Guests:
- Col. Joshua Gaspard, commander of the 173rd Airborne Brigade, based in Vicenza, Italy.
Learn more about exercises Swift Response and African Lion 2025 here and here, respectively.
Find a transcript of this conversation below.
Watson: Army Col. Joshua Gaspard commands the 173rd Airborne Brigade based in Italy. They’re viewed as America’s rapid response force for the European region and beyond. They have an incredibly storied legacy, and back when I was in the Army, it was maybe the most coveted assignment for airborne-qualified soldiers. Col. Gaspard, welcome to Defense One Radio.
Gaspard: Thanks Ben.
Watson: So your soldiers recently took part in a few large scale exercises called Swift Response in Europe, and African Lion 25, which the Army describes as the “largest annual joint military exercise on the African continent.” Swift Response involved more than 1,500 paratroopers from five European nations. And more than 10,000 troops across 50 different nations were involved in African Lion this year, including seven NATO allies. So a pretty big operation there. Now I will say we don’t typically cover exercises at Defense One. There’s so many exercises; basically, in short, it’s like, where would you begin and select, and why would you pick one over another? Well, one of the common threads in these exercises is why we speak today. Because from what I understand, this year, the training featured a fairly new weapon that we’re seeing in growing use across the Ukraine battlefield. And that is, of course, the FPV, or first person view drone. One of your soldiers said, “Over 60% of all engagements in the Ukraine-Russian war are done with FPV drones.” It’s kind of a remarkable shift in the way that conflict and war is carried out, but it’s undeniable, and it’s certainly affecting not just the U.S.; clearly, we have multiple continents here that are involved with this. So to get us started and to kind of continue this big-picture overview for our audience, what did I overlook or understate about the two exercises we’re talking about, and your soldiers role in them?
Gaspard: I often tell people every day I command two brigades. On one hand, it’s the tough, it’s the gritty, it’s the lethal brigade that requires paratroopers to be the best of the fundamentals, best of the basics. Because ultimately our job is to kill our nation’s enemies and to break their things. And that comes in the human dimension that requires a paratrooper standing over and imposing our will on our nation’s enemy. So that’s one brigade that I command every day. The second brigade that I command every day is interwoven with all the things we’re talking about—technology, you mentioned FPVs, first person view drones; it’s about network, it’s about new sustainment techniques; it’s about power generation; it’s about all this other tech that’s out there. And then how is that interwoven into the first brigade that I mentioned? The one that’s rooted in those fundamentals has to be enabled by all this tech. And so I lead off with that, because I think it’s an important part where we’re at, given the current construct of what we’d say, “modern warfare.” Now going to the two specific exercises, the one thing that I would say is that not many units get to do two large-scale exercises on two different continents at the same exact time. What was unique about this one was that we did get a chance to pull out and put into practice the first true iterations of armed first person view drones, and that we were able to take modifications, arm them with C4, explosives, and to fly them into respective targets. In Africa, we used two different variants. We used a variant that was built by DEVCOM for us. And then we use an older variant that we’re able to use from a kind of a legacy Army system. And then we got to test to see what’s the better variant. And then in Lithuania, we got a chance to use the DEVCOM variant, which is better. And not only did we get a chance to shoot static targets, we also had some moving targets—a moving Jeep used by Marathon Targets that we’re able to use and to attack something on the move, to really test the lethality of our drone operators to get the effects we’re looking at.
Watson: I think one of your soldiers was saying that they had specially created the drones, and they’ve got specially created targets. It’s a fascinating look at this early stage adoption of this technology and ways to counter it or learn from it. I wonder if we can get into just a little bit more of the maybe size and speed of these drones, for example. I think in the context of, like, you can’t really practice with tanks. I can’t imagine we have a ton of tanks sitting around that we could just roll out for this sort of thing. Plus logistics for that would be way more difficult than bringing up maybe a skeleton Jeep. Can we get into a little bit more of these drones? And, you know, was it hard—did the soldiers realize that they were going too fast and they missed it? What are some of the lessons that they learned from these processes?
