In recent weeks, there has been a lot of discussion in Washington about Israel’s international isolation. It began with a warning from Canada, France, and the United Kingdom to the Israeli government on May 19, concerning the humanitarian situation in the Gaza Strip and Israel’s withholding of aid from the area.
The British followed up by suspending talks to expand free trade between London and Jerusalem. The French government made its interest in recognizing a Palestinian state clear, ahead of an upcoming United Nations conference aimed at revitalizing the two-state solution. Slovenia’s government has kept up a drumbeat of criticism of Jerusalem throughout the war in Gaza. Recently, several Italian regions and cities cut ties with Israel. Within the European Union, 17 of 27 members support reviewing Israel’s association agreement with the bloc. And the new German chancellor, Friedrich Merz, recently said Israel’s military operations in Gaza can “no longer be justified.”
It all seems ominous for Israel, especially the French threat to recognize Palestine. After all, it is one thing for Ireland, Norway, and Spain—third-tier countries—to do so, but it is quite another for France, a global power, to offer such recognition. And, given Germany’s staunch support for Israel and its tradition of keeping criticism of Israeli policy private, Merz’s statement stung Jerusalem and shocked members of the German Jewish community.
But despite all the sturm und drang about Israel’s global isolation among its supporters, Israelis seem less concerned. That does not mean all Israelis, of course, but there is less of a freak-out in Israel over the criticism coming from Europe, as well as Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, than folks might believe.
There are several reasons for this. First, even with the new apparent outrage of Western politicians over Gaza—French President Emmanual Macron was previously all in with Israel’s effort to destroy Hamas—the threatened international isolation has not materialized thus far. Second, Israelis across the political spectrum seem resigned to threats of isolation but are also not willing to give in to them and thereby allow the Irish, Norwegians, Spaniards, Germans, Brits, French, and Canadians dictate how to secure Israel’s borders. Finally, there can be no international isolation without the United States.
The idea that Israel was becoming isolated internationally has been part of a narrative critical of Israeli military operations that started in the first part of 2024, just a few months after Hamas’s October 7, 2023, attack. It was mostly found in the elite press. The story was not quite accurate, but it was consistent with a worldview articulated on college greens, at the U.N., the Spanish prime ministry, and Dave Matthews concerts—all zones of anti-Israel agitation. In time, of course, Israel did suffer several setbacks in its international relations. In addition to the examples above, several Latin American countries broke relations with Jerusalem, and Turkey restricted trade with Israel.
That seemed to be more bark than bite. Israel’s trade with Norway fell in the first part of 2025 by approximately 9.5 percent—not an insignificant number, but hardly the end of the world. Israelis seem to be getting along just fine with less fish filet, which was Norway’s top export to Israel in 2023, totaling $169 million. Turkey’s decision to ban trade with Israel garnered a fair amount of press attention last year, but there has been far less reporting on the fact that Turks and Israelis continue to trade. So far, the fact that several Italian regions and cities have broken ties with Israel has not had an impact on Israel-Italy relations.
Of course, Western leaders may feel compelled to take action that might actually isolate Israel in time, but even sanctioning Israeli Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich and Israeli National Security Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir—as the U.K., Canada, Australia, and New Zealand have done over comments both officials have made about Gaza—is unlikely to make much of a difference. No doubt, there will be official and unofficial outrage in Israel over that action, but if leaders in London, Ottawa, Canberra, and Auckland believe that these sanctions will force a change in Israel, then they need to tell their diplomats to get out more and talk to Israelis.
It is true that Smotrich and Ben-Gvir have said terrible things, are deeply polarizing in Israel, and have worked hard to prolong the conflict in Gaza in service of other goals, such as their far-right and annexationist agenda. It is also true that a 2025 poll from the Israel Democracy Institute shows that majority of Israelis want the government to prioritize bringing hostages home as opposed to prioritizing Hamas’s defeat. And a 2024 study from the Pew Research Center found that 83 percent of Israelis believe that it is important for their country to be respected. Taken together, one might reasonably believe that Israelis would be susceptible to the kind of external pressure that Europe and others are threatening, but the Israeli view of these matters seems more complicated.
It might be easy to draw the conclusion from Pew that if governments are threatening Israel with measures that would result in the country’s isolation, Israelis would pressure their government to change course. It’s also lazy. Most Israelis do not need encouragement from the U.K., Canada, Australia, and New Zealand; they already want a change in course in Gaza. Pew seemed to miss an important part of the story by never asking how Israelis connect respect with their security. In other words, would they trade international respect for their own security? That seems unlikely.
From the very start of the war, Israelis understood that they would soon have to contend with international criticism no matter what the Israeli government did in Gaza. Being pilloried at international fora, in Europe, and on campuses is just part of being Israeli. That outlook does not seem to have changed much. As one left-wing interlocutor recently relayed to me, “Of course we do not like what the Europeans are doing. It concerns us, but we have to have security. I want the hostages home, a cease-fire, and Hamas disarmed not because some Europeans want that, but because it is good for the country. We will soldier on with or without Europe.” Another contact on the right, when asked about how the settler community was responding to the EU’s threats, responded, “Political activists in [Judea and Samaria] are more concerned about what is happening in J&S—the threats from Palestinian terrorists there.”
Separate but related, there is an assumption that underlies the narrative about Israel’s isolation, that the country is more like it was in 1955—weak and vulnerable—than how it is in 2025, which is powerful militarily and well integrated into the global economy. The relationship is not as one-way as observers imagine. Not long after the British government suspended trade negotiations with Israel, the U.K.’s trade envoy, Ian Austin, showed up in Haifa to promote trade. Merz’s criticism may have upset some of Israel’s supporters, but Germany still plans to accept a delivery of Israel’s Arrow 3 ballistic missile defense system—the largest defense deal Israel has ever concluded. Not only do the Europeans’ criticisms have no teeth, but Israel has a lot to offer them and the rest of the world in a range of fields and critical industries, including tech, agriculture, health, and security.
There is only one country that will make a difference and that is the United States. The tension between Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is clear by now, but there seems to be little chance that the Trump administration would seek Israel’s international isolation. And even if ties between the White House and the Knesset deteriorate, Israel has many friends in the U.S. Congress. Knowing it has cover from Washington gives Israel the “luxury” of caring less about what European foreign-policy bureaucrats are saying about it.
A lot of Israelis would prefer it if the world saw their efforts to ensure their security differently, but they do not, so, for many Israelis, that’s fine. Europeans and others have not forced them to pay a price, but even if they did, Israelis would likely elect to pay it.
The post The World’s Criticism Doesn’t Bother Israel appeared first on Foreign Policy.
