Forget the pageantry, the open-top carriage, and the royal welcome in the Windsor sunshine. The state visit to the United Kingdom of French President Emmanuel Macron will be remembered as British Prime Minister Keir Starmer’s “surrender summit.” So declared the Daily Telegraph, a previously sensible Conservative paper, indulging in the standard genuflection of the British media whenever Europe is concerned.
If he had been made aware of the headline, Starmer would have done nothing more than shrug his shoulders. He might have appreciated the alliteration but little else.
The anti-European invective is standard fare for the island nation. Since Brexit, it has become more pronounced than ever—among a certain stratum at least. This vocal and still politically significant minority sees any attempt at a rapprochement with Paris or Berlin or the perfidious institutions of Brussels as selling out, no matter if in policy terms it might be sensible.
Starmer plows on doggedly. It doesn’t matter what he says or what he does, whether he tries to strike bilateral or multilateral deals on migration or science cooperation or anything else: He will be accused of giving away Britain’s sovereignty. Because of this, the wider and long-promised “reset” between Britain and Europe is proceeding at a snail’s pace.
During Macron’s visit, the only issue that seemed to exercise British journalists and politicians was the “small boats”—the unending arrival of asylum-seekers in fragile dinghies across the choppy English Channel. The issue, which first came to public attention during the 2015-16 refugee wave and was regarded as a contributory factor to Brexit, has been likened to a national crisis—even though the numbers are a small proportion of overall immigration.
That is why it was so important for Starmer to get a deal, pretty much any kind of deal, to show that he is extracting concessions from the French. In the first instance, they have agreed on “one in, one out,” which involves the U.K. formally accepting one person and sending another back. But at an initial 50 returns per week, the plan has already been denounced as a mere gesture.
In coming days, Friedrich Merz will arrive in the U.K. for a lower-key working visit, his first to the country since taking over as Germany’s chancellor in May. Yet, in its substance, it is just as significant. Merz and Starmer will sign a wide-ranging Germany-U.K. treaty. It is modeled on the French-U.K. Lancaster House Treaties, signed in 2010 (which came half a century after the Élysée Treaty between France and Germany).
This week’s agreement is expected to contain measures between London and Berlin on tackling illegal migration while announcing new collaborations on research and innovation. It is also set to feature a commitment to promote cross-border exchanges—rebranded as a “youth experience” program to make it sound a little less threatening to those in the U.K. complaining about any reintroduction of free movement by stealth.
The first anniversary of Starmer’s election victory on July 4, 2024, was marked with widespread criticism of his record so far. On the domestic front, he has flip-flopped on welfare reform, caving in to Labour Party MPs angry at proposed cuts. Economically, the government has seemed anything but surefooted and has very limited fiscal rule for future improvements.
All the while, he looks over his shoulder not at the Conservatives, Labour’s traditional adversary, but at the insurgent Reform UK party, led by the far-right Nigel Farage, which is leading the polls.
Each of the three European leaders faces his own challenges at home. Merz is only just getting started but is already being criticized by some in his party for giving away too much to their coalition partners, the Social Democrats, while proposing eye-watering spending increases on defense and public infrastructure. Macron is never far from a crisis. All three face challenges from the far right.
That partly explains why THEY HAVE ALL devoted so much time and energy to international affairs. It helps that they closely agree—on the dangers facing Ukraine, on the need to increase defense spending, and on the colossal unpredictability of U.S. President Donald Trump. They have no idea from one day to the next about Trump’s relationship with Russian President Vladimir Putin (it has gone from a bromance to a fallout but could easily return to warmth); they have no idea if he is committed to NATO. Not to mention the Middle East and other flashpoints.
In the long term, they all realize that Europe will have to defend itself. Their task is to extend that transition point for as long as possible, to keep the Americans present in Europe for as long as possible, and to coordinate as much as possible. They are seeking to revive the E3, a semiformal partnership focusing on defense and security. It is here where Britain can be most helpful and where the most progress has already been made.
The most important part of the Macron-Starmer summit was not—whatever the hysterical headlines—the migration issue but a series of decisions on defense and security. The Declaration on Modernising UK-French Defence and Security Cooperation includes a de facto mutual assistance clause in the case of a threat to either nation. Think of it as a smaller version of the Article 5 mutual defense clause underpinning NATO—an attack on one is an attack on all.
Both countries declared their commitment to coordinate each country’s nuclear deterrents through a steering group—although operationally they remain separate and independent. Dubbing it an “Entente Industrielle,” both leaders vowed to improve the coordination of weapons procurement. They will jointly develop a new cruise missile to replace the Storm Shadow/SCALP and work together on the development of advanced anti-drone weapons.
Expect more of the same this week as Merz visits London. The chancellor has spent his first two months in office crisscrossing Europe affirming Germany’s commitment to spend more on defense to get to the new target of 3.5 percent of GDP on hardware and a further 1.5 percent on critical infrastructure as soon as possible and presenting his country as a much less diffident military player. His public utterances about the Russian invasion of Ukraine have been among the most forthright.
In so doing, Merz is bringing Germany much closer to the U.K. and indeed has made a point of mentioning Britain in speeches relating to the future of Europe, rather than dwelling on the damage wrought by Brexit.
Slowly but surely, as the United States disengages, Starmer is inching the U.K. back into the heart of Europe. But he won’t expect any gratitude back home for doing so.
The post Britain Is Failing to Become European Again appeared first on Foreign Policy.