Gaspard: So the team built—we call it a “Sky Raider.” So it’s a variant designed by our team. And ultimately, the drone weighs about five to six pounds. The largest component is the battery to better provide the power that we need for it. It has a capacity, I’d say, probably three to five pounds. And then what that allows us to do is put the right armament on there for what we’re looking for. In this case, we’ve been using predominantly about one pound of C4 with the right primer and detonator to go after the respective targets we’re looking for. And this is really more than anything else it’s a test case for us just to see can we replicate this time and time again? And most importantly, can we replicate it safely time and time again?
Gaspard: Because, this is a new piece of technology and kit that we’re using, but with it comes a lot of safety parameters that we got to make sure that we can do this repeatedly and every time it’s safe. In terms of some of the target tree that’s out there, a lot of just kind of static things. First, you know, flying a drone in the direction of a target, even static at upwards of 60 to 70 kilometers per hour is pretty challenging. A lot of things get a vote. Wind gets a vote, weather gets a vote. And it is individual operators that are doing this, and so there they have the terminal guidance all the way into when they hit the objective. So that requires a level of finesse that maybe folks in their mid 40s, like myself might not possess, but the young paratroopers definitely do. And so the static targets are just standard targets. And then, in this case, in Lithuania, we had a few static opportunities, but then we incorporated some the moving Jeep. It’s a robotic full size Jeep that we got, and we’re able to drive it. And it was going anywhere from like 10 to 15 miles an hour. And then the target, the drones were coming in at about between like 60 to 70 to 80 kilometers an hour for that strike. So very, very precise what the folks were doing to bring those in. And we hit about 75% of the targets that we’re looking for, which is pretty good for the first ones out the box to get the paratroopers aligned with what what we thought was going to look like again, them having to possess the terminal guidance all the way in with the drone moving at that speed. And it’s pretty, pretty impressive.
Watson: Yeah, I can imagine. I mean, I’ve played a couple games recently, and I’m in, you know, my mid 40s. I suck at these video games. I am the worst. It’s the sort of thing where I try once or twice, and then I hand the controller back to my kid, and I’m like, “You know what? This is for you guys.” So I’m wondering, has drone warfare, broadly speaking, taken up a larger portion of the 173rd’s training lately? And if so, are there things that get cut? Are there elements that in the past may have been prioritized more, that maybe kind of get diminished just a little bit because of this new priority?
Gaspard: Yeah, I’d say that the drones have to enable what we were fundamentally going to do with our maneuver units. I don’t think they replaced. We as the U.S. military, the U.S. Army, in particular—I mean, we are very offensively minded, so we were always on the go into to me, the wraparound of all the drones that we’re talking about has got to enable the maneuver that we’re going to do on the battlefield. Now there is tension. There’s tension because we only have a finite amount of people, we only have a finite amount of time, and so in that, how do you prioritize the people and the time to make sure you get the right value out of it. There are folks in our formation that we’re sending to internally develope a drone operator course that they might have 11-Bravo, so an infantryman, or 12-Bravo, a combat engineer, that might be their primary MOS, but we send them to this, like I said, internally-built course that gives them a little bit more skill, a little bit more expertise, so that when we give them the drones, and then now we bolt them into the respective maneuver, live fire or warfare that we’re looking at, they’re able to employ that method. I don’t think it’s a one or the other. I think the drone technology has to fully complement the maneuver that we’re doing. It has to achieve the effects that we’re doing. Because what we can’t do is we can’t rely solely on that, because there’s a lot of things that get a vote out there—electromagnetic Spectrum gets a vote; certain signals interference gets a vote; weather gets a vote; battery life gets a vote. So there’s a lot of things that are out there that we need to make sure that we’re prepared still to do on our side fundamentally. And then the drones help provide some enabling effects that we couldn’t achieve without them.
Watson: How did your troops’ knowledge of counter drone systems and approaches evolve based on these experiences? We’ve been talking about offensive use of drones. Was there a defensive component? You mentioned the electromagnetics magnetic spectrum just a moment ago; was there a less direct offensive component to the drone training that your troops were doing?
