If there were any truth to the running joke—or conspiracy theory—that the NBA rigs games so that big-market teams like the Los Angeles Lakers end up in the NBA Finals, then this year’s matchup between the Oklahoma City Thunder and the Indiana Pacers would be disastrous for the league. In reality, NBA owners have gotten exactly what they wanted.
Although television ratings are down, the NBA’s plan to bring more parity to the league is working. Two years ago, owners and players signed a new collective-bargaining agreement designed to give more teams, especially those in small markets, a chance at competing for a championship. Under the new CBA, the owners made it more difficult for any individual team to load up with multiple superstars and to keep championship-winning rosters together year after year.
This is a sharp departure from most of NBA history. The league had built itself into a juggernaut on the success of big-market teams, traditional dynasties, and superstars who are household names. Parity? That was for the NFL. In the NBA’s 79-year existence, the Lakers and Celtics have won 35 championships combined. Golden State has won seven titles, including four during a seven-year span. The Michael Jordan–led Bulls ruled the 1990s by three-peating twice. And the San Antonio Spurs have won five.
The late 2000s brought on the super-team era. Ray Allen and Kevin Garnett teamed up with Paul Pierce in Boston to deliver the Celtics a title in 2008. In 2010, LeBron James and Chris Bosh, then free agents, decided to join Dwyane Wade’s Miami Heat. That team went to four straight NBA Finals, winning two of them. James’s orchestrating his and Bosh’s move to Miami created lasting animosity among NBA owners, who resented the amount of power that superstar players had begun to exercise. Small-market teams, in particular, felt that they were at a permanent disadvantage when it came to attracting top-tier players. Perhaps that was front of mind during the latest CBA negotiations. Welcome to the age of parity in the NBA.
Under the current CBA, loading up on superstars doesn’t look nearly as attractive as it used to. The culprit is something called the “second apron,” a spending limit that triggers severe punishment for a team that crosses it, on top of existing luxury taxes. For example, a team that pays its players more than the second-apron threshold can lose the ability to trade future first-round draft picks. If they remain over the second apron for two of the following four years, their upcoming draft position is automatically moved to the end of the first round.
These new rules explain why many experts think that Boston, which won the championship last year and seemed poised to establish yet another Celtics dynasty, will make significant changes to its roster this offseason. Between salaries and the luxury tax, the Celtics are looking at a payroll that will exceed $460 million for the 2025–26 season. Its star-packed roster is just too expensive to maintain.
“I think it’s a new blueprint for the league,” the Indiana Pacers center Myles Turner told the media after the Pacers eliminated the big-market New York Knicks from the playoffs. “I think the years of the super-teams and stacking, it’s not as effective as it once was.”
To Turner’s point, the most consequential player in this year’s NBA Finals isn’t Oklahoma City’s Shai Gilgeous-Alexander or the Indiana star Tyrese Haliburton. It’s Paul George, a nine-time All-Star who is currently a member of the Philadelphia 76ers, the team that finished this season with the fifth-worst record in the league.
Both the Pacers and the Thunder were able to construct championship-caliber teams by trading George, who spent seven years with the Pacers and two with Oklahoma City. In 2017, the Pacers traded George to Oklahoma City for Victor Oladipo and Domantas Sabonis. The Pacers eventually flipped Sabonis for Haliburton, who was previously with the Sacramento Kings and is now Indiana’s best player. Meanwhile, the Thunder traded George to the Los Angeles Clippers, who were trying to create their own super-team featuring George and Kawhi Leonard. The Thunder got Gilgeous-Alexander, now the reigning league MVP, plus a trove of draft picks that they have used to select other excellent players. Both teams turned a big-name player into assets that reshaped their rosters, focusing more on depth, youth, and versatility than building a superstar-heavy team.
Another factor pushing in the direction of parity is the rise of international talent. Not too long ago, foreign-born stars were an oddity in the NBA. No longer. On opening night of this season, the league had a record-tying 125 international players on its rosters. The past seven MVP awards have gone to foreign-born players. (Gilgeous-Alexander is Canadian.) The result of adding so much talent without expanding the league is that more teams than ever have world-class players on their rosters, making it harder for any one franchise to consistently dominate.
The downside is that there may be some years where the Finals don’t have their usual buzz. The owners wanted a more equitable league in which small markets have a better shot at competing and superstars have slightly less power to cosplay as general managers. Regardless of who wins the title this season, for the owners, that might be a fair trade. That’s something that doesn’t often happen in the NBA.
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