The shocking turn in U.S. policy away from Ukraine and its long-standing allies and toward Russia has led European leaders to make a fundamental reassessment of their security requirements. Gone are the days where faith in dialogue and reliance on the United States could be assumed. Now, Europe needs to take responsibility for bolstering Ukraine and defending itself.
The March 6 emergency European Council meeting resulted in fundamental agreement on a core principle: European governments, alone and together, will devote the necessary resources to finance a rapid buildup of their defenses and support for Ukraine. These decisions are critically important, for without adequate funding there can be no real security.
The shocking turn in U.S. policy away from Ukraine and its long-standing allies and toward Russia has led European leaders to make a fundamental reassessment of their security requirements. Gone are the days where faith in dialogue and reliance on the United States could be assumed. Now, Europe needs to take responsibility for bolstering Ukraine and defending itself.
The March 6 emergency European Council meeting resulted in fundamental agreement on a core principle: European governments, alone and together, will devote the necessary resources to finance a rapid buildup of their defenses and support for Ukraine. These decisions are critically important, for without adequate funding there can be no real security.
But money alone is not enough. The key question Europeans still need to answer is how to ensure Ukraine’s security without U.S. backing and how to take primary responsibility for their own defense. Both will take time—in the latter case even years to complete. While U.S. President Donald Trump’s Washington may ultimately leave Europe no choice but to move forward on its own, European leaders would be well advised to make the United States an offer that will be hard to refuse.
Such an offer would have two elements: First, a commitment to deploy a significant reassurance force into Ukraine to prevent future Russian attacks as part of any cessation of hostilities. And second, a clear timetable for transitioning primary responsibility of Europe’s defense onto European shoulders.
To support negotiations to end the war in Ukraine, Europe should agree to deploy four fully enabled armored brigades, backed by robust air power and other critical combat assets including air and missile defenses, to deter Russia and reassure Ukraine that the resumption of war would immediately involve Europe and its military.
This commitment, however, would need to be conditional on four elements. First, Ukraine needs to be part of any negotiation leading to a cease-fire, and Europeans deploying a security force need to have full and complete transparency regarding the substance and outcome of negotiations.
Second, Ukraine’s military capabilities must not be constrained by any agreement or negotiated settlement with Russia. Moreover, continued Western support to the Ukrainian Armed Forces should also be unrestricted, as a credible Ukrainian military is a condition for a lasting peace.
Third, European combat deployment needs to be under NATO command and control, even if the United States opts out of participating on the ground (as other allies have done in past operations). Most European militaries have been trained, equipped, and operated in combat as part of NATO or U.S.-led operations, especially in nonpermissive environments. The United States has always opposed duplicative European efforts to establish parallel command structures and insisted on the integration of European high-intensity combat power within NATO. To achieve a successful mission and enable a lasting peace, European forces in Ukraine require access to NATO command and control, intelligence, enablers, and other strategic assets.
Finally, the United States needs to remain fully committed to Article 5 and commit to defend Europe in case of an armed attack against a NATO member. Europeans cannot be expected to weaken their defense and deterrence capacity by deploying their most advanced capabilities to prevent the recurrence of war in Ukraine without the sure knowledge, reaffirmed at the highest level, that the United States remains fully committed to NATO’s collective security and defense.
In the longer term, Europe needs to take primary responsibility for its defense. Decades of European under-investment have left Europe woefully unprepared to take a major, let alone a leading, role in its defense. European allies must commit to a clear timeline transitioning responsibility from the United States to Europe for its defense through three key steps.
First, by the end of 2025, European forces should replace the 20,000 U.S. troops deployed to Europe following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. However, this commitment only applies if no European forces are deployed in Ukraine, for it does not have the forces necessary to do both within the suggested timeframe.
Second, by the end of this decade, non-U.S. NATO allies will fill 70 percent to 80 percent of the force and capability requirements of the NATO Response Force. This includes the ability to deploy around 75,000 troops in 10 days, another 225,000 troops in 30 days, and a further 400,000 troops in six months. All these forces will be ready, fully trained, and fully equipped for sustainable, high-intensity combat operations.
Finally, by the end of 2032, non-U.S. NATO allies will procure and deploy 75 percent of all required advanced strategic enablers. The United States has for decades provided the bulk of these critical forces to NATO—including heavy airlift, aerial refueling, intelligence and targeting information, advanced surveillance and reconnaissance, integrated air and missile defenses, and more. To take primary responsibility for the defense of Europe, Europeans need to invest in acquiring these strategic assets to enable the United States to redeploy them to other contingencies.
In making these commitments, it is important that the United States also agree to several commitments of its own. First, Washington needs to agree to an orderly transition over the next five to 10 years by drawing down its forces and capabilities only as new European capabilities are fielded. The United States should also commit to carrying a significant, if much reduced, part of the collective defense burden, including through the support of U.S. strategic enablers, after Europe has taken primary responsibility for its defense.
Second, Washington needs to commit to heading the overall NATO command structure (Saceur) and all force commands (land, air, and maritime) by dual-hatting its European commanders under the NATO structure, notwithstanding other adjustments in the command structure. While Europeans will bear the brunt of NATO’s defense, a U.S. commitment to continue providing the command-and-control glue to hold NATO together is vital.
Finally, Washington needs to affirm that it will continue to provide the backbone of NATO’s nuclear deterrence, including with the continued deployment of nuclear forces in Europe as part of NATO’s nuclear-sharing agreements. The role of other nuclear and non-nuclear allies is to strengthen this deterrent posture.
It’s time for a new trans-Atlantic bargain—one where Europe takes primary responsibility for security on the continent and where the United States empowers and enables Europe to do so. The White House may be in no mood to accept this timeline for transitioning responsibility, but agreeing to it will strengthen Europe’s commitment to its own security and a renewed trans-Atlantic relationship.
The article, which includes inputs by Camille Grand, Kajsa Ollongren, and Daniela Schwarzer, draws on a report titled A New Transatlantic Bargain: The Case for Building a Strong European Pillar, published by the Belfer Center at the Harvard Kennedy School last month.
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