As the war in Ukraine enters its fourth year, the toll of relentless drone attacks, grim front-line updates, and the psychological strain of protracted conflict have shifted Ukrainian public opinion. Roughly one-third of Ukrainians surveyed are now open to territorial concessions and 44 percent believe negotiations are overdue.
Earlier this month, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky signaled his openness to negotiations and suggested to the Trump administration that U.S. military support—or a potential NATO path—be traded for access to Ukraine’s vast rare earths and natural resources. Instead of strengthening Kyiv’s negotiating position, however, the proposal invited what many Ukrainians view as economic colonization: a draft agreement granting Washington control over critical minerals, oil and gas deposits, strategic infrastructure, and half of Ukraine’s resource extraction revenues—all without firm security guarantees. Ultimately, Ukraine rejected the deal.
As the war in Ukraine enters its fourth year, the toll of relentless drone attacks, grim front-line updates, and the psychological strain of protracted conflict have shifted Ukrainian public opinion. Roughly one-third of Ukrainians surveyed are now open to territorial concessions and 44 percent believe negotiations are overdue.
Earlier this month, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky signaled his openness to negotiations and suggested to the Trump administration that U.S. military support—or a potential NATO path—be traded for access to Ukraine’s vast rare earths and natural resources. Instead of strengthening Kyiv’s negotiating position, however, the proposal invited what many Ukrainians view as economic colonization: a draft agreement granting Washington control over critical minerals, oil and gas deposits, strategic infrastructure, and half of Ukraine’s resource extraction revenues—all without firm security guarantees. Ultimately, Ukraine rejected the deal.
At the same time, the diplomatic landscape has grown more complex as U.S. President Donald Trump has decided to end Russia’s international isolation and normalize U.S.-Russia relations. After a three-year effort by the United States to isolate Russian President Vladimir Putin over his invasion of Ukraine, Trump talked to him on the phone last week, which was followed by U.S.-Russia talks in Saudi Arabia. Notably, the conversations excluded Ukrainian and European representatives.
U.S. officials have begun checking off items on Putin’s wish list. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth recently dismissed the idea of Ukraine joining NATO and urged Kyiv to abandon its goal of reclaiming all occupied territory. At the recent Munich Security Conference, Vice President J.D. Vance’s remarks signaled a growing rift within the Western alliance, which was welcomed by Moscow.
The next possible item on the list? Forcing early elections in Ukraine before any peace agreement is signed—an effort to remove Zelensky from power. On Feb. 18, Trump suggested Ukraine was to blame for starting the war and said Ukraine should have new elections as a precondition for negotiations.
Kyiv may soon find itself caught between two foreign leaders, both eager to see a change in its leadership for their own reasons. Delegitimizing another country’s leader is a familiar ploy in the Russian playbook, and while Ukraine falling back into Russia’s sphere of influence might seem unthinkable now, it could, in fact, become a reality over the course of a decade. Recent Ukrainian history and broader geopolitical trends provide ample evidence of this risk.
Removing Zelensky and initiating elections is exactly what Russia is waiting for. Putin has claimed Zelensky is “illegitimate” because Ukrainian elections scheduled for 2024 were postponed and said he has no right to sign any peace agreements as a result. More importantly, ousting him would allow Putin to claim progress on one of his war’s key objectives: “denazification.” Despite Zelensky’s Jewish heritage, Russian propaganda has cast him as the leader of a “Nazi-controlled” Ukraine—a narrative that Putin has used to justify the invasion and rally domestic support.
Trump has his own grievances. Zelensky was at the center of Trump’s first impeachment, after he attempted to pressure Kyiv into investigating Joe Biden. On Feb. 19, Trump, who has previously criticized Ukraine’s push for U.S. aid, called Zelensky a “dictator without elections,” after the Ukrainian leader said that the U.S. president is living in a “Russian disinformation bubble.”
A change in power would hand Putin the leverage he needs to achieve his ultimate goal—erasing Ukraine as an independent state. Russia has mastered the art of infiltrating foreign governments by using the Kremlin’s well-worn playbook, which includes spreading disinformation, as well as promoting pro-Russian narratives and political candidates. Often referred to as hybrid warfare, it is used to shift the political direction of nations aligned with Western ideals, pulling them back under Moscow’s influence.
In Ukraine’s case, this strategy would allow Russia to exploit internal divisions and political corruption, gradually maneuvering pro-Russian leadership into power through political subversion. From there, Ukraine could be pulled back into Russia’s orbit, especially if the United States continues to treat Kyiv as a resource to be extracted rather than a partner to be defended and if Europe remains unwilling and unable to confront Moscow directly. The consequences of such a scenario would be far more devastating in the long run than any negotiated settlement over territory or security guarantees.
