Last summer, nervous liberals breathed a sigh of relief when a snap election in France ended in surprise defeat for the far right and its fearsome leader, Marine Le Pen. But the hero of that election was in many ways not Emmanuel Macron, who called the election nominally to sideline Le Pen and then marshaled embarrassingly little public support for his own party. It was Jean-Luc Mélenchon, the polarizing leftist, often described as France’s Bernie Sanders, whose coalition won the most seats, pushing Le Pen’s National Rally — once favored to win the election — into third place.
In the months that followed, Macron struggled to form a governing coalition without Mélenchon’s La France Insoumise party or the broader New Popular Front alliance the leftists had cobbled together during the brief campaign. Instead, Macron ultimately made an unstable arrangement with the right, turning Mélenchon into a strange kind of marginalized figure: perhaps the rich world’s most electorally successful leftist, both the face of European left populism and the reason the continent’s most feared right-wingers had been kept out of power, but now haunting European politics like an ambiguous apparition. Today the left alliance looks weaker than it did last summer, and a conviction for embezzlement temporarily barring Le Pen from running for office has made her into something of a haunting apparition, too. The future of French politics — and its lessons for the continent — looks again quite unstable.
Last month, Mélenchon made a rare trip to the United States, where Verso is publishing his “Now, the People! Revolution in the 21st Century,” and we spoke for an hour or so, with the help of several interpreters. What follows is an edited and condensed version of that conversation.
In the United States, the conventional liberal view of European politics runs something like this: The center is in shambles, the left is in retreat and the right is on the march. What are we missing in our solipsism?
Obviously there’s an element of truth in that picture, but I don’t agree that the left is in retreat. In France, instead of disappearing, the left has created something new with La France Insoumise. In 2022, I won a greater percentage of votes than Jacques Chirac won in the first round when he became president in 2002.
In the last election, your coalition won the most votes.
But in the broader picture, what you have to understand is that in 1991, it wasn’t just the Soviet Union that collapsed; it was an entire world. There was very suddenly a change in the balance of power within the countries of Europe, with the United States and with the rest of the world.
Strangely, Americans didn’t really appreciate how big an earthquake this was, because in the minds of Americans, the Soviet Union didn’t really exist, it was just the evil empire. And so the evil empire fell. But in Europe it was a crisis, indeed, a series of crises, with the disappearance of the Communist Parties and the collapse of the social-democratic parties. The relationship between labor and capital changed. And in a very brutal way, the dominant conservative sectors broke their commitment to freedom.
How do you mean?
The traditional formula that capitalism equals economic freedom and thus individual liberties — that has gone away.
We had been living with the achievements of World War II: an extraordinarily high level of social development, a welfare state, public schools that worked very well, a health care system that was the best in the world. Then everything became a commodity. The policies that had been applied elsewhere in the world were now applied to us. All European societies were shaken and challenged.
Normally, we should have had revolts everywhere, and there were some. But our adversaries immediately deployed a strategy to confront and divide the people. These divisions — racism and sexism and Islamophobia — are not just moral failings. They are political strategies.
Their objective is to divide popular resistance, to single out people because of their skin color, their religion, their gender. And thus to impose other issues of broad agreement. And that’s the choice they made. It’s the choice of the far right. It happened gradually at first. The far right was an ultraminority because it had been defeated in World War II. But very quickly, we saw how it resurfaced with newspapers that became far right, with forces that took up far-right words and from within the left itself, people taking up far-right ideas. Voilà — a new consensus.
You’re telling a long story, stretching back 30 years. How do you understand the last five or 10 years and the gains the right has made more recently?
I believe that history operates through long waves, and I think it’s important to resist the temptation to waste time thinking too much about the short term. It’s not true that the far right has only gained in the recent period; it’s been the product of a long process that they have been carrying out methodically and carefully. There have been some points where we have managed to push them back, and there have been other moments where we have retreated, but it’s a long process. And now I think we’re in a moment that is the moment just before the apogee of the crisis — just before the acute phase.
And the crisis has perhaps taken its most extreme form here in the United States with the Trump presidency. Donald Trump is not crazy, he’s not a madman, and he’s not a brute. He responds to something very real, which is the crisis of American dominance over the rest of the world. He represents the entire sector of the dominant classes who say we have to move faster or we’re going to lose control, and that the Chinese will definitely win.
