The European Union is making a significant shift in its approach to resource security, preparing to launch a strategic stockpiling program for critical minerals. Amid growing geopolitical tensions and risks, this new EU stockpiling strategy, which the Financial Times first reported on last weekend, signals Brussels’s intent to reduce vulnerabilities in the supply of key raw materials and components, such as rare earths, lithium, and permanent magnets, that are essential for clean energy technologies, digital infrastructure, and defense applications. While the EU is not the first to adopt such measures—Japan, South Korea, and the United States have long maintained national stockpiles—this move underscores a broader securitization of critical mineral supply chains. But while stockpiling may offer short-term resilience, it reflects a largely unilateral response to a broader global challenge. Without stronger multilateral cooperation, such strategies risk exacerbating resource competition and undermining efforts to ensure fair and equitable access to the materials needed for the global energy transition.
Recent tensions between the United States and China over rare-earth exports appear to have eased following a new trade agreement signed last month, but this diplomatic breakthrough offers only temporary relief in an increasingly volatile market. Deeper structural challenges are obvious: the lack of robust international governance and coordination across critical raw material value chains. Earlier episodes underscore the problem. In April, U.S. President Donald Trump pressured Ukraine into a critical minerals deal that would allow the United States access to Ukraine’s mineral resources as a condition for continued military support. Trump also repeatedly made provocative claims about acquiring Greenland (“We need Greenland very badly”), not ruling out using military force, motivated in part by Greenland’s vast untapped mineral resources.
These incidents highlight a growing risk that critical raw materials may be used as instruments of geopolitical leverage, with smaller or resource-rich countries facing pressure to enter into asymmetrical or extractive bilateral agreements that potentially undermine their sovereignty and long-term development goals. To address these issues, the international community should establish a reliable institutional framework to manage risks to countries and supply chains, promote transparency, and ensure equitable access and benefit sharing. Otherwise, such geopolitical flashpoints are likely to recur with increasing frequency and growing stakes.
Currently, no institution exists to coordinate the governance of raw materials globally—even though their systemic importance is only growing. According to the International Resource Panel, a body of scientists and policy experts established by the United Nations Environment Program, resource extraction and use have more than tripled since 1970. By 2060, resource extraction could rise even further by 60 percent from 2020 levels, driving increasing environmental damage, climate change, and geopolitical risks.
The risks of this clear governance gap are increasing tensions among countries over these resources, exploitation of countries in the global south, and, in the absence of commonly adopted standards, environmental impacts from mining explorations. Also, intensifying global competition for critical raw materials is fueling national stockpiling. Uncoordinated stockpiling by multiple countries will trigger a global race for resource hoarding, which in turn leads to market distortions and inflation of prices. It can also fuel distrust and provoke retaliatory policies, such as the imposition of export restrictions or export bans, and also a shift toward zero-sum resource diplomacy.
New ideas and initiatives are emerging to address these challenges. One such proposal, recently put forward by the United Nations University, is the creation of a Global Minerals Trust, a mechanism for collective stockpiling of critical minerals and coordinated, equitable distribution among countries. Colombia has called for a global minerals treaty, driven by the urgent need to combat illegal gold mining and its devastating impact on human health and the environment. These are a bold steps toward addressing one of the most undergoverned aspects of the global economy. However, negotiating such a treaty at the international level poses significant challenges. First, a resolution would need to be passed at December’s UNEA-7, a gathering of the United Nations’ highest environmental decision-making body. Securing agreement among member states to even begin formal negotiations is a political and procedural hurdle, particularly given diverging national interests over resource sovereignty, trade, and development priorities. If a resolution were adopted, the treaty negotiation process would likely span several years, involving protracted discussions over definitions, scope, enforcement mechanisms, and financing—mirroring the complex pathways of other multilateral environmental agreements.
Another option could be a more agile and immediate step: the establishment of an International Materials Agency, formed initially by a coalition of countries. This would probably be a group of middle powers, rather than big players.
Led by the co-chairs of the International Resource Panel, a growing number of international organizations (including the World Business Council for Sustainable Development, Club of Rome, and WWF) and experts have issued a global call to action for improving global materials stewardship and governance through an such an agency. Now the International Energy Agency (IEA) itself has added its voice to growing calls for greater cooperation on the issue of critical minerals. In its latest Global Critical Minerals Outlook, published in May, the IEA warned of growing risks of disruption to mineral supply chains as the market becomes increasingly concentrated instead of becoming more diversified.
This concentration is especially true in refining and processing, despite efforts by the Biden administration and the EU to build refining and processing capacity and invest billions of dollars under programs such as the EU’s Critical Raw Materials Act. Between 2020 and 2024, nearly 90 percent of growth in refined supply came from a handful of dominant suppliers. Indonesia leads in nickel processing, while China dominates the refining of cobalt, graphite, rare earths, and, along with the Democratic Republic of the Congo, copper. As a result, the top three refining countries now hold an average market share of 86 percent, up from 82 percent in 2020.
