U.S. President Donald Trump has alternated between making threats and suggesting negotiations with Iran. His proposal of direct talks has so far been dismissed and rebuffed by a regime that is deeply suspicious of Washington after the first Trump administration pulled out of the 2015 nuclear deal.
Given the risk of military confrontation over Iran’s nuclear program—which is, according to some analysts, only weeks away from producing a deliverable weapon—Foreign Policy asked three experts to assess how a strike by the United States, Israel, or both acting together would affect Iranian politics, the strategic outlook of Saudi Arabia, and regional dynamics more broadly.
—Sasha Polakow-Suransky, deputy editor
An Attack on Iran Could Strain U.S. Capabilities in Asia
By Mahsa Rouhi, research fellow at National Defense University’s Institute for National Strategic Studies
A U.S.-Israeli military strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities could have profound regional and global implications.
There are different military action scenarios against Iran’s nuclear program. Coordinated U.S. and Israeli airstrikes targeting Iran’s nuclear, military, and command infrastructure—including underground sites—is the option most likely to set back Iran’s ability to build a nuclear bomb should it choose to do so.
Those who advocate for this type of operation argue that it could significantly delay Iran’s nuclear ambitions at the very least, and potentially lead to capitulation and nuclear reversal. Opponents maintain that a strike could further motivate Iran’s leadership to pursue a nuclear weapon, far outweighing any temporary benefits a military strike might confer.
Regardless of the setback that such an attack achieves, it is important to keep in mind the price tag for preventing Iran from weaponizing in the long run. It would require a long-term military commitment that could escalate into a regional conflict, push Iran towards weaponization, and ultimately raise serious concerns about sustainment feasibility and compatibility within the framework of U.S. national security regional and global priorities.
Coordinated U.S. and Israeli airstrikes targeting Iran’s nuclear, military, and command infrastructure—including underground sites—are likely to escalate into a wider conflict, given the higher probability of retaliatory strikes.
This option, as opposed to Israeli unilateral operations, could inflict significant damage to Iran’s nuclear and air defense capabilities. It would likely set back Iran’s ability to build a bomb more significantly but not permanently.
Additionally, a large-scale aerial attack would likely push Iran’s leadership to accelerate its nuclear ambitions covertly, increasing the risk of an undetectable breakout. Iranian leaders may conclude that becoming a nuclear armed state is the only viable long-term safeguard against future attacks.
It is not clear if Gulf states, including Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, would support the operation or remain neutral and even deny air access. However, while Gulf Cooperation Council involvement might have been a major consideration for the success of such a military operation in the past, the recent geopolitical changes in the region, particularly in Syria, have made an initial offensive military campaign by the United States and Israel feasible even without being granted air access by Gulf nations. Whether there is regional support or lack of support for the operation, the United States risks triggering changes in its regional security dynamics.
While tactically feasible, a full-scale aerial offensive against Iran’s nuclear program may undermine U.S. national security priorities in the long run. It would require sustained force posture, continuous military operations, and resource commitments. This ongoing engagement would detract from other U.S. priorities, particularly the strategic focus on countering China’s rise and influence. This diversion of military and intelligence assets to the Middle East would strain U.S. capabilities elsewhere, weakening deterrence against other global adversaries.
The analysis and conclusions presented here are based on individual research and do not necessarily represent the policies or perspectives of National Defense University, the U.S. Defense Department, or the U.S. government.
A U.S.-Israeli Attack Could Strengthen Saudi-Iranian Ties
By Aziz Alghashian, fellow with the Sectarianism, Proxies, and De-Sectarianization project at Lancaster University’s Richardson Institute and associate fellow at the Center for Applied Research in Partnership With the Orient
The Middle East has not been this volatile for some time, and U.S. President Donald Trump is only exacerbating tensions. Saudi leaders know that regional security is precarious and inextricably tied to the country’s security. With the loss of Iran’s influence in Syria and the decimation of Hezbollah in Lebanon, Iranian regional power has certainly been curtailed. That said, the Saudi ruling elite knows that while Iran may seem to be weakened, it is certainly not weak.
Saudi elites know that Iran can reassert its presence through its three pillars of deterrence: accelerating the nuclear program, projecting the missile program, and utilizing Iran-aligned groups, especially the Houthis. While these threats are worrisome for Riyadh, the notion of “forward defense” is perhaps the most problematic issue to deal with—a dilemma that Saudi leaders know must be dealt with proactively, pragmatically, and delicately.