Gaspard: So from the defensive side—number one, it’s certainly a wicked problem. I think you can ask anybody, and certainly learn from what we’re seeing in the Ukraine conflict. What we’ve what we’re trying to do at echelon is build, hey, what’s the right packages? So what’s the right counter-UAS package at a platoon, at a company, at a battalion, at the brigade? And each one of those layers, there’s certain kits we have—drone busters or some sort of smart shooter, some sort of electronic interference that we use. There’s sensing capabilities, whether it’s radars or acoustic sensors, and then, you know, at our level, at the brigade level, there’s systems that we have that can kind of pick up a wider band to understand what does that look like? The challenge is that this technology is changing all of the time. And so what might work today might not work tomorrow. And so there are some things that we fundamentally have to make sure that we’re smart at. Number one, cover and concealment still matters. Using vegetation around you still matters. Understanding how you can blend in with the surroundings still matter. So there’s some fundamentals that are ever present with what we got going on here when we look at the counter-UAS problems. But what I would what I would say for all of our teammates, is, when we look at this, is like we got to continue to plan for the future. What does the future look like with counter-UAS? One day might have high energy weapons. How do we incorporate that? How do we put that into things? You know, kamikaze drones. How can we build kamikaze drones that could seek out other drones, et cetera. So we’re always looking for emerging things that we could built into ourselves. But I think key for us is to look at the echelons that we have and then making sure that those folks are outfitted appropriately to give the right counter measures for this technology. Because, again, most of our conversations thus far has been about offensive, but defensive is a certainly a big part to protect our force and to make sure that we’re postured appropriately.
Watson: To the extent that you can talk about it, what did you learn about equipment support and perhaps some measures that—going, of course, a step beyond—some measures that Congress might be able to take to ensure that 173rd has the best resources to do its job effectively?
Gaspard: I won’t weigh in on Congress. I think that’s a little out of my realm here. But what I would talk about is, I think you’re hearing it in some of the discussions, it’s our procurement methods. It’s our procurement processes that we’ve had for quite a while. It’s the ability to do kind of research and development at echelon, from Department of Defense, Joint Force on down certainly to my level, at the brigade level. And how do we have, like the capability, the needs-based development that we can do amongst ourselves? And then how are we resourced to do that? Most modern nations, most modern countries, invest about 4% of their revenue into research and development funding. I think that’s probably about right that we need. And so inside the brigade, we’re trying to use all the resources we have to appropriately invest in what I’d say R&D at the right magnitude to make sure that we are keeping pace with with the changing battlefield to make sure that we have that stuff woven into our formation.
Watson: Now, of course, these exercises were not just the U.S., as we described in the introduction here. What can you say about allies, their involvement, their input and their concerns this year, in terms of how these exercises proceeded, and maybe some of the things that were remarkable to them or even remarkable to you about their their participation?
Gaspard: So number one, for Swift Response with five allies—Dutch, German, Italians, we had French and then we also participated with some Spaniards in Latvia, with one of our elements. You know what I would say right off the bat is they’re excited. And you know, my opening comments to them is, it’s not the U.S. and NATO; it’s just NATO. We’ve been a member of NATO since its founding. And so so we are part of this team as much as anybody else. And so I think that’s number one. And so with that comes the excitement to work amongst each other and to understand how each of us fight. It’s number two, we’re talking about technology. We’re talking about how do we have the right wraparound to be to communicate with one another? We can say the word interoperability, but interoperability is—it means several things, often defined and in three different buckets. You look at the technical side of things, that’s often kind of a communication structure side of things. You look at a procedural side of things, that’s often the way in which we do business; so that could be doctrine. And then you look at the human side of things, and that’s liaison officers that go and embed themselves. The procedural and the human are often easy, because procedural is a list; it’s written. The human is often easier, right? Because you can send the right guy or gal into formation. It’s the technical side that’s the most challenging. And so inside the brigade, we built a series of what we call “mission partner kits.” And so when folks bolt on to us, we’re able to proliferate these mission partner kits that share certain information, certain data, and then we can pass it back and forth to one another to make sure that we’re we’re really fast in the way in which we can communicate. And then I think the input of all the output of all this is that like we converge to see like what the capability could be. And we do these repetitions multiple times. And so for for Swift Response in particular, by the time we got to the actual execution in Lithuania, we had already jumped three or four times with some of these countries beforehand that we had done many rehearsals. And so the first time that we did this in Lithuania, it wasn’t the first time we did it. We had gotten the repetitions. We’ve gotten kind of some of the bugs worked out. We got some of the kinks worked out. And most importantly, we were a team. And I think that’s a pretty powerful, pretty powerful statement, when you look at the integration we can have within this case, the allies that we have for Swift Response.
