“I want to swim in Lake Tiberias,” then-Syrian leader Hafez al-Assad told U.S. President Bill Clinton in March 2000, just months before his death. It was a striking remark during the final stretch of Israeli-Syrian peace talks—negotiations that had once inspired optimism in Washington and Jerusalem. Israel had signaled a willingness to withdraw from the Golan Heights, the strategic plateau it captured in 1967, but balked at allowing Syrian access to Lake Tiberias (also known as the Sea of Galilee). In the end, the talks collapsed.
Now, U.S. President Donald Trump has picked up where Clinton left off, pushing Syria and Israel toward peace negotiations. However, this time, it is not an Assad at the table; it is Ahmed al-Sharaa, the former militant leader whose forces overthrew Bashar al-Assad in December 2024.
But despite the change in leadership, making peace will not be easy. In fact, it may not be possible. Thankfully, this does not rule out limited forms of security cooperation. Today, Syria and Israel can find common ground in confronting shared threats—particularly Hezbollah and other Iranian proxies operating near their borders. Negotiations that prioritize these modest goals over a comprehensive peace agreement will be far more likely to bring tangible results.
The structural realities that doomed earlier negotiations remain in place and have only been compounded by new challenges. For Israelis, the Hamas-led Oct. 7, 2023, massacre has hardened national consensus against ceding any strategic territory. For Syrians, conceding the loss of the Golan—viewed as a symbol of national dignity—remains politically unthinkable.
Fifty-eight years after Syria lost the Golan Heights, it remains etched into the national psyche—not just as a strip of land but as a symbol of loss and identity. For many Syrians, the Golan is a wound that shapes how they see their country. Syrian school curricula have historically framed the Golan as an “Arab Syrian land” seized by Israel while teachers portrayed concepts such as resistance to Israel as noble action. Twelfth grade textbooks even defined modern-day jihad through the lens of resistance in the Golan, casting the struggle to reclaim it as a sacred duty.
The Golan is the most visible obstacle—but not the only one. Sharaa governs a country still reeling from civil war, with fragile institutions and a skeptical public. Israel was already deeply unpopular in Syria, and recent events have only exacerbated the situation. After the fall of the Assad regime, Israel launched an aerial and ground campaign to destroy Assad’s military infrastructure and sent troops into southern Syria, taking up positions in and beyond the demilitarized zone established after the 1973 Arab-Israeli war. Ordinary Syrians have also watched images of the Gaza war play out on television for the last year and a half, further complicating Sharaa’s ability to pursue any negotiations.
Against this backdrop, even symbolic gestures toward peace risk blowback from citizens and jihadi groups alike. As a result, the hurdles to an Israeli-Syrian normalization agreement outweigh the incentives for Sharaa.
And even if Sharaa were willing to compromise on the Golan and pursue a peace treaty in exchange for incentives—such as expanded sanctions relief or guaranteed foreign investment— a fractured state limits his ability to deliver a deal.
This stands in stark contrast to the relative strength of other regimes that have made peace with Israel. Egypt’s Anwar Sadat and Jordan’s King Hussein were able to not only sign peace agreements but ensure their continuation. As Jacob Abadi of the U.S. Air Force Academy noted, “In order to suppress the opposition to the separate treaty … the King [Hussein] had to take a personal lead in the campaign and show the Jordanian public that this ‘was the King’s peace.’” Similarly, Sadat used sweeping arrests in 1981 to neutralize dissent against the Camp David Accords.
Sharaa, by comparison, has only been in power for six months, and while he governs the majority of Syria, much remains beyond his control. He does not have the institutional depth or coercive capacity to enforce such a controversial decision. Syria’s post-Assad institutions remain brittle, and his ruling coalition includes factions that, while currently loyal, could oppose him if he moves toward normalization with Israel.
Some of the foreign fighters who helped Sharaa oust Assad are already turning against him. Their anger stems not only from his refusal to impose strict Islamic law but also from claims that he has cooperated with the United States to target extremist factions. These fighters, many of whom hold rigid ideological beliefs, have condemned Sharaa’s new government as “un-Islamic” and criticized its outreach to Western officials. Adding to this tension, figures within his own group, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS)—including Mazhar al-Wais, Sharaa’s own justice minister—have publicly praised the Oct. 7 massacre and referred to Hamas fighters as “mujahideen of justice and jihad.” HTS’s political office also declared unwavering support for the “Palestinian people to reclaim their land.” While these statements were made before they officially assumed power, they suggest that key members of Sharaa’s government remain deeply hostile to Israel and could seriously obstruct any attempt to strike a deal.
When all these factors are weighed up, a complete peace agreement between Israel and Syria is out of reach—for now. That is why the United States should broker a security-first framework that reduces tensions and builds trust. It must also avoid pushing Sharaa into politically damaging concessions.
Already, Syrian officials have sought to alleviate Israel’s concerns over the new leadership. Sharaa stated in December that he would “seek no conflict, whether with Israel or anyone else, and we will not allow Syria to be used as a base for such hostilities.” Damascus Gov. Maher Marwan has also signaled that the new administration is not fearful of Israel and does not want to endanger its security.
Negotiations should build on this to advance further security-related measures. As a first step, Damascus should be asked to expel all Palestinian factions and leaders who have operated on Syrian soil since the days of Hafez al-Assad and seize the properties they have accumulated. So far, Damascus has only established a monitoring mechanism and selectively targeted pro-Assad Palestinian groups.
Second, Syria should coordinate with Israel to dismantle Iran-backed militias entrenched in the south, such as the so-called Islamic Resistance Front in Syria.
Most crucially, there is room for intelligence cooperation against Hezbollah. Despite the fall of the Assad regime, Hezbollah may still attempt to use Syria as a weapons corridor from Iran to Lebanon. With Israel’s intelligence capabilities and Syria’s goal of curbing Hezbollah’s activities in its territory, both sides have a shared interest in sealing off this supply line.
In the end, a full-scale normalization deal between Syria and Israel—on the model of the Abraham Accords—is unrealistic in the short term and should not be rushed. Pushing for a rapid breakthrough could backfire, overwhelming Sharaa and prompting him to abandon the process entirely. Instead, Washington should champion a gradual, phased approach.
At the same time, the United States should reassure Israel that these initial steps are not an end in themselves but a pathway toward eventual full normalization—a goal that Israeli officials have emphasized in recent weeks. For Sharaa, a slower pace offers more breathing room. He understands that rushing the process could destabilize his fragile grip on power. However, if given time to demonstrate stability, the likelihood that Sharaa and Syrians will embrace normalization will grow.
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