Four years after he plunged the country into chaos with his 2021 coup, Myanmar’s commander in chief, Min Aung Hlaing, handed power over to an interim government—led by himself.
Observers do not expect the cosmetic makeover that Min Aung Hlaing announced on July 31 to result in any substantive policy changes for a military regime that has committed severe repression and human rights atrocities. Instead, the announcement signals that preparations are underway for an election Min Aung Hlaing has been promising to hold ever since he jailed Myanmar’s civilian leader, Aung San Suu Kyi, in February 2021.
Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy (NLD) is barred from competing in the election, which is scheduled for December. That’s enough to render the entire operation a sham: The NLD won around 60 percent of the popular vote in the 2015 and 2020 elections. The military proxy Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) is likely to prevail instead.
China, the main backer of Myanmar’s military regime, is also the principal architect of the election. In a recent report, the International Crisis Group said Beijing views the election as a “quid pro quo” for preventing the regime’s collapse.
Immediately following the 2021 coup, China kept the erratic Myanmar regime at arm’s length diplomatically, even while continuing to supply it with fighter jets and contributing to its bomb production. Facing widespread armed revolt, the junta was unable to bring stability to the Chinese border and key Chinese infrastructure projects, which observers believed annoyed Beijing.
But starting last year, China intervened to an extraordinary degree to prop up the military regime. It placed enormous pressure on the ethnic armed groups that operate on the Chinese border to sign a cease-fire with the Myanmar military—and even hand back some seized territory to the junta in Naypyidaw. The groups were also pressured to cut ties with the broader pro-democracy movement, which China reportedly regards as too close to the West—and therefore even more problematic than the unreliable Min Aung Hlaing.
While Beijing sees military-backed rule in Myanmar as here to stay, it may be hoping Min Aung Hlaing is not. That’s where the election comes into play. “Beijing would prefer to deal with a nominally civilian government and, if possible, with someone other than Min Aung Hlaing,” the Crisis Group report claimed, adding China believes the senior general is “incompetent.”
After the election, power would be divided between the commander in chief and president, two roles Min Aung Hlaing occupies simultaneously today. It would also see parliament filled with hundreds of politicians, and led by a speaker of the house, whose powerful position was created by the 2008 military-drafted constitution.
So, will the elections change anything at all? Some analysts and diplomats hope they could remove Min Aung Hlaing—or, more realistically, limit his influence by creating space for rival power centers to emerge. Others, however, dismiss this as wishful thinking.
Optimists point to Min Aung Hlaing’s own unpopularity within traditional pro-military circles. He has faced unprecedented criticism from senior military officers and prominent nationalists due to his staggering battlefield losses against rebel groups.
Observers believe that the USDP widely resents the commander in chief—and not just for the chronic instability and economic collapse he ushered in. USDP members have been routinely targeted for assassination by pro-democracy forces since the coup. The party claimed some 3,000 members and supporters have been killed, while the military has been unable or unwilling to protect them.
At the same time, Min Aung Hlaing has centralized power even more than his predecessors, making it increasingly difficult to sideline him. A spate of public criticism that began when the Myanmar military lost control of most of the border with China in 2023 was snuffed out through a campaign of threats and intimidation.
For instance, a prominent member of the USDP obliquely criticized Min Aung Hlaing’s strategic prowess. Hla Swe used his personal publication to praise other military leaders for their wartime victories, specifically mentioning conflict theaters where Min Aung Hlaing has faced notable defeats. Shortly after, he was reportedly briefly detained, and has since changed his tune. When contacted by Foreign Policy in July, Hla Swe insisted there is no dissatisfaction with the regime leader and hung up the phone.
For optimists, any election that sidelines Min Aung Hlaing could be an important step toward peace. “The one trend line is election then dialogue,” said one Western diplomat, who spoke to Foreign Policy on the condition of anonymity because he was not authorized to speak to the media.
Min Aung Hlaing has become so personally associated with the atrocities committed under his rule that the idea of him initiating peace talks while in power is largely unthinkable. Just in May, an airstrike on a school in rebel-held territory killed 20 students, as young as 8, and two teachers.
Taw Nee, a spokesperson for the Karen National Union—Myanmar’s oldest ethnic armed group—told Foreign Policy that the group would only consider negotiations if the military agrees to place itself under civilian control. “Even if Min Aung Hlaing steps back, it wouldn’t be easier to negotiate with [the] military regime,” Taw Nee wrote in a text message. Among other political privileges, the 2008 military-drafted constitution places the military outside civilian oversight.
However, this might be too much to hope for. “The mood of diplomats is a bit desperate these days,” said the Western diplomat, who added that Min Aung Hlaing leaving power is “wishful thinking.”
With the election scheduled for December, Min Aung Hlaing has ample time to manipulate the proceedings to install a loyalist as president or line up a compliant replacement as commander in chief should he ascend to the presidency. If Min Aung Hlaing feels like he’s been outmaneuvered by a rival faction in the military, he could simply call the whole thing off.
Holding an election will be logistically difficult. Pro-military campaign events or polling stations could become a target for rebel groups that hope to disrupt the proceedings. Some administrative divisions in Myanmar are now a patchwork of mixed control, while others have nearly been lost entirely to rebels. In the far western Chin and Rakhine states, on the borders with India and Bangladesh, the regime controls little more than the state capitals.
From Min Aung Hlaing’s perspective, there are also benefits to this instability. The regime has said the election will be held over multiple weeks in phases using electronic voting machines that Crisis Group reports were manufactured in India. This format will make it easy for Min Aung Hlaing to adjust the results to his liking.
The electronic voting machines are an awkward solution for the military, which seized power after baselessly accusing the NLD of committing voter fraud in the 2020 election. Despite its authoritarian tendencies, the Myanmar military has long held a strange attachment to holding clean elections, even when it rejects the results. Military-administered national elections in 1990 and 2015, and by-elections in 2012, all resulted in massive landslide victories for the NLD. The military would go on to annul the results of the 1990 election, as it did for the 2020 polls, but it still counted the votes fairly.
Faced with existential threats and pressure from Beijing, Min Aung Hlaing has agreed to hold an election. What happens next, however, very much remains to be seen.
Canceling the election or maintaining his status as absolute dictator risks angering China, which was largely assumed to have given approval to the major rebel offensive on its border in 2023. But Min Aung Hlaing has shown time and again that he is willing to damage the country and the military as an institution for the sake of his own survival. If an election looks like it could threaten his standing, there is no reason to expect him to proceed, even if he risks incurring the wrath of his main backers in Beijing.
At this point, China is aware of that. Promoting Myanmar’s election, therefore, is a shot in the dark by an international community devoid of other ideas, hoping it hits something unexpected.
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