For decades, U.S. policy toward Africa has underdelivered or outright failed for both Washington and Africa—and the Trump administration appears to have noticed. On Feb. 3, it announced that it was shuttering the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), a key element of traditional U.S. engagement with Africa. In explaining the closure, Secretary of State Marco Rubio criticized the agency for violating the guiding precept of President Donald Trump’s foreign policy—namely, that it should scrupulously focus on winning concrete achievements for Americans.
U.S.-Africa policy desperately needs a dose of realism. Perhaps more than any other area of foreign policy, Washington’s engagement with the continent is overly idealistic and impractical. For decades, Washington has deployed unworkable tactics in pursuit of unachievable goals—and seen its competitors thrive on the continent while U.S. influence and popularity slumps.
For decades, U.S. policy toward Africa has underdelivered or outright failed for both Washington and Africa—and the Trump administration appears to have noticed. On Feb. 3, it announced that it was shuttering the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), a key element of traditional U.S. engagement with Africa. In explaining the closure, Secretary of State Marco Rubio criticized the agency for violating the guiding precept of President Donald Trump’s foreign policy—namely, that it should scrupulously focus on winning concrete achievements for Americans.
U.S.-Africa policy desperately needs a dose of realism. Perhaps more than any other area of foreign policy, Washington’s engagement with the continent is overly idealistic and impractical. For decades, Washington has deployed unworkable tactics in pursuit of unachievable goals—and seen its competitors thrive on the continent while U.S. influence and popularity slumps.
To ensure better returns on its Africa investments, the administration should overhaul the core elements of Washington’s policy toward the continent and enshrine commercial engagement as the new central area of effort.
A prosperous Africa is manifestly in the United States’ interests, but U.S. development assistance has failed to bring about widespread development on the continent.
Africa today has a larger population of poor people than at any time in history, though the overall rate of poverty has decreased slightly since 1990. In many countries, corrupt officials also often plunder or even fight over development assistance, and generous U.S. aid may shield feckless and corrupt regimes from being held accountable by their citizens.
Similarly, while development assistance could be a useful lever for Washington’s policymakers, in its current form, it has bought precious little U.S. influence. African governments often vote alongside U.S. rivals against Washington on key issues at the United Nations. South Africa openly aligns with the likes of Hamas and Russia despite being the largest beneficiary of the U.S. President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief program. Senior officials in places such as Zimbabwe deride the U.S. government, despite the billions of dollars Washington has given it over the decades. African governments largely treat U.S. assistance as something that they are owed, rather than as a favor to reciprocate.
Rubio noted that some USAID activities will continue within the State Department, and certain elements are worth preserving. U.S.-funded public health programs have been a clear success in saving millions of African lives. They are also key to the unquantifiable but nonetheless real moral authority that helps the United States in its struggle for influence against China.
With reforms requiring more recipient country ownership of the programs and stronger safeguards against illegal uses such as funding abortions, these programs can continue to save lives and prevent terrible diseases such as Ebola from reaching the United States. Other programs that help counter China, such as the first Trump administration’s funding for countries’ removal of Chinese telecommunications equipment from their networks, should continue as well.
Absent compelling mitigating circumstances, however, Washington should stop aiding countries with hostile regimes, such as Zimbabwe, and instead reserve its assistance for friendlier nations. The Trump administration should also condition aid on support for key U.S. objectives. That would include important votes at the United Nations, though such conditions should be used sparingly and only on votes that materially affect Americans’ well-being. Most African countries will oppose the United States at the U.N. for other reasons, and Washington doesn’t want conditioning to be a perpetual irritant in its Africa relationships.
And while some may fear that conditioning could drive countries into China’s arms, aid as it is currently used hasn’t prevented African countries from enthusiastically embracing Washington’s rivals. What is required now is to demonstrate to African countries that a healthy partnership with the United States, and all the benefits that it can bring, requires reciprocity.