The crucial thing for us is that we need to understand the state of the world and how we can possibly try to reverse it. That’s why I wrote this book.
How would you suggest we see it?
Capitalism has always been a crisis. It has a crisis every 10 or 12 years. The socialist movement has been built as an attempt to try to understand this crisis. That’s not new either. But what’s different now is two things. First, crises sometimes lead to wars, and if they lead to wars in our time, they are likely to become nuclear wars, with all the irreversible consequences for humanity that entails. And second, there is the ecological crisis, which is irreversible. We can no longer stop it. All we can do is try to work out how to confront it and deal with it.
That’s why I insist so much on warning about the current crisis. From now on, the question facing human beings is more a question of what it means to survive, rather than what are my ideological preferences. Because there comes a time when there are no more preferences. As Deng Xiaoping said, it doesn’t matter if a cat is white or black, as long as it catches mice. So, how are we going to survive?
I’m struck by the absence in your answers of so many of the things Americans tend to emphasize in talking about these developments: the financial crisis; austerity; the slowdown of economic growth, especially in Europe; deindustrialization, especially here. There’s the internet and social media. There’s immigration.
I think all the events you just mentioned are all a consequence of what I’m describing. The 2008 crisis is the consequence of the new form of capitalism. Austerity policies correspond to the temptation for neoliberals to commodify everything and destroy the welfare state so that it can be replaced by commerce. I’m a historical materialist, and for me, these are just the forms in which the contradictions of our time have been revealed.
But you’re also right to say that certain events and dynamics are important. For example, we’ve gone from digitizing the world to artificial intelligence, but ultimately, to create artificial intelligence, you need large computers, you need cables, you need materials, and whoever owns them dominates the world. That’s why Trump wants Greenland, it’s why he wants Canada — to have these materials.
And Trump is a magnificent caricature. He is a perfect embodiment of the crisis. He’s destroying the Democratic political scene and the old Republican Party. First, he says, there is no ecological crisis, and we are leaving the Paris Agreement. Second, he says, no, human beings are not actually equal; there’s a big difference between us and foreigners. And third, he says, no, it’s not the invisible hand of the market that will decide prices and value — I will, as president. That last point is in some ways the most incredible, as a commentary on capitalism in the United States, because you’ve been lecturing us that it’s precisely the opposite for 40 years. Who are the communists here? Wow.
Although there’s another, alternate history of neoliberalism — not that it was a period of always liberating markets but a period in which the state aggressively intervened on behalf of capital within markets.
Yes, I know the lecture isn’t true. I’m a socialist, after all. I know capitalism is a machine for exploitation. But I’m responding to the legend, and this legend is now being refuted by the very people who used it in their electoral campaigns!
And how do you understand your own success in this context? Among the world’s left-wing leaders, you are what passes for a standout success story.
That’s right, we are the only ones in this position in all of Europe. And there must be specific reasons. First, the French people, that’s for sure — their willingness to fight is quite specifically French. But we also worked intellectually to understand what was happening, why things weren’t happening as we had planned. We learned from others. When there are social movements anywhere, we study them. In our country, there were the Gilets Jaunes, for example. And each time we studied each case. And then we were very methodical: Instead of making speeches about the working classes, we went looking for the working classes to put ourselves at their service.
In France, there are three blocs: the far right, the right and the left. If we try to scratch a few votes from the center, we’re wasting our time. If we try to act like the old traditional left, we’re wasting our time. Instead, we’ve gone after the fourth bloc, the millions of people who are no longer involved in politics, who think it’s not for them. And that’s where we’ve built our success.
By the way, aren’t you struck by Sanders’s age?
What do you mean?
We’re both old. It’s kind of curious. I think it has to do with the political moment — that precisely because we are men who have lived through a long period, we know the weight of the long waves of history.
And in France we know very well that we depend a lot on what happens in this country, the United States. The left here could be destroyed, as happened in Italy. And then you have a consensus among social elites to move in the same direction, to the right. That kind of thing is possible; the last time it was with the Nazis. In our country, the elites collaborated with the Nazis. Very few people refused to do so. So we’ve already seen disasters of this nature.
But there is no country where there is no more hope. I think that all crises provide opportunities. You have to know how to seize them.
