This week, U.S. presidential envoy Richard Grenell met with members of Venezuela’s government in Antigua and Barbuda. It was the latest round of negotiations between Washington and Caracas over everything from migration and energy to the future of authoritarian Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro’s regime.
Prior to this week’s talks, energy companies based in the United States and a handful of other countries faced a May 27 deadline to exit Venezuela or risk running afoul of U.S. sanctions. In 2022, the Biden administration had granted firms such as Chevron and Repsol licenses to operate in Venezuela under tightly controlled conditions. Upon retaking office in January, U.S. President Donald Trump vowed to reverse the move, giving the companies a few months to leave the country.
It is not yet clear whether the United States will, in fact, force energy companies out of Venezuela next week. Bloomberg reported that Grenell returned from his Caribbean meeting with a 60-day extension for the oil giants. But Secretary of State Marco Rubio announced on Wednesday that the deadline stands.
“The pro-Maduro Biden oil license in #Venezuela will expire as scheduled,” he posted on X.
The mixed messages on the extension showcase an apparent tug-of-war in the Trump administration between those who want to negotiate with Maduro, such as Grenell, and those who favor a hard-line approach to the country, such as Rubio. Grenell’s trip suggests that the pro-talks faction is gaining ground. Trump will make the final decision on how to proceed.
If the White House chooses to pursue negotiations, it may correctly realize that the “maximum pressure” approach to Venezuela that Trump promoted during his first term did not serve U.S. objectives. Rather than returning to a strategy based on heavy-handed sanctions, Trump in his second term should preserve existing space for U.S. energy companies in Venezuela while retaining economic leverage over Caracas to incentivize a democratic opening in the country.
There are several signs that Washington and Caracas may quietly be hashing out a deal. In March, the Trump administration published an executive order empowering Rubio to impose a 25 percent tariff on goods from any country that imports Venezuelan oil and gas. But he does not yet appear to have imposed those levies on buyers such as China and Malaysia. Even if Grenell’s promised extension is not borne out, his visit with his Venezuelan counterparts is the strongest indication that negotiations are ongoing—and that an agreement may be in the works.
Grenell’s meeting in Antigua—which also secured the release of American prisoner Joseph St. Clair from Venezuela—is not an isolated incident. Grenell opened up a channel of communication with the Maduro government in January, returning home from a trip to Caracas with six formerly detained Americans in tow.
After the January meeting, the Trump administration announced that Maduro had agreed to begin receiving regular flights of Venezuelan nationals deported from the United States. Following an initial delay, as many as three U.S. deportation flights per week now arrive Venezuela—in some cases, coming directly from the United States rather than via an intermediary nation such as Honduras.
The direct deportation flights are a sign that there is fluid behind-the-scenes communication between Caracas and Washington—and that both countries see value in ongoing negotiations. The last time that the United States announced economic sanctions on Venezuela—when President Joe Biden reimposed previously paused measures in February 2024—Maduro responded by immediately ending his acceptance of deportation flights.
The pro-negotiation camp within the Trump administration may be strengthened by growing evidence that maximum pressure on Venezuela benefits China. Independent energy consultancy IPD Latin America told Foreign Policy that Venezuelan crude output has remained steady through April 2025. Crude exports to China have risen steadily from an average of 277,000 barrels per day in the period from November 2024 to January of this year to an average of 453,000 barrels a day between February and April, according to the group.
Venezuelan crude exports to the Atlantic basin (primarily to the United States) are down from an average of 223,000 barrels per day in March to 113,000 barrels per day in April—and are expected to be just 80,000 barrels a day in May, IPD Latin America said. Since Washington’s threats of secondary tariffs do not seem to have impacted China, growing Chinese demand for Venezuelan oil means Caracas could sustain production even if U.S. sanctions force Western companies to exit the country.
But the clearest signal yet that Trump is interested in pursuing talks with Maduro comes from the administration itself. In addition to Grenell making at least two trips to speak with Venezuelan counterparts, the Trump administration’s solicitor general recently argued before the U.S. Supreme Court that preventing the suspension of temporary protected status for Venezuelan immigrants would interfere with U.S. foreign policy “just as the government is engaged in complex and ongoing negotiations with Venezuela.”
