A decade ago, Russia seemed to be having its moment in the Middle East. But from today’s perspective, that moment appears distinctly momentary. To the surprise of many, Moscow did not step in to prevent the downfall of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad in December 2024. Now, Russian President Vladimir Putin has been careful to appear neutral in the punch-up between Israel and Iran, offering his services as a peacemaker rather than concrete support for Tehran.
Putin’s choice to do so is driven by weakness. When the chips are down, Russia has neither the will nor the capacity to intervene in Middle Eastern power politics. Yet the decision to steer clear also reflects Moscow’s conflicting motives. Russia’s interests require it to navigate a complex set of relationships with regional players, including Iran’s adversaries and competitors.
After invading Ukraine in 2022, Russia dramatically improved its relations with Iran. The motive was pragmatic, and Moscow needed Tehran much more than the other way around. Iranians supplied Russia with the Shahed drones and related technology that it used to pummel Ukrainian cities and infrastructure. Iran also shared tested tips for evading Western sanctions, enabling Moscow’s “ghost fleet” of oil tankers to learn from Iran’s experience. The two countries also started beefing up rail and port infrastructure in order to strengthen a north-south trade route through Eurasia.
Russia also secured other indirect benefits from its relationship with Tehran. Iran’s support for Hamas and Hezbollah paved the way to the Oct. 7, 2023, attacks against Israel and the ensuing regional conflict. Surging violence in the Middle East diverted international attention away from Ukraine, created bad blood between the West and large parts of the global south, and injected tension into the United States’ domestic politics ahead of a critical presidential election. What’s more, instability in the Middle East usually drives up oil prices, which is always good news for the Russian Federation’s budget.
But Russia has also repaid Iran’s support. In the immediate aftermath of Oct. 7, Russia’s response leaned further toward the anti-Israel coalition than it might have otherwise. A Hamas delegation arrived in Moscow later in October, ostensibly to negotiate the release of hostages holding Russian citizenship. In January 2024, a Houthi delegation met with Russia’s Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Bogdanov. And U.S. intelligence has indicated that Russia’s military intelligence agency, the GRU, was reportedly helping the Yemeni militia attack Western ships transiting the Red Sea.
More to the point, Putin expressed support for Iran as it came under direct fire from Israel. He reached out to Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei to urge restraint following the Israeli strike that killed Hamas political leader Ismail Haniyeh in August 2024. And unlike today, he did not call Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. Then, while Israel was trying to appear neutral in the Russia-Ukraine war, Moscow signed a security partnership with Tehran in January 2025.
Yet Russia’s reaction to the latest round of Iran-Israel fighting shows that its friendship with Tehran has never been of the “no limits” variety. To start with, documents affirming the two countries’ ties are still ridden with vague, aspirational phrases. In the five months since signing a security partnership with Tehran, Russia did not deliver any meaningful military assistance, such as air defense missile systems to use against Israeli jets. The advanced Su-35 fighters that Tehran purchased in 2023 have not been transferred yet, leaving Iran to rely on U.S. planes purchased in the 1970s.
Moscow’s stance reflects a deeper ambivalence toward Iran. Sure, Putin has condemned the Israeli strikes and accused the United States of “bringing the world to a very dangerous point” with its own attacks. And the prospect of a regime change in Tehran is truly troubling for the Kremlin, given its die-hard rejection of interventionist crusades. But then again, a nuclear Iran is not in Russia’s interest either, as demonstrated by Moscow’s support for U.N. Security Council sanctions against Iran in 2010. Tehran’s utility as an ally is receding as well. After all, Shaheds are now manufactured in Russia, complete with key upgrades such as jet engines and Starlink-enabled navigation components.
Russia’s decision to essentially sit out the Israel-Iran war may seem surprising in light of its recent ties with Iran, but it fits with Moscow’s historical behavior in the region. Ever since it intervened in Syria in 2015, Russian forces and their anti-aircraft missiles have stood by while Israel hit Hezbollah and other Iranian proxy assets. A Russian plane did get shot over Latakia during an Israeli raid in September 2018—but that was an accident caused by Assad’s air defenses. Moscow’s policy was to leverage its newly acquired position in Syria in order to engage Iran’s rivals, including Turkey; Saudi Arabia; and also, to a lesser degree, Israel.
The Kremlin certainly rolled the dice when it chose to deploy troops to Syria. But subsequently, in trying to cash in diplomatically, it crafted a relatively balanced approach. Moscow sought to circumvent local rivalries by talking to all regional stakeholders: Iran and Israel, Assad and the Syrian opposition, and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), to name a just few. Now, after its wartime pivot toward Iran, Russia is seeking to restore this equilibrium.
If Moscow is ambivalent toward Tehran, then Russia’s leadership and society at large have a love-hate relationship with Israel. The propaganda emanating from Moscow often paints Israel as an extension of the U.S. hegemony. What’s more, antisemitism has deep roots in history and society across Eastern Europe, and certainly in Russia.
But these attitudes coexist with a deep Israel-philia—sometimes concealed but often very much explicit. Many Russians admire Israel’s muscular foreign policy and penchant to deploy military force to create faits accomplis in defiance of international rebuke. Russian ultranationalists on Telegram praise Israel’s military prowess and argue that, had it not been for the country’s corrupt elite, Russia could have showed the same strength. Finally, the presence of a large Russian diaspora in Israel creates a strong bond between the two countries.
Recently, Putin declared that “almost 2 million people from the former Soviet Union and the Russian Federation live in Israel. Today, it is almost a Russian-speaking country.” The rhetoric may be extravagant, but the sentiment is real.
Russia’s course ultimately reflects its own limited clout in the Middle East. As much as it envies Washington, Moscow is in no position replace the United States as a linchpin of the regional order. Nor will it ever have as much skin in the game as local states. Russia’s priority remains subjugating Ukraine and maintaining primacy in the post-Soviet space. This leaves it both opportunistic and somewhat risk averse in the Middle East.
As a result, Russia will continue to do business with all regional players, Israel included. The Iranian leadership knows this all too well.
The post Why Russia Is Sitting Out This Round of the Israel-Iran Conflict appeared first on Foreign Policy.