Let’s talk about the relationship between Europe and the United States. You’ve described Trump as a kind of monstrous force. But Europe appears also to be plotting a new course for itself to navigate that monstrousness, and quite differently from in his first term, it seems to me. That time, it looked like European leaders often saw their role as holding things steady until there was a political change in America, when normal politics could return. This time, it seems like most countries are trying to stake out a new sovereignty — remilitarizing, perhaps forging new ties with China.
First of all, Trump will bring about a worsening of social tensions here and throughout Europe. He will export social tensions and indeed class struggle to Europe, because we’re going to have inflation as a result of his tariffs and trade war. And in no country will inflation be offset by wage increases. So we’ll have very active social struggles everywhere. Inevitably, this will help us politically. But we’re going to be in a tight spot. He may even provoke a generalized financial crisis.
Second, the European leaders. I don’t agree with your analysis regarding a political pushback at all. Not at all. We’ve never seen such a pathetic team as the one we have. They aren’t showing signs of independence or autonomy. It’s the opposite. Trump says, you’re all going to pay 5 percent of your G.D.P. to buy weapons, and they all stood to attention, and like pathetic little creatures they decided that, OK, yes, we’re going to spend billions on weapons.
They probably won’t get to 5 percent. But in Germany, they’re even removing the debt brake to increase military spending.
And what weapons are the French going to buy? We can produce our own weapons, but they all said they’re going to buy American weapons. There isn’t any new European sovereignty. It’s about accepting subjugation.
Look, Trump says he’s going to “get” Greenland, which is a European country for the moment. Trump is threatening Canada. Did the British prime minister protest that? No! When a journalist asked him about it, he was the one who got defensive. He said, “You’re trying to find a divide between us that doesn’t exist.” Quebec is in Canada. Did you hear Macron protesting? No. Trump threatened Mexico. Is anyone protesting? It’s political submission.
What about Ukraine? What would you like to see happen there?
We did everything we could. We supplied weapons, we provided money, we opened our markets to Ukraine. We imposed a lot of economic sanctions on Russia that had no effect. And everyone says we must continue. OK, fine. Carry on. But the best solution is, instead, to just discuss peace.
Of course, we cannot accept an invasion. We, the French, have been invaded, we cannot accept even the concept of invasion. But we need a method for peace. We need a method for diplomacy, for a concerted European diplomacy. And there isn’t one. We must return to the discussion with greater force. The North Americans have no place in the negotiations. It’s not their territory. It’s not their continent. Why are we discussing peace in Europe in Saudi Arabia? It makes no sense. We must discuss it ourselves, directly with the Russians, guaranteeing it through mutual security. Until we do that, we’re not defending our interests, we’re just flexing our muscles.
And China?
I’ll start with a question: What is the problem? Why is China a problem?
Years ago, no one was saying that China was a problem. The United States certainly wasn’t. I benefited greatly. Everyone profited. Now, all of a sudden, it’s a problem. Why? What’s the issue? They are very productive. They’re very advanced technically in dozens of areas. But what’s the problem? Now there’s a question of military competition, particularly over Taiwan. We all agreed that there was only one China. And now we have to say that there are two. But it wasn’t a problem for there to be two Germanys that turned into one, was it?
There’s a real problem with how this is all framed. It’s painful for me to see how much we are wasting our time, instead of trying to put together coalitions to more effectively deal with the consequences of climate change. Trump thinks he’ll get away with it, that he can bully China and not end up in a war. But if he spends all his days creating incidents, he will end up having a war. I think the behavior toward China is totally irresponsible. But an empire only does one thing: It wants to maintain its domination.
What’s the alternative path? Your book is quite international in its outlook. Do you think it’s possible to forge global left-wing alliances, in this context? Or have we moved too much into the geopolitics of nationalism and self-interest?
Yes, of course it’s possible. But first we have to win somewhere.
In France?
In France, maybe. Or the United States. Or somewhere else. But if we win in France, the first strategy is nonalignment. We don’t want to be part of the American bloc. We don’t want to be part of any bloc. We simply want an orderly world with consistent laws that are accepted and defended.
We have to move away from the internationalism of the past, which was an alignment based on the most powerful socialist country or on an ideology. Rather, the new internationalism will be constructed around common causes like the preservation of water, of air, and the struggle for peace.
Is there hope? Of course, I’m full of hope. I don’t believe this is the end of history, but it could be the end of a long period of history. And we have to be clearheaded about that. Remember: This is not the first time an empire has slowly died. And there is nothing to be gained by allowing another form of disorder to replace it.
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