The Trump administration’s airstrikes on Yemen over the weekend marked the first time the United States has explicitly targeted Houthi leaders—alongside military and command-and-control centers. These strikes were warranted and then some. But the hard part may still be ahead.
The rap sheet against the Houthis is unchallenged. Following the Oct. 7, 2023, terrorist attack by Hamas against Israel, the Houthis declared that they would shut down shipping through the Red Sea to protest Israel’s operation in Gaza. Houthi terrorists targeted many Western maritime vessels that they claimed had Israeli ties transiting the Bab el-Mandeb Strait (often exempting Russian and Chinese shippers), forcing shipping companies to bypass the Suez Canal and sail around the Cape of Good Hope, adding significant costs to each journey.
The Trump administration’s airstrikes on Yemen over the weekend marked the first time the United States has explicitly targeted Houthi leaders—alongside military and command-and-control centers. These strikes were warranted and then some. But the hard part may still be ahead.
The rap sheet against the Houthis is unchallenged. Following the Oct. 7, 2023, terrorist attack by Hamas against Israel, the Houthis declared that they would shut down shipping through the Red Sea to protest Israel’s operation in Gaza. Houthi terrorists targeted many Western maritime vessels that they claimed had Israeli ties transiting the Bab el-Mandeb Strait (often exempting Russian and Chinese shippers), forcing shipping companies to bypass the Suez Canal and sail around the Cape of Good Hope, adding significant costs to each journey.
The Houthis hijacked a ship and kidnapped its crew, holding them for over a year. They sank two ships, murdering several mariners and causing grave environmental damage. And their terrorist anti-shipping campaign caused grave harm to their Red Sea neighbors, endangering shipments of aid to Sudan and Somalia and depriving Egypt of critically needed hard currency from Suez Canal transits.
As 2024 wore on and the Palestinian death toll in Gaza climbed to the tens of thousands, the Houthis increasingly turned their weapons—including ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs)—against U.S. warships patrolling the Red Sea. Due to the skill and tenacity of American sailors and aviators, these Houthi attacks were defeated and no U.S. ships were struck. But there were close calls, and U.S. Central Command leadership emphasized that the risk of a U.S. warship being struck—when U.S. forces had to be perfect in defense every time, while the Houthis needed to get lucky just once—was increasing.
The Biden administration, in which I served, struggled with the Houthi challenge. President Joe Biden also authorized extensive strikes against the Houthis. Unlike the description of some Trump administration officials, these were not pinpricks nor purely responsive strikes. On at least seven occasions, U.S. forces, sometimes with U.K. participation, struck underground weapons and storage facilities and command-and-control centers. In addition, U.S. Central Command carried out almost daily self-defense strikes against weapons in use or being prepared for firing. All told, many hundreds of Houthi missiles and UAVs were destroyed in these strikes.
But the attacks did not restore deterrence. The Houthi leadership, with its deeply anti-Israel and anti-American ideology, seemed emboldened by the exchanges. Indeed, it parlayed a fight with the United States into increased popularity at home, while its portrayal of itself as a defender of the Palestinians gained the Houthis a regional following. Their strikes, enabled by Iranian personnel assisting in locating and targeting ships for attack and by Iranian resupply of weapons, continued until they announced a pause when the Gaza cease-fire came into effect on Jan. 19.
In our discussions with regional partners, both Arab and Israeli, we heard one common refrain: to stop the Houthis, you must kill their leaders. The top Houthi commander, Abdul Malik al-Houthi, sees himself as a rising regional strongman, not a mere proxy of Iran. Kill him and his top lieutenants, we were advised, and perhaps Houthi aggression will abate.
That kind of targeting is easier said than done, especially in a remote, rugged place like Yemen. Houthi leaders take precautions with their personal safety, operate underground and embedded in civilian populations, and are protected by sophisticated air defenses that the U.S. military acknowledges have downed American MQ-9 surveillance drones.
In order to mount a sustained campaign against such targets, the U.S. military requires additional intelligence and needs cooperation—both analytical and operational—from key regional partners. A mission of this type takes time and comes with trade-offs, as asset-collecting against one target must be moved off of others.
From Trump administration officials’ descriptions of their strikes, it sounds as though the intelligence picture has matured enough to target Houthi leaders. That is necessary and appropriate, provided care is taken to minimize civilian casualties as much as possible (The Houthis said children were among the dead after the U.S. attack.). But this will need to be a sustained effort. The Houthis claimed they responded in real time with attacks on the USS Harry S. Truman carrier strike group that led the U.S. strikes (if true, apparently unsuccessfully). And al-Houthi popped up hours after the U.S. strikes with a typically defiant speech.
President Donald Trump’s team has promised an “unrelenting” campaign until the Houthis end their attacks. As it carries out that campaign, it will also face the following challenges:
The Houthis are unlikely to just roll over. They endured years of bombing by Saudi-led coalition forces before a 2022 cease-fire and peace negotiations. They have a high pain threshold. They see combat with the United States as both ideologically worthy and politically beneficial. They may take the aggressive tone Trump adopted as a challenge. And they have proved flexible and adept in making use of new weapons systems and creative tactics.
In response to U.S. strikes, the Houthis may launch attacks against Arab partners who host American forces, including Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Bahrain. That threat has constrained the cooperation those states have offered in previous rounds. Bolstering their air defenses will be necessary to maintain their support, which provides operational benefits.
A sustained campaign against the Houthis will come with trade-offs. Forces sent to the Middle East might come at the expense of deployments to the Indo-Pacific, where they would be used to help contain aggression by China. These forces are needed in the Middle East, given the threat the Houthis pose to freedom of navigation—a core U.S. interest—and in light of their backing by Iran, which the United States must also deter from pursuing a nuclear weapon. But competing demands exist, and there will be calls internally to divert resources elsewhere.
Iran must be held at risk over its support to the Houthis. The Houthis have diversified their supply networks, but they could not succeed to the extent they have without Iranian provision of equipment, intelligence, training, and targeting data. U.S. National Security Advisor Michael Waltz was right to threaten Iran clearly with consequences if that support continues. The non-denial denial issued by Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps commander Gen. Hossein Salami should not be taken seriously but indicates that the Iranians know they may be at risk.
Finally, the military tool is necessary but not sufficient to solve the Houthi problem. The Trump administration has already added useful tools by restoring the designation of the Houthis as a foreign terrorist organization, opening new sanctions possibilities. Interdicting weapons shipments transiting by land and sea, and toughening U.N. inspections of cargo entering the Hodeidah port, are also key tools. But political measures should not be taken off the table. It is insufficient to say, as U.S. Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth did, that we don’t care what happens in the Yemeni civil war. The Houthis’ success in that war brought us to this point. So even if Houthi leaders are removed, there needs to be a “then what?” Support for the Republic of Yemen government—the Houthis’ rivals—and a negotiation to install credible, consensus leadership will be necessary to prevent a replay of these Houthi battles all over again.
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