be its best shot to reset U.S.-Myanmar relations and maybe receive support from Washington to finally vanquish the opposition and win the war, Naypyidaw is pretending to clean up its act. The regime, for example, declared that it would hold national elections in December or January of this year—despite that free, fair, and inclusive elections would be impossible because of the ongoing war. On July 31, for the first time since it seized power in February 2021, the junta announced an end to the national state of emergency—but then quietly reimposed it within hours, along with martial law, in many restive and rebel-controlled towns. Naypyidaw gave a similarly deceptive order to return the government to civilian leadership, because the power went from Min Aung Hlaing as commander of the military to the country’s acting president, who also happens to be Min Aung Hlaing.
Most recently, the regime has employed a Washington-based lobbying firm, DCI Group, to help it reestablish ties with the United States. The contract is reportedly worth $3 million a year, and in a U.S. Foreign Agents Registration Act filing, the firm stated that it “shall provide public affairs services … with a focus on trade, natural resources, and humanitarian relief” as the basis for resetting bilateral ties.
If the Trump administration is indeed considering direct engagement and even support of the junta in some sort of strategic quid pro quo to eventually access Myanmar’s rare earth minerals, then it would likely do more damage to U.S. interests and values than it’s worth.
For one thing, the United States would further sully what is left of its long-standing reputation of being on the side of democracy. Following Trump’s decision to lift sanctions on certain junta-affiliated actors, for example, the United Nations special rapporteur on human rights in Myanmar, Tom Andrews, called the decision “shocking.” Andrews argued that the move constituted a “major step backward for international efforts to save lives by restricting the murderous junta’s access to weapons.” But, of course, this wouldn’t be the first time—and likely not the last—that Trump has sided with strongmen in the contest between authoritarianism and democracy.
U.S. support for the regime would also blatantly undermine the Association of Southeast Asian Nations’ (ASEAN) Five-Point Consensus on Myanmar, forged back in 2021, which calls for, among other things, “constructive dialogue among all parties” to achieve a peaceful resolution to its conflict. Although the bloc’s consensus has been relatively ineffectual, it nonetheless remains its guiding approach toward its fellow member, and if the Trump administration attempts to go around it, then the bloc would roundly condemn such efforts, straining U.S.-ASEAN ties in the process.
All this aside, U.S. coordination with the Myanmar regime to access rare earth minerals would be highly impractical. The junta remains far more suspicious of the United States than it is of China and Russia—both key benefactors that provide it with arms, diplomatic cover, and financial assistance—making it less likely that Naypyidaw would reciprocate in Washington’s interests.
And then there are enormous challenges with the actual mining of rare earth minerals. Notably, the northern Kachin state, which is in the hands of the KIA’s opposition government, known as the Kachin Independence Organization (KIO), has significantly increased production of rare earths. The junta lacks jurisdiction over this region, and, in fact, has recently lost ground there to the KIA. Nonetheless, China continues to benefit from rare earth exports from this disputed region. Thus, if Washington wants to fully benefit from rare earth minerals in Myanmar, then it would either have to strike a better deal with the KIO than the one that Beijing currently has or support the junta’s full military takeover of areas that are rich in rare earths. The latter would be a potential new quagmire that poses a high risk of failure and damage to U.S. values and interests.
To be sure, the Trump administration has yet to make any moves that indisputably show that it has sided with the junta over the opposition. In fact, it has done the opposite in some cases, such as by keeping a 40 percent tariff on the regime, with no anticipated reduction. But Trump’s recent sanctions relief for individuals and businesses affiliated with the junta is a worrisome sign. Washington should seek to avoid going down this critical minerals rabbit hole any further because a major strategic blunder almost certainly waits at the bottom.
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