When Israel attacked Hezbollah last September with exploding beepers and a broad assassination campaign, one thing that dictated the timing was Israel’s concern that the group was about to discover that its communication gear had been boobytrapped—part of a complex intelligence operation that took years, or even decades, to plan. Israeli leaders decided to strike hard rather than risk losing the capability.
A similar consideration might have been at play in the timing of Israel’s decision to go to war against Iran last week. Tehran was not about to field a nuclear weapon. For the last few years, it had been a few months away from developing a nuclear weapon, and U.S. officials did not see any significant change in the Iranian program, much less a decision to weaponize. But Israel had managed by last week to put in place a remarkable intelligence and covert military operation, placing drones inside Iran that could be used to strike strategic assets and pinpointing the location of key regime figures. The concern about losing that capability was perhaps one of the factors that led Israel to launch its attack when it did.
It wasn’t the only factor. A mix of genuine strategic concerns, tactical opportunism, domestic politics, and a different Israeli mindset toward security all played a part.
Let’s start with Israel’s view of Iran’s nuclear program. Israel sees an Iranian nuclear weapon as an existential threat. It opposed the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), which the Obama administration and Iran agreed to in 2015, because it allowed continued low-level Iranian nuclear activity, left open a possible pathway to a bomb, and did nothing about Iran’s missile program and support for various militant groups in the Middle East. Since the first Trump administration abandoned the JCPOA in 2018, Tehran has ratcheted up its nuclear activities. Iran has steadily increased its uranium enrichment, going from the 3.67 percent permitted under the JCPOA to 60 percent. From that level, it is easy to go to the 90 percent needed for weapons-grade uranium. In 2024, the Biden administration estimated Iran’s breakout time at one to two weeks. Shortly before the Israeli strike, the International Atomic Energy Agency found that Iran was in breach of its nuclear obligations because it was not providing full information on its nuclear activities. This mix of noncompliance and close-to-the-line activities meant that the world might only discover an Iranian nuclear weapon when it was too late.
Israel is less willing to take that chance than in the past, and changing risk calculations are a second factor. More than a decade ago, Israel threatened military action against Iran’s program, but the United States dissuaded it. But since the Oct. 7, 2023, Hamas attack, Israel has far less faith in deterrence. Oct. 7 blindsided Israel and led to a different strategic approach in the region. These days, the country seeks to destroy its opponents’ capabilities rather than rely on changing their intentions. Many Israelis describe Iran as the ultimate villain responsible for Oct. 7, given its support for Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Houthis. In their view, security, as well as justice, depends on devastating Iran.
Third, Iran is less able to respond effectively to Israeli strikes, reducing the cost and the risk for Israel. Before Oct. 7, Iran relied on the threat of its rocket, missile, and drone arsenal and the power of Hezbollah and other proxies to threaten its enemies. Israel took down Hezbollah in its devastating military and intelligence campaign last year, and the April and October 2024 Iranian missile attacks largely fizzled. Iran has hit Israel with missiles successfully in recent days, killing around 24 Israelis so far, but this cost appears to be acceptable for Israel and amounts to around a tenth of the fatalities that it is inflicting on Iran.
The fourth and fifth reasons concern the United States. U.S. talks with Iran over its nuclear program appeared to had made progress before the latest Israeli strikes, although the emerging deal looked suspiciously like the JCPOA. Israel has long opposed any deal that would allow continued Iranian enrichment, even at very low levels. The attacks, of course, have both set back Iran’s program and blown up the negotiations. This is especially so given U.S. President Donald Trump’s claim that he “knew everything” about the strikes in advance, which bolsters the perception in Iran that the United States was negotiating in bad faith as a cover for Israeli military action.
Even as the United States pursued negotiations, Israel could reason that it was unlikely that Washington would punish it for attacking Iran or otherwise oppose the operation. The United States did veto an Israeli proposal to kill Iran’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, but at the same time, it is not currently putting pressure on Israel to end military operations even though they have disrupted negotiations. In addition, the United States is helping Israel with air defense against Iranian missiles and stepping up threats against Tehran. While not exactly a green light, this is a de facto yellow light.
Finally, there are Israel’s contentious domestic politics, which shape almost every Israeli foreign-policy decision. Shortly before the strike, some members of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s coalition joined in an unsuccessful vote of no confidence, suggesting that his coalition was increasingly shaky. Israel, exhausted by almost two years of waging war in Gaza, is also divided over drafting members of the ultra-Orthodox community, an issue that puts pressure on Netanyahu politically given their parties’ presence in his coalition.
More broadly, Netanyahu is trying to win the battle of narratives. His critics, and there are many, argue that he bears ultimate responsibility for Israel’s Oct. 7 failures, perhaps the worst surprise attack in Israeli history. Israel’s other massive intelligence failure, when Egypt and Syria launched a surprise attack on Israel in 1973, eventually led Prime Minister Golda Meir to resign less than a year later.
Netanyahu, however, is putting forth a counternarrative: that he is the Israeli leader who settled all family business. Hamas and Gaza are devastated. Hezbollah is a shell of its former self. And now Iran, the big bad, is being taken down. This is a powerful message for Israelis who are scared and angry after Oct. 7.
Taken together, these factors reveal that Israel’s strike was less a reaction to a discrete Iranian move than a calculated effort to change the playing field to make it more favorable to Israel—and to help Netanyahu’s political position in the process. Whether Israel’s gamble succeeds will hinge on Iran’s capacity to regenerate its nuclear and proxy capabilities faster than Israel can erode them, or Washington’s ability to manage escalation, and on Israeli society’s appetite for prolonged confrontation. For now, Israel has chosen preemption over patience, staking its security and political coherence on the claim that tomorrow’s risks demanded action today.
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