As Washington debates its role in the escalating conflict between Israel and Iran, U.S. policymakers will be forced to choose between two competing visions for the Middle East. In recent years, Arab countries have increasingly sought to integrate Iran into the region rather than confront it. Israel, by contrast, believes it cannot accept a regionally integrated Iran. With these rival goals in mind, America’s Gulf allies are hoping Washington will help de-escalate the conflict, while Israel is hoping Washington will join its fight against the Islamic regime.
Well before Israel’s unprecedented June 13 attack on Iran, a push for regional integration was already underway. It is difficult to pinpoint an exact date marking the start of this journey. One momentous event, however, stands out: the Sept. 14, 2019, attack on Saudi oil facilities at Abqaiq and Khurais. Claimed by the Iran-backed Houthi militia, the attack disrupted around 50 percent of Saudi oil production. More importantly, the U.S. non-response to the strike served as a watershed moment for the Gulf. Many came to believe they were in the crosshairs of a burgeoning U.S.-Iran conflict but could not rely on the United States to protect them in the event of a major Iranian attack.
This belief drove a process that led Saudi Arabia and Iran to reestablish ties on March 10, 2023. Warming relations advanced slowly but persisted even after Oct. 7, 2023, and despite concerns over Iran’s support for regional proxies.
Indeed, Gulf rapprochement with Iran appeared to accelerate as Israel-Iran tensions deepened. Just one month after the first direct military confrontation between Iran and Israel, the Saudi foreign minister—along with the Qatari emir, Emirati foreign minister, and other key Arab dignitaries—attended the funeral of the Iranian president who died in a helicopter crash. Then, Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi visited Saudi Arabia on Oct. 9, 2024, following Iran’s second direct attack on Israel earlier that month. Also in October, Saudi Arabia and Iran conducted their first-ever joint naval exercises. Even Bahrain—despite its long-standing tensions with Iran—moved to restore relations. Most recently, the Saudi defense minister visited Tehran in April. Discussions last month with Gulf strategists suggest that the talks focused on insulating ongoing U.S.-Iran nuclear talks from an anticipated effort by Israel to derail the negotiations.
More broadly, the Gulf’s drive for a new order in the region has prioritized de-escalation, growth, and diversification at home while building deeper economic ties across the region and globally. Quelling potential conflict with Iran and deepening Iranian engagement—if not integration—are at the core of this Gulf vision. With these goals in mind, Gulf leaders believed that three years of rapprochement with Iran yielded more benefit than 30 years of isolation.
A renewed U.S.-Iran nuclear deal was a critical element to this approach. Before last week’s attacks, Gulf interlocutors were focused on ensuring the negotiations’ success. In Oman last month, analysts suggested that Iran could propose an ambitious agenda as part of a successful deal that would include major economic agreements and investment opportunities for the United States. President Donald Trump’s trip to the region further heightened optimism that a deal could be reached that would herald a new era for the region.
These hopes and calculations were behind the Gulf’s strong criticism of Israel following the June 13 attacks. Notably, Saudi Arabia issued a particularly pointed condemnation, referring to Israel’s “heinous” attack on “the brotherly Islamic Republic of Iran.” Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, and Oman, among others, also condemned Israel’s actions. These denunciations stand in marked contrast to previous confrontation with Iran, when Gulf countries were among the most vocal in urging the United States to “cut off the head of the snake” and destroy Iran’s nuclear facilities.
At the same time, Gulf countries are wary of being caught in the crossfire of a widening conflict between Israel and Iran. Worries are mounting that attacks on Iran’s energy infrastructure will provoke serious consequences for the region and could even threaten Gulf waters should they lead to oil spills. There is also a fear that the United States could be drawn into the fight, potentially provoking Iran to strike U.S. targets in the Gulf. For now, Iran has avoided Gulf targets in order to preserve its deepening ties with the region, but this could change.
As a result, the Gulf is urgently calling for a diplomatic solution. Driven by their economic growth imperatives, Gulf stakeholders will seek to prevent the conflict’s spread and will look for ways to move ahead with their preferred order. Going forward, traditional mediators such as Oman—and now perhaps Saudi Arabia—will look to develop creative off-ramps for both sides, possibly leveraging the UAE’s quiet ties to Israel as a back channel. Such efforts will intensify as the conflict grows more acute.
The current war has brought the tension between the Gulf’s vision for the region and Israel’s to a head. In Israel’s view, the Israel Defense Forces is building on its successes in decimating Hezbollah, facilitating the collapse of Syria’s Assad regime, and opening the way for a new era in both Lebanon and Syria. From this perspective, Israel’s attack on Iran is the next step in this progression, aimed at ensuring the Islamic Republic will have no place in this Middle East. Indeed, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has raised the prospect of regime change in Iran as a result of Israeli military action.
For others in the Arab world, Israel’s use of force undermines the rule of law, and its reliance on military might leaves little space for a more economically integrated region that depends on stability. Thus, it is Israel, rather than Iran, that has become “the main source of instability in the region.” In this view, Israel’s military interventions in Gaza, Lebanon, Syria, Yemen, and Iran stand as examples of its aggressive and destabilizing posture. Moreover, by assassinating Ali Shamkhani, a senior aide to Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei who was key to the country’s rapprochement with Saudi Arabia, Israel sought to disrupt Iran’s integration into the region.
Ultimately, the future of the Middle Eastern order depends on whether today’s fighting deepens or de-escalates. Will we see a triumphant Israel vanquish Iran and reset the regional balance? Or does the Islamic Republic survive while the Gulf continues to pursue its integration?
Each path has clear benefits and risks that would entail different levels of U.S. involvement. Certainly, depriving Iran of its nuclear ambitions would fulfill a long-term U.S. national security objective. Yet the complete dismantling of Iran’s nuclear capabilities will require significant U.S. involvement in what could become a new forever war. Regime change in Iran would also require a major intervention with an uncertain end point.
Choosing a path of diplomacy would avert U.S. military entanglement and de-escalate a conflict that is destabilizing the region. It could herald a new era of stability and prosperity but would require accepting Iran’s integration into the region. Even with successful negotiations, the question of Iran’s nuclear ambitions may linger unresolved, raising the stakes for this integration.
Up until Israel’s latest attacks, Washington has been able to avoid definitively choosing between its allies’ conflicting goals. Now it will have to decide.
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