Watson: It wasn’t just FPV drone work that you all did. What are the other lessons and goals that these two different drills had for your troops, and, you know, relatedly, were there kind of, you know, very different terrain considerations during these drills as they tried to accomplish their goals and the variety of different challenging environments, perhaps?
Gaspard: No, for sure. So we talk about the technology, we talk about the drones; but what we’ve learned that really the most important component of the innovation that we’re relying on, it’s really the network backbone. Do we have the command and control apparatus that lets us stream all the information, all the data, share it prolifically across the battlefield, from the tactical edge back to the respective command post nodes? And so it’s the network that really, I think, is the fundamental innovation and learning that we pulled from both of these exercises again, on the African continent and on the European continent. And so that’s number one in terms of like innovation and technology. The second part—and this goes back to my opening comments on the two brigades I command—it’s the toughness, it’s the grittiness. And so in particular, in both exercises, that was a big part of this. In Swift Response, when I was up in Lithuania with the team, we put on some situational training exercises that would put every single maneuver company through. And at the end of the day, it was about a 20-kilometer movement over the course of about 20 hours in some pretty tough terrain against a pretty formidable opposing force that was made up of ourselves, and some of the French Foreign Legion. And what that allowed us to do was to test ourselves in a really hard, gritty, tough terrain. Because, again, that’s a fundamental part of what we have to do here. So I think the two other components that I would say that come out of this besides, let’s say the FPVs or robotics, is really the network backbone. And then still being tough, still being gritty, to make sure that we are not missing that component of what it takes to be a warfighter.
Watson: We really appreciate you taking the time to speak to us. But before I go, I’m just curious—and there may not be much that you have for this question—but are there issues that you sometimes wish the U.S. defense press understood a little bit better about what you do, what your soldiers do? Are there things that you maybe wish that sometimes we grasped a little bit a little bit better?
Gaspard: I think the first thing that I would say is that we are a professional force. And certainly we’re learning a ton from Russia-Ukraine. But let’s not fool ourselves, we’re also learning a ton from the Pacific. And so with that, inside of the Army at various echelons, there is a ton of innovation, transformation, and I would say evolution, to keep pace, and most importantly, to push the pace to ensure that we’re ready. The most important patch that I wear in my uniform every day, it’s the U.S. flag, because I know that the American taxpayers pay me and pay all of our paratroopers to be ready to kill our nation’s enemies and to break their stuff. That’s it. And so we, as a professional force, we owe it to constantly be learning. And so we have this insatiable thirst to learn, improve and repeat. And so I think that’s number one. Number two, what I would say is we are ready. I hope we never have to be utilized. But if the call comes, the 173rd Airborne, and I would say, the U.S. Army at large is ready. And it’s ready because of the professionalism, because of the folks that are here, because every morning at 06:30, folks are out there putting in the sweat, putting in the work at physical training, and then all of the other things that come after that. And so the team is ready. And so I would say regardless of what thoughts are out there at our level, we are fundamentally ready. And if you were to come hang out with us for a few days, I believe you would leave here with a sense of inspiration and awe of what the group of paratroopers you see assembled from all walks of life, from all countries, from all from all states, assembled here in Vicenza, Italy, or Grafenwoehr, Germany, because we have elements up there, what they look like and what they can do and what they can accomplish. And then also just their desire to ensure our families are protected. I think that’s an important part to all this, and I’m trying to give it lip service, but this is something that matters dearly to us, particularly since we’re over here in Europe, we’re often positioned outside of the proximity of our families and loved ones. And I think it’s an important component to what we do, and how we’re ready.
Watson: U.S. Army Col. Joshua Gaspard commands the 173rd Airborne Brigade based in lovely, beautiful Italy, which I’ve never been to. Maybe one day, maybe one day. Colonel, thank you so much for speaking with me today. I really appreciate it.
Gaspard: Thanks, man. Have a great day.
The post Defense One Radio, Ep. 181: What the Army is learning about FPV drones appeared first on Defense One.