Of course, Rubio’s favored approach can’t be entirely discarded. As the secretary of state and acting national security advisor, he has outsized influence over the direction of U.S. Venezuela policy and will ultimately need to greenlight—or at least tolerate—any changes to U.S. sanctions in the country. If the Trump administration is set on cutting some kind of deal with Venezuela, then Rubio may try to push for clearer democratic concessions from Maduro in talks.
While the details of Grenell’s negotiations remain unclear, the possibility that Western oil companies may not have to exit Venezuela preserves space for the Trump administration to use the offer of U.S. sanctions relief to advance a democratic transition in Venezuela.
As Energy Secretary Chris Wright said in a May 11 Fox News interview, Trump wants to “force a change in Venezuela.”
Doing so would not require entirely new thinking. In March 2020, during the first Trump administration, the State Department announced a “democratic transition framework” for Venezuela. The road map promised Caracas graduated sanctions relief in exchange for the creation of a joint transitional government involving both Maduro’s ruling party and the opposition.
The proposal faltered in part because it demanded that Maduro step down and cede executive powers to a multiparty council. Yet the framework’s basic logic—sanctions relief in exchange for concrete, verifiable democratic reforms—remains sound. Trump should dust it off and adapt it to Venezuela’s current reality.
Offers of sanctions relief are the only tool that has achieved progress toward a democratic opening in Caracas. The sanctions waivers that Biden issued for oil companies opened limited space for international investment and ultimately induced Maduro to agree to hold a presidential election on July 28, 2024. He went on to steal that contest precisely because the opposition’s landslide win made the regime’s unpopularity impossible to hide. (Maduro claims to have won the contest, but scans of precinct-level vote tally sheets obtained by opposition activists showed that the opposition presidential candidate won more than twice as many votes as Maduro.)
An updated U.S. democratic accord with Venezuela should build on ideas put forward by the first Trump administration. Washington should insist on genuine power-sharing between Maduro and the opposition in a way that does not force Maduro’s immediate resignation, but rather paves the way for a leadership transition. Any deal should also include the release of all political prisoners, an end to the repression of dissidents, a clear path toward competitive electoral conditions, and the restoration of independent democratic institutions. Phased U.S. sanctions relief would be tied to verifiable benchmarks at every step.
Such a carrots-and-sticks approach could yield benefits not just to Venezuelans, but also to Americans. If Venezuela experiences an economic recovery triggered by targeted sanctions relief, then it would slow the northward flow of Venezuelan migrants at a time when Trump is interested in limiting undocumented immigration. Venezuelan migrants now total nearly 8 million globally, with an estimated 730,000 or more living in the United States.
A deal could also potentially reopen Venezuela’s oil reserves—the largest on the planet—to U.S. energy companies. Their once-strong foothold has been ceded in recent years to shadowy traders and illicit buyers. That has only strengthened the United States’ main adversary: Shut off from the rest of the global economy, Venezuela began to export most of its crude oil to China at a significant discount—which has benefited the Chinese economy.
Securing a new U.S.-Venezuela deal will require time. Trump should use the coming months continue to recalibrate his approach to the country, focusing on democratic reforms. Even if the licenses are not extended next week, a new permit allowing the companies to remain in country and protect their assets would be a signal that negotiations can continue. Doing so could preserve U.S. leverage in political negotiations with Maduro without requiring Washington to withdraw energy companies entirely.
The stakes are high. If negotiations fail and the United States returns to maximum pressure, then China will likely continue to benefit. Beijing remains Venezuela’s key international ally; on May 10, Maduro met with Chinese President Xi Jinping in Moscow, where the Chinese leader vowed to “firmly support Venezuela in safeguarding its sovereignty, national dignity and social stability.”
If U.S. policymakers are serious about combating Chinese influence in the Western Hemisphere, then they should not pull U.S. companies out of Venezuela and push Caracas even closer to Beijing. Instead, they should use their limited economic leverage to advocate a gradual, negotiated transition of power in Venezuela—even if it that preserves space for Maduro’s party in the future. Doing so will yield more benefits than another attempt at overnight regime change.
The post Give Negotiations With Venezuela a Chance appeared first on Foreign Policy.