An International Materials Agency could serve multiple critical functions. At the most basic level, it would offer authoritative data on global material flows, reserves, market trends and prices, and recycling rates. It would also facilitate policy coordination on issues such as sustainable extraction, circular economy integration, and equitable benefit sharing. In addition, the agency could offer dispute resolution and negotiation support for mineral agreements—as seen in recent cases involving the United States and Ukraine and the United States and Congo. Capacity building would be another core function, helping resource-rich countries strengthen their negotiation capabilities. Finally, the agency could play a coordinating role during supply disruptions or geopolitical tensions, such as potential future rare-earth embargoes by China or other key suppliers.
The agency’s global data hub would cover the full range of materials essential for achieving climate and sustainable development goals, with a particular focus on critical minerals. The data hub would enhance transparency across global supply chains and enable the tracking of their environmental and social impacts. Beyond data provision, the agency would promote sustainable material use and circular economy principles by advancing additional core missions such as improving material efficiency and circularity across key sectors such as mining, energy, and construction. It would support enhancing equity and accountability through benefit sharing, fair contracts, and environmental, social, and governance standards. By strengthening global cooperation and policy alignment, fragmented responses and resource nationalism can be avoided.
To fulfill these objectives, the agency’s broader mandates could include setting international technical benchmarks and sustainability standards for extraction, processing, and recycling, as well as providing technical assistance and capacity building to resource-rich countries to strengthen negotiation capacity and environmental oversight. It would act as a neutral platform for dispute resolution and dialogue between governments, companies, and communities impacted by resource extraction activities and support innovation and investment in circular technologies and alternative materials through knowledge exchange and public-private partnerships. In so doing, the agency would align global material governance with environmental integrity, economic development, and geopolitical stability.
There are lessons from recent history of international institutions being established to address geopolitical resource crises. The IEA was established in 1974 in the wake of the 1973 oil shock, which exposed the vulnerability of oil-importing countries to supply shocks and geopolitical disruptions. Created under the framework of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the IEA was designed to foster greater coordination among industrialized nations in responding to energy emergencies and to reduce their collective dependence on OPEC oil. Its founding mandate focused on developing shared energy security strategies, establishing emergency oil-sharing mechanisms, and improving the transparency of energy markets through reliable data and analysis. Over time, the IEA evolved into a leading authority on global energy policy, offering policy advice and an institutional vehicle for cooperation on energy policy. The IEA provides data and forecasts and fosters international cooperation on energy transitions to address climate change. The agency’s creation reflected the realization that fragmented national responses to resource crises were inadequate and that multilateral coordination was essential for both economic stability and geopolitical resilience.
Another example is the International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA), established in 2009 as a response to the growing global recognition of the need to accelerate the deployment of renewable energy technologies to address climate change, energy access, and sustainable development. Unlike the IEA, which was created in response to fossil fuel supply shocks, IRENA was formed to support countries in their transition to renewable energy by providing policy advice, capacity building, technology road maps, and data on renewable energy trends. Its creation marked a shift in global energy governance toward a more inclusive and forward-looking approach focused on decarbonization and equitable energy access.
Some of the challenges for the establishment of an International Materials Agency is that it will require political buy-in from both producing and consuming nations. It also must avoid duplicating existing initiatives and instead foster complementarity. In the way the IEA was established as an OECD initiative, the agency would not need full U.N. endorsement but rather governmental endorsement at a major summit.
Establishing an International Materials Agency will face several implementation challenges, beginning with the need to translate expert proposals into political momentum. The first critical step will be for a group of governments to jointly make a formal political commitment and publicly champion the idea. This would ideally be within multilateral forums such as the G-20 (lead this year by South Africa) or at UNEA-7.
This would need to be followed by the development of a clear mandate and governance structure (balancing the interests of both raw material-producing countries and industrialized countries with corporate technology providers) through inclusive consultations.
A third step would involve securing initial funding and institutional support, potentially from a mix of governments and multilateral banks. This could potentially also come from the philanthropic sector and foundations.
Finally, to build credibility and demonstrate value early on, the agency should focus on a set of targeted coordination functions—such as data harmonization, diplomatic crisis response protocols, or capacity building for mineral-producing countries—while leaving the door open to evolve into a treaty-supporting body over time.
Establishing a new institution may sound challenging, especially at a time when multilateralism is under strain and many countries are retreating from international commitments. Yet such an agency offers the most promising path to align sustainability, resource security, and equity in an increasingly material-intensive global economy. The global race for resources must not become another global risk.
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