For all its destructiveness, U.S. involvement in Israel’s war on Iran so far has been limited. U.S. President Donald Trump announced on Saturday that the United States had bombed several nuclear sites across the country, with the main target being Fordow, the underground facility that houses—or perhaps housed—many of the most important components of Iran’s nuclear program. Trump stated that the goal of the strikes was the “destruction of Iran’s nuclear enrichment capacity.” The attack complements Israel’s destruction of many other, less hardened nuclear sites in Iran and its assassination campaign against Iranian military leaders and nuclear scientists.
While the president basks in the apparent success of the strikes, it is important to anticipate—and guard against—how the war could go south.
Given the limited U.S. role so far, the first area of concern is that the current U.S. and Israeli strikes simply do not do enough damage to Iran’s nuclear program to make the war worth it—with all its attendant cost, destruction, and risk. Trump claims that Iran’s program was “completely and totally obliterated,” and post-strike battle damage assessments may soon confirm this. However, more lasting destruction may require additional strikes at Fordow or other sites.
A more likely mistake would be the opposite risk—trying to do too much with too little. In particular, the United States should not dramatically expand the goals of the campaign and seek regime change, a goal Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has implicitly endorsed but Trump, so far, has not. Trump’s focus on destroying Iran’s nuclear capacity is a limited goal, in keeping with the current means to achieve it.
To be clear, the end of the Iranian regime would be a good thing in the abstract. Tehran’s support for terrorism, hostility to the United States and Israel, and efforts to subvert U.S. Arab allies in the Middle East all make Iran a dangerous foe. The regime’s abysmal human rights record also means its end would be good for the people of Iran.
Regime change, however, is a can of worms. There is no strong Iranian opposition to take the reins. It is not clear if a new regime would give way to a true democracy, a military dictatorship, or something else—or perhaps absolute chaos, as we saw in Iraq post-Saddam Hussein, Libya post-Muammar al-Qaddafi, and other countries in the Middle East. The ability of outsiders to shape regime change is limited at best and is more likely to backfire than succeed. A U.S. embrace of the policy would implicate the United States in whatever comes next. Trying to ensure regime change occurs in a way that favors U.S. interests would require far more resources, including ground troops—and even then it could easily fail.
It is possible, moreover, that regime change might come on its own, and the United States should welcome that. The clerical regime is on its knees: Its weak response to the Israeli and U.S. strikes is a particular embarrassment for a government that prided itself on taking on the United States and Israel. This humiliation is on top of its miserable economic performance, corruption, and sclerotic authoritarianism.
So, consider regime change a lucky bonus should it happen, not a goal of military operations.
Another mistake would be to underestimate Iran. It is not clear how the regime will respond to the U.S. strikes, both now and in the future. Iran cannot match Israel blow for blow, let alone the United States, and Tehran has long had a healthy respect for U.S. military power. So it is possible the regime will hunker down, trying to withstand U.S. and Israeli blows, and seek a deal, although for now Tehran is emphasizing defiance, not diplomacy.
Yet a mix of misperception, paranoia, politics, and desire for revenge that likely characterizes the Iranian leadership right now might make such a rational approach unlikely, and the United States should prepare for the worst. Before the U.S. attack, Iran’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, already warned that there would be “irreparable damage” in response. When the United States assassinated the leader of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ elite Quds Force in 2020, Iranian-backed groups attacked U.S. bases in Iraq with missiles. Bombing Iran itself, of course, is a significant step up from killing one commander, and U.S. forces and personnel in Iraq, as well as elsewhere in the Middle East, could come under fire.
The good news is that Iran’s largest proxy groups in the region, Hezbollah and Hamas, are lying low. Israel has devastated both groups since the Oct. 7, 2023, Hamas attack on Israel, and they are not eager to take on the United States even if they have some spare capacity. Tehran, however, has long funded proxy groups in part as a counter to U.S. and Israeli influence, and at least some might respond should Tehran call.
Tehran is one of the world’s leading state sponsors of terrorism, and strikes beyond the region are also a risk. Iran, working with Hezbollah, has attacked U.S., Jewish, and Israeli targets (Iran claims there is no difference between the latter two) in Argentina, Bulgaria, Saudi Arabia, and other countries. Tehran has also struck against U.S. Arab allies. Iran’s use of terrorism has usually backfired strategically, uniting countries against Iran. But it is also a way, perhaps the only way, Iran can make its enemies pay a price. This would be a form of revenge and, from Tehran’s point of view, a way to bolster its deterrent. Although Iran would surely suffer reprisals if it carried out an attack, the death of Americans could, over time, turn popular opinion in the United States against the war.
The most extreme response, and perhaps most counterproductive for Iran, would be to try to cut the flow of oil from the Persian Gulf. Iran’s own oil shipments would be disrupted, and Arab and European states that are currently calling for de-escalation would unite against Iran. The United States, moreover, has long prepared for this contingency and would respond harshly.
Some of the biggest risks concern the long-term impact on Iran’s nuclear program. Tehran might humble itself and accept severe limits to any nuclear enrichment or otherwise ostensibly agree to U.S. terms but expand its clandestine nuclear program. After Israel bombed Iraq’s nuclear reactor at Osirak in 1981, Baghdad threw resources at its nuclear program and came near to building a nuclear weapon. Iranian leaders might conclude in hindsight that their mistake was not crossing the line from nuclear program to nuclear weapon and, in the future, go full steam ahead.
The good news is that Israel has shown it has excellent intelligence on Iran, and it is probable that at least some future weaponization efforts would be detected. However, Iranian counterintelligence might improve, Russia might step up nuclear aid for Iran, or politics in the United States and Israel might change, any of which could make stopping Iranian violations of any deal difficult.
Much depends on the deal that Trump supposedly seeks from Iran. When announcing the strikes, the president declared, “NOW IS THE TIME FOR PEACE!” But peace on what terms? Any deal should not only stop future enrichment but also include extensive monitoring provisions and punishments for violations. Any deal should also bring in U.S. regional allies. They are anti-Iran and probably delighted by the destruction of its nuclear program and the death of many senior Iranian military commanders, but they have to continue living alongside Iran and, as such, seek stability. Bringing them on board would make any deal stronger.
If Iran appears weak, as it does now, it will be tempting for U.S. policymakers to expand their goals to address all forms of noxious Iranian behavior, including human rights and support for proxies. The challenge for the United States will be to walk the line between opportunism and caution, recognizing that the more ambitious the goals, the more troops and resources the United States would need to commit to the war to ensure its success.
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