China on Tuesday accused of “pouring oil” on the conflict as the raged for a fifth straight day.
“Making threats and mounting pressure will not help to promote the de-escalation of the situation, but will only intensify and widen the conflict,” Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokesman Guo Jiakun said in Beijing.
He was referring to a social media post by Trump before he left for the , in which the US president wrote: “I said it over and over again! Everyone should immediately evacuate Tehran!”
Guo said China was calling on all sides concerned — “especially those countries with particular influence over Israel” — to take immediate measures to calm the tense situation.
While the US is Israel’s strongest ally, Beijing and Tehran share close ties.
In a DW interview, William Figueroa, an international relations expert focusing on China-Middle East relations at University of Groningen, talks about how China sees the conflict, and what role Beijing could play to defuse the tensions.
DW: How do you see China’s stance on the ongoing conflict between Iran and Israel?
William Figueroa: China’s reaction closely mirrors its stance on the . Essentially, China tends to focus on two main points: first, it largely places the blame on Israel, and second, it consistently calls for dialogue, negotiation, and de-escalation, rather than resorting to military action or coercive diplomacy.
As the situation evolved, China’s position continued to emphasize Iran’s right to retaliate and defend itself, particularly in response to Israeli attacks. China’s objections have primarily been framed around the issue of sovereignty.
Would you say China hasn’t been so far actively involved in the situation?
No, nor does China see this as an arena where it can exercise influence — Chinese state media are barely covering this issue.
I believe this position reflects China’s fundamental limitations in this arena. Simply put, China does not have a significant role in this conflict. It lacks the capability for power projection in the region and is not a key player in the traditional security sense.
China’s real competitive advantage in the Middle East lies in its economic relationships and, occasionally, in its ability to serve as a diplomatic bridge.
However, in this specific conflict, Iran and Israel are not short of communication channels — they are simply unwilling to talk. This leaves China with very little room to maneuver diplomatically.
Additionally, given the relatively limited exposure, I don’t think China has any appetite to involve itself directly in this conflict, even if it had the capacity to do so, especially when an action carries high costs and offers little benefit.
China has actively engaged in Middle East affairs in recent years, most notably facilitating the Saudi-Iran reconciliation. Do you think China will attempt to mediate in the Iran-Israel conflict as well?
I believe China will maintain its current approach, which is to stay open to regionally initiated efforts. that are generated from within the region itself. It does encourage diplomatic engagement, but China does not have the tools nor the diplomatic style to apply pressure in the way that, for example, the United States might.
To put it simply: — it involved low cost and high political reward. Any involvement in the Iran-Israel conflict would be the opposite: very high cost and very low potential gain. I do not believe China has the ability or the incentive to pursue such a role.
Given China’s reliance on Middle Eastern oil, do you think the current situation poses a threat to China’s energy security?
The situation does pose some risk to China’s energy security, and Chinese leaders are certainly aware of that. This is part of the reason why they want the conflict to de-escalate quickly.
However, I would not characterize it as a major threat.
Currently, surpassing Iran. China also has substantial domestic oil reserves. So, while losing access to Iranian oil would affect supply, it would not create a critical shortage.
Iran accounts for roughly 10% of China’s total oil imports. Additionally, China sources oil from countries like Brazil and Saudi Arabia. I believe Saudi Arabia is relatively insulated from this particular conflict. If Iran were to attack Saudi Arabia or significantly involve it in the conflict, it would provoke a much stronger response from the United States. Such an escalation would be very costly for Iran, making it an unlikely scenario.
China is the biggest buyer of Iranian oil and its largest trade partner. Could this economic relationship give Beijing meaningful influence over Iran?
Generally speaking, no. I think this has been demonstrated quite clearly. For example, when Iran-backed groups attacked Israeli shipping in the Red Sea, there were calls for China to use its influence over Iran to prevent further escalation. Either China chose not to act, or they were not able to.
Fundamentally, I don’t believe it’s in China’s interest to weaponize its economic relationships. China is unlikely to say to Iran, “If you don’t do what we want, we will cancel our deals.”
China might consider such tactics in situations where its core national interests are involved — such as matters concerning Taiwan — but not over what it considers to be regional or domestic issues in the Middle East.
Even if China had significant leverage over Iran, it would be very difficult to resolve this particular issue. No country is going to persuade Iran to abandon its civilian nuclear program, and China does not even support that objective. Beijing believes Iran has the right to civilian nuclear energy.
If the Iran-Israel conflict drags on, there is a possibility that the US could be drawn more deeply into it. Would such US entanglement be seen as a strategic advantage for China?
Yes, I believe that would generally be seen as beneficial to China. In fact, this is a frequent point made by both mainstream scholars and popular commentators in China. They often argue that America’s continued military entanglement in the Middle East drains US resources, time, and strategic attention.
This is precisely why many Chinese analysts advocate for China to avoid similar military commitments and instead continue focusing on its strengths — economic development, investment, and initiatives like the .
Even American politicians are debating this issue. Some in Congress argue that the US should prioritize competition with China in the Pacific rather than becoming further involved in the Middle East. From China’s perspective, further US entanglement in Middle Eastern conflicts would likely be viewed as strategically advantageous.
Given China’s growing alignment with non-Western powers, do you see it moving more aggressively toward anti-Western positions in conflicts like this?
There’s sometimes a misconception that China will automatically align itself with an anti-Western bloc in opposition to US-backed policies. In reality, while China is diplomatically, emotionally, and perhaps ideologically supportive of the Palestinian cause, when it comes to practical influence and the willingness to incur costs to shift outcomes, China is like most other countries, and it is willing to do very little.
If the Iranian regime were to collapse, would China quietly welcome the power vacuum?
I don’t think China would welcome such a scenario. China generally opposes power vacuums and chaotic transitions. China has had no significant issues dealing with the Islamic Republic and would actually prefer that the international community normalize relations with Iran.
Historically, China has acted with caution in these situations. For example, in 1979, as Iran’s monarchy was collapsing. China’s past behavior suggests that in the event of regime collapse, it would adopt a wait-and-see approach, preferring to work with whoever emerges as the next stable authority.
The interview was conducted by Jinhan Li. It has been edited for length and clarity.
Edited by: Srinivas Mazumdaru
The post Iran-Israel conflict: ‘China has no appetite to be involved’ appeared first on Deutsche Welle.
