The return of U.S. President Donald Trump to the White House has sent ripples of concern through Cairo since November as Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi and his inner circle grapple with the implications of a second Trump administration. While Trump’s first term was marked by outward friendliness toward Sisi—Trump famously called the Egyptian leader his “favorite dictator”—the reality of their relationship was far more complicated and, at times, detrimental to Sisi’s interests.
Sisi’s regime, which relies heavily on external financial and political support, saw Trump’s presidency as a double-edged sword; despite the warm rhetoric, Trump’s policies and unpredictability often undermined Sisi’s strategic goals. Within the first week of Trump’s return to office, the Egyptian leader’s fears had been confirmed, with Trump insisting on solving the Gaza crisis by having Egypt and Jordan take in more than a million refugees each—a move that would greatly destabilize Sisi’s regime, if not undermine it completely.
The Egyptian state responded to Trump’s Gaza demand in a stern and clear statement that did not even mention Trump by name—leading him to double down on his demands. The reaction on Egyptian social media was notable for its unanimity, with both regime supporters (who are few) and detractors (who are many) unifying behind Sisi against Trump.
The sentiment throughout the country is head-spinning, especially in contrast to how hopeful Sisi was about the relationship eight years ago.
Sisi initially saw Trump’s first election as an opportunity to strengthen his position vis-à-vis the Persian Gulf countries.
In 2016, Egypt and Saudi Arabia reached a controversial agreement to transfer sovereignty of the two Red Sea islands, Tiran and Sanafir, to Saudi Arabia in exchange for an estimated $16 billion in aid and investments—a deal that was met with widespread public opposition in Egypt, with critics accusing Sisi of “selling” Egyptian territory.
Sisi wanted to pocket the aid money and use the Egyptian public’s opposition to delay the transfer to Saudi Arabia indefinitely. He hoped to do so by leveraging his relationship with Trump to pressure the Gulf countries, especially Saudi Arabian Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman.
However, this strategy appeared to backfire during the Riyadh summit in 2017, when Trump pressured Sisi to expedite the transfer of the islands to Saudi Arabia. Sisi reluctantly complied, but Egypt has since used bureaucratic delays and legal challenges to obstruct the full transfer.
Despite Trump’s outward friendliness toward Sisi, his first-term administration provided little in the way of tangible support. Trump’s aversion to foreign aid meant that Egypt received no significant uptick in financial assistance during his first term, and there were no major new arms deals between the two countries.
At the time, this lack of support was not a significant blow. But since the COVID-19 pandemic, the Russia-Ukraine war, and Sisi’s financial mismanagement completely destabilizing Egypt’s economy, Sisi regime has grown more and more dependent on external funding to survive.
Another area where Trump’s presidency posed challenges for Sisi was on the issue of human rights. Despite his reputation for ignoring human rights abuses in allied countries, Trump’s administration cut some aid on human rights grounds and successfully secured the release of Egyptian American activist Aya Hijazi from an Egyptian prison.
This release, which occurred under significant Western pressure, was notable because it marked the last time in the past seven years that such pressure led to the freeing of an activist in Egypt.
By contrast, the Biden administration provided Sisi with a more favorable environment, offering financial lifelines and easing pressure on human rights issues. Under the Biden administration, Egypt has faced less pressure to finalize the transfer of the Red Sea islands, allowing Sisi to maintain a degree of control there. The Biden White House took a softer approach on human rights, rarely commenting on Egypt’s abuses and even attempting to release $300 million in withheld military aid—a symbolic gesture that was ultimately blocked by the Senate.
Economically, the Biden administration threw Egypt a critical lifeline, securing an International Monetary Fund deal nearly three times larger than previous agreements—and stripped of stringent conditions—to ensure Cairo’s cooperation with Israel during the war against Hamas in Gaza. This financial infusion, alongside Gulf investments, funneled more than $50 billion into Egypt’s struggling economy in 2024 alone, with promises of more to sustain the fragile rapport between Sisi and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.