Ukraine’s recent history offers a stark example of how pro-Russian forces can reemerge, even after a seemingly decisive defeat.
The 2004 Orange Revolution famously thwarted Viktor Yanukovych’s presidential ambitions and brought a pro-Western leader, Viktor Yushchenko, to power. But in 2010, just six years later, Yanukovych returned and won the Ukrainian presidency, demonstrating how quickly political momentum can shift. What appeared impossible in 2004 became a sobering fact in 2010, a reminder that Moscow’s favored candidates can rebound if Western support for Ukraine falters or fragments.
The experiences of Georgia and Moldova, too, show that even countries that have faced Russian aggression and partial occupation of their territories can still fall back under the Kremlin’s influence.
Despite Russia’s 2008 invasion of Georgia and ongoing Russian occupation of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, Moscow was eventually able to steer the ruling Georgian Dream party toward a pro-Russian position. With the help of billionaire Bidzina Ivanishvili, the Georgian government froze European Union accession talks and pushed through a “foreign agents” bill similar to Russian legislation, which was seen by many Georgians as a betrayal of their nation’s pro-Western aspirations. Sustained propaganda, political corruption, and voter intimidation have all contributed to this slow drift eastward.
Moldova’s continued vulnerability is obvious, given the de facto occupation of Transnistria since 1992. The Kremlin’s playbook—spanning clandestine financing of pro-Russian political forces, election meddling, and organized intimidation—resurfaced in Moldova’s recent presidential elections. President Maia Sandu claimed that Russian money aimed to buy 300,000 votes for a pro-Russian candidate. The country staved off a turn toward Russia due to Sandu’s eventual victory, which hinged on the support of Moldovans living abroad, beyond Moscow’s reach.
Additionally, Hungary and Slovakia also show how Russia manipulates political corruption to steer EU and NATO members closer to its orbit.
In Hungary, Moscow capitalizes on Prime Minister Viktor Orban’s government through lucrative projects financed largely by Russian loans and high-profile sponsorship deals, such as Gazprom’s support for the Ferencvaros football club. Such economic entanglements benefit Orban’s inner circle while pro-Russian media outlets like Voice of Europe spread Kremlin-friendly narratives. Hungary has become a low-risk hub for Russian intelligence activities and a shield for key Kremlin allies from EU sanctions, positioning Budapest as a Trojan horse within Western institutions.
Slovakia, meanwhile, offers a parallel cautionary tale. By fueling disinformation networks that framed NATO and the United States as aggressors in Ukraine, the Kremlin helped propel nationalist leader Robert Fico back to power in Slovakia’s 2023 parliamentary elections. Once in office, Fico halted direct arms shipments to Ukraine. His next step was to weaken democratic safeguards by dismantling the Special Prosecutor’s Office, which was investigating corruption cases and taking greater control over media. Today, Fico continues to align Slovakia’s policies more closely with Russian interests.
These examples demonstrate how consistently Russia applies the same methods, from choosing and backing a figure with electoral prospects to installing authoritarian pro-Russian regimes, funding them through corruption and supporting them by spreading disinformation.
If Ukraine is pushed into early elections now, Moscow would have the perfect opportunity to promote a candidate who promises an end to the bloodshed, a return to “normalization” with Russia to avoid everyday terror, or simply a seat at the negotiating table—offering, at least on the surface, better terms than Zelensky’s isolation.
A Kremlin-backed candidate wouldn’t need to win outright; they would only need to fracture Ukraine’s political landscape, erode unity, and create a perception that a pro-Russian alternative is viable. In the short term, this might appear as a path to peace, offering war-weary Ukrainians relief from relentless attacks. However, in the long run, it would pull Ukraine back under Russia’s influence, especially without a strong Western alternative to counterbalance Moscow’s grip.
For Trump, this would amount to a strategic loss, allowing Russia to achieve its objectives without a military victory. Worse, it could happen before the end of his term, shaping a legacy of defeat in one of the most significant conflicts of the 21st century. This would not only empower Moscow but also send a message to U.S. allies across the world that U.S. commitments are unreliable.
If Ukraine falls, the Kremlin’s success would echo far beyond Eastern Europe, encouraging further geopolitical shifts in Russia’s and, more importantly, China’s favor. To prevent this, the Trump administration should approach Ukraine’s future with patience and strategy, resisting quick fixes that could ultimately embolden the Kremlin and signal waning U.S. influence on the global stage.
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