With the war in Gaza raging again, and the U.S. strikes on the Houthis continuing, the region is anxious that Iran could be provoked. If this happens, Riyadh is confident that it can withstand the storm. Both the war in Gaza and the direct military exchanges between Israel and Iran in 2024 gave Saudi leaders confidence in their strategy of constantly remaining in dialogue with Iran. As a result of the Gaza war, a blueprint of how to manage the situation is already there. The Saudi ruling elite will use diplomacy in three ways to avoid being caught up in the crossfire.
First, if there is an attack on Iran, Saudi leaders will be proactive in condemning any strike and will call for respect of Iranian sovereignty. They have done this rather consistently throughout the Israel-Hamas war when tensions were high (but will most likely not call for the right to self-defense, as that may be taken as siding too heavily with Iran and encouraging more retaliatory actions by Tehran).
Second, they will condemn the Israeli government and the occupation. Due to the war and provocative statements by both Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu about establishing a Palestinian state in Saudi Arabia, anti-Israeli sentiment in the country is higher than at any time since the Second Intifada. Netanyahu’s statements and actions are actually encouraging greater Saudi-Iranian agreement and cooperation, which will help protect the kingdom from any Iranian backlash.
Third, Saudi leaders will not just offer but actively pursue a mediating role between Iran and the United States. The Saudi ruling elite is keen to serve as an international mediator, as is clear from ongoing U.S.-Russia talks held in Riyadh. It allows them to be proactive agents of de-escalation, raising the cost of them being targeted in any crossfire.
Paradoxically, then, another Israeli attack on Iran is likely to bolster Saudi-Iranian rapprochement even more.
The Saudi-Iranian relationship is on its way from being turbulent and adversarial to one that is more calm and cautiously cooperative—but it is not there yet. Currently, the rapprochement is about entrenching the notion that the two nations are not existential threats to each other. Saudi Arabia’s proactive diplomacy in recent years has positioned the country to not just manage threats but meticulously channel regional developments into new diplomatic opportunities.
An External Threat to Iran Could Spark More Internal Repression
By Saeid Jafari, Iranian journalist and Middle East analyst
A possible strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities by the United States and Israel would have far-reaching effects, especially on Iranian domestic politics.
Public dissatisfaction with the Iranian regime has increased dramatically in recent years—arguably reaching its greatest level since the 1979 revolution. Because of this, some Iranian opposition groups now see foreign military involvement as a possible opportunity for bringing about change. But based on past experiences, it seems doubtful that such an attack would help the regime’s opponents get any closer to their goals.
The Iranian government has a tendency to strengthen political repression during times of war and increased foreign threats, as was the case during the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq War.
Thus, rather than undermining the administration, such an attack would likely lead to an even harsher crackdown on dissent, further restricting political and social freedoms. The regime would use the situation to frame any opposition as aligned with foreign adversaries while simultaneously rallying its supporters and moderate factions in society around the narrative of an external threat and the need to defend national sovereignty.
The second aspect to consider is how an attack would shape the future of Iran’s nuclear program. On a technological level, it is unclear that a military attack could really stop Iran from crossing the nuclear weapons threshold. Iran’s nuclear infrastructure is significantly more developed and extensive than Syria’s Deir Ezzor complex, struck by Israel in 2007, or Iraq’s Osirak reactor, which Israel destroyed in 1981.
Some important sites, such as the Fordow enrichment plant, are located well below ground and difficult to demolish without extremely specialized bunker-busting weaponry. Even if the attack successfully destroyed Iran’s nuclear facilities, it wouldn’t eradicate Iranian scientific knowledge. Though it would be costly both financially and logistically, Iranian scientists could eventually rebuild the program.
Still, the political ramifications could be far more important. A military attack might change Iranian leaders’ oft-repeated public claims that they are not pursuing a nuclear weapons capability. If Iran is attacked, Iranian officials may conclude that developing a nuclear weapon is the only way to ensure the country’s security and deter future threats. Such an attack may increase Iran’s determination to achieve its nuclear goals as soon as possible, rather than putting a stop to them.
The regional impact could also be dire. Iran has repeatedly warned that any military strike against it would turn U.S. interests in the region into legitimate targets for retaliation.
Some proponents of military action cite the U.S. killing of Qassem Suleimani, the leader of Iran’s elite Quds Force, in January 2020 to show that Tehran doesn’t always follow through on its threats to retaliate.
Nevertheless, it’s crucial to differentiate between an individual like Suleimani and a decades-long initiative into which the Iranian regime has poured massive resources. Given this long-standing investment, it’s likely that Tehran won’t just back off if its nuclear sites are attacked, especially since other elements of its deterrent strategy—such as its proxy groups in the region—are already weakened.
Should that happen, the already unstable Middle Eastern environment could become uncontrollable.
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