Dan Sleat is a senior policy advisor for Russia/Ukraine at the Tony Blair Institute for Global Change.
As Ukraine prepares to mark another Independence Day this Aug. 24, the mood in Kyiv is one of deep resilience and mounting uncertainty.
More than three years into Russia’s full-scale invasion, the war has now entered a grinding new phase — one where neither victory nor collapse are in immediate sight for either side. What’s become clear, however, is that the Kremlin has recalibrated, increasingly convinced that even if it can’t win outright, it also can’t lose.
This isn’t the war Russia had planned, but it’s the war it has learned to fight: one of attrition and calculated pressure. Moscow believes it has the manpower and economic flexibility to sustain a conflict that exhausts both Ukraine and Western allies before it exhausts itself. And unless the West shifts its strategy to match this reality of patience and persistence, there’s a growing risk it could unwittingly play into the Kremlin’s hands.
This is Russian President Vladimir Putin’s long game — a war where time is the key battleground.
Clearly, Putin’s original aims haven’t been met. There was no lightning strike on Kyiv, no rapid regime change. Ukraine’s state, army and national identity are strained, but they remain unbroken. Meanwhile, peace negotiations are still a possibility — though a remote one for now, as Moscow rejects Ukraine’s condition that any talks must follow a ceasefire.
Still, Russia currently controls roughly 19 percent of Ukraine’s territory, including swathes of the Donbas and a land bridge to Crimea, and it continues to make incremental progress. Its advances, however, have become costly and slow; the war has claimed over a million Russian lives; and the tempo of fighting is high yet grinding.
But the Kremlin feels it no longer needs rapid or dramatic territorial expansion to maintain its strategic momentum. It need only keep going — and wait.
This strategy isn’t without its limits, of course. In terms of manpower and military equipment, Russia is facing growing pressure. At the current intensity of fighting, the country can likely sustain operations into next year without a further mobilization, but its shortfalls will slowly become more acute. Plus, when the time comes, a further mobilization may not be politically palatable.
The Russian public is already feeling the squeeze of economic pressures, with slowing growth, increasing inflation and interest rates, and biting sanctions. Putin has kept a balance between military needs and civilian consumption so far, but this balance is becoming harder to maintain.
Next year, more difficult decisions will follow.
Internal polling already suggests more Russians now favor a negotiated settlement than an outright continuation of the war. And if the Kremlin is forced to choose between military escalation and political stability, there’s a limit to how far it may be willing to go. Building on modelling by the RE:Russia think tank, recent analysis by the Tony Blair Institute shows that if the war continues as is, Russia is projected to spend more on army personnel than its federal budget for education and health care combined.
Regardless, Putin is betting Ukraine will blink first, as the constraints Kyiv faces are very real: chronic shortfalls in 155-milimeter shells, air defense systems and troop rotation capacity. All these constraints can be rectified, though.
Despite the growing sense many have that the war is at a stalemate — a static front line, a battle for inches not breakthroughs — that perception is wrong. The Kremlin’s calculations assume Ukraine won’t be able to sustain the fight for as long as Russia can, that Western allies won’t meaningfully scale up their support in time, and that Kyiv will ultimately have to make greater concessions to end the war.
This isn’t a plan for victory, it’s a bet on exhaustion. And it will continue to work, unless that logic is broken.
Ukraine can call Putin’s bluff on being able to stick it out, but it needs help to do so. If Western policymakers can match Russia’s strategy of patience with one of scale and commitment, they can shift the balance. In this regard, European efforts are finally ramping up, but they’re not yet at the speed or scale required to make a tangible impact.
What Ukraine needs is depth and durability — tools for sustained operations over time and across terrain. The focus here shouldn’t just be on high-profile systems like F-16s — though they undoubtedly help — but on real game changers. This means: Infantry fighting vehicles and tanks for mobility and offensive operations; a steady pipeline of 155-milimeter shells; the mass production and deployment of drones, for both surveillance and strikes; advanced engineering equipment to breach Russia’s defensive lines; and a reinforced logistics backbone to support maneuver across multiple fronts.
If NATO partners — with U.S. support — can deliver these over a sustained period and at scale, Ukraine could regain the initiative, shifting from limited gains to sustained offensive operations. Only then can it impose real pressure and disrupt Moscow’s assumption that time is on its side. Any sense of a credible support package beyond a 12-to-18-month period would also force a shift in the Kremlin’s calculus.
So, as Ukraine’s Independence Day approaches, Western leaders must confront a test of their own: independence from short-termism. Supporting Ukraine in this new phase isn’t just about territory. If the country is to endure and stand in a better position a year from now, it must be strong enough and armed enough to shape the end of the war on its own terms.
The recent summit in Washington showed a united Europe with a desire to secure peace for Ukraine on terms the country will accept. If properly leveraged, this could lead to a more coordinated strategy, with the continent working together toward a clear aim.
In 1991, Ukraine won its independence. In 2022, it defended it. Now, in 2025, it needs further support to keep it. That requires more than promises — it demands sustained support. Now.
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