Another key element of traditional U.S.-Africa policy is the promotion of democracy and respect for human rights. While a world with as many democratic states that protect human rights as possible falls squarely within U.S. national interests, Washington hasn’t discovered how to successfully encourage the spread of democracy. On the contrary, coups proliferated across a band of sub-Saharan Africa over the past four years even as the Biden administration made democratic renewal a key part of its foreign-policy agenda.
Part of the problem is how unrealistic the United States’ democracy goals can be. Washington pushes for Western-style democratic governance in countries with radically different societies, histories, and cultures from the West.
Consider Somalia, where a long-held aim of U.S. policy is promoting “democratic governance” under the rubric of a strong central government. Yet Somalia’s society is atomized by clan rivalries that make such a goal utterly impractical. Working bilaterally with those of Somalia’s constituent states that are relatively well-functioning, especially Somaliland, would be a far more realistic goal and therefore have an actual chance of success.
Washington’s engagement on democracy and rights in Africa should flow from sober assessments of countries’ cultures, histories, and societies. If there is no plausible scenario in which a country’s government would embrace those values, Washington should tailor its engagement within the constraints of that reality. The U.S. government can try to quietly persuade partner governments on the benefits of democracy and human rights, but it shouldn’t sacrifice achievable U.S. objectives in a vain cause.
U.S. tactics need an overhaul as well. At times, Washington pointlessly antagonizes African partners with public lectures that seem designed mostly for domestic U.S. political consumption. Public remonstrations can be appropriate if they serve a material, achievable American interest, but it’s impossible to browbeat countries into a genuine embrace of democracy and respect for human rights.
Less public posturing would avoid some of the reputational damage that comes when Washington must inevitably compromise on its principles. It would also give policymakers more room for maneuver in tricky situations such as during coups. Instead of treating all putsches as equally bad, requiring Washington to stop dealing with the government or power responsible, a nuanced policy of treating juntas according to what is at stake for U.S. interests would be better.
According to the 2024 Afrobarometer survey, most Africans polled would, in fact, accept a coup if it ousted abusive leaders. This suggests that rather than “democracy,” the United States should adopt “legitimacy” in the eyes of the people as the gauge for good governance.
Africa is key to the global competition against China, Russia, and Iran. So, as Washington demands more of its African partners, it must simultaneously better demonstrate the benefits of friendship with the United States.
The Trump administration should start by making commercial exchange the heart of its policy toward Africa. African governments would welcome an approach built around trade and investment, as nearly all of them face a youth unemployment crisis. Focusing on activities that African governments welcome—rather than forcing on them democratization programs and progressive understandings of cultural issues such as LGBTQ rights that they often resent— would ensure greater U.S. success in Africa.
American companies profiting in Africa also contribute to the U.S. economy and spread soft power that helps bind other countries to the United States. Their operations can strengthen the types of economic, regulatory, and governance norms that are crucial for a fair playing field that allows U.S. firms to grasp lucrative opportunities. Commercial ties also foster equal partnerships requiring contributions from both sides, whereas humanitarian aid always creates an imbalanced donor-supplicant relationship.
Ironically, a commercial-first engagement may also help speed the growth of democracy and respect for human rights. Increasing prosperity doesn’t always lead to more democratic systems, but a merchant class and middle class are generally stabilizing forces that can check the worst impulses of governments.
There will, of course, be challenges. Washington will need to better motivate and aid U.S. firms interested in Africa. It will also have to upgrade its abilities to help African governments improve their business environments.
The Trump administration must also prepare for the bruising bureaucratic battles that will erupt if it starts redirecting the budgets and personnel necessary to make commercial-first engagement a success. It will require pivoting away from unserviceable tactics and unrealistic objectives and toward results-based policies.
Africa is too important to U.S. security and prosperity to continue a dysfunctional U.S.-Africa policy. By refocusing on what benefits the United States, Africa will benefit, too.
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