The Biden-era State Department also approved the sale of almost $5 billion of advanced weapons, including Abrams tanks and Hellfire missiles, to Egypt. Had former Vice President Kamala Harris won the 2024 election, based on her campaign statements and time in office, this arrangement of financial support and weapons deals would likely have continued.
Instead, there is now an existential threat looming over Sisi’s regime: the revival of the agreement that Trump once called the “deal of the century.”
Trump’s controversial Middle East peace plan remained a flash point between the two leaders during Trump’s first term, despite Sisi’s public acquiescence to it. The proposal’s most explosive provision demanded that Egypt cede territory in the Sinai Peninsula to resettle displaced Gazans—a red line for Egypt’s military establishment, which viewed it as both a security risk and a political death warrant for Sisi.
The plan stalled as Trump pivoted to pandemic management and his 2020 reelection bid, sparing Sisi an immediate confrontation. Trump’s reelection, however, likely guarantees the plan’s resurrection. Trump has picked up where he left off in 2020—and his efforts come at the worst possible moment for Sisi, whose regime is grappling with unprecedented economic fragility and domestic discontent.
Compounding Sisi’s anxieties is Cairo’s assessment of U.S. leadership dynamics: Biden defers to Netanyahu, while Trump aligns with the Saudi crown prince. Not a single Arab country, including the Gulf states, has issued a statement of support for Egypt’s position in publicly rejecting Trump’s demands about Palestinian refugees. The reality is that many in the Gulf countries see the displacement of Gazans into Sinai as a viable solution—even if they would never say the quiet part out loud.
Though the Gulf states have historically mediated between Egypt and Washington, they could again collude with Trump to pressure Cairo on issues ranging from hosting Palestinians in Sinai to returning the islands to Riyadh.
Despite a joint statement issued on Feb. 4 by the foreign ministers of Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Egypt, and Jordan rejecting Trump’s plan, the unity among these nations remains fragile.
The statement, which came in response to Trump’s “we will own it” Gaza press conference, underscores the region’s collective resistance to the proposal. Egypt, in particular, has taken a firmer stance, with its foreign minister releasing a separate declaration condemning any resolution to the Palestinian issue that relies on forced displacement. However, this solidarity may prove fleeting if Trump intensifies pressure on these nations, leaving Sisi to navigate yet another precarious geopolitical challenge.
Facing such a scenario, Sisi has spent the past year crafting countermeasures to avoid being cornered. For Egypt, the task is clear: find a way to survive Trump’s ambitions without sacrificing its own stability or sovereignty.
In the realm of geopolitical strategy, Egypt has long adhered to a doctrine of calculated obstruction—delaying, complicating, or derailing initiatives to extract concessions. As one Egyptian general quipped to me 10 years ago, speaking on the condition of anonymity, “If we made everything run smoothly, who would call us and ask for favors?”
Today, this doctrine faces a threefold test: obstructing Trump’s Sinai plan, pressuring Israel to respect Egyptian sovereignty amid rising border tensions, and cultivating a non-Israeli regional ally to counterbalance Gulf influence. To navigate this trifecta, Egypt has embarked on a multifront campaign of military posturing and strategic realignment.
Reports since last year—vigorously denied by Cairo—detail a gradual but deliberate Egyptian military buildup in Sinai, likely breaching the Camp David Accords after Cairo saw that Washington was doing nothing to constrain Israel’s own breaches of the accords by occupying territory along the Egyptian border.
Although the Sinai buildup was initially coordinated with Israeli approval, the deployment grew contentious after Egyptian and Israeli forces clashed near the Gaza border during Israel’s bombardment of the enclave in May 2024.
Reported signs of the buildup include expanded airbases in Bardawil and Al-Arish, underground tunnels beneath the Suez Canal for rapid troop movements, and stockpiles of advanced weaponry. While Egypt has no intention of war with Israel, the message is clear: By having Israel accuse it of violating Camp David, Cairo reframes the conversation from Trump’s Sinai resettlement plan to one of mutual accusations of treaty breaches.
This would stoke public anger at Israel and force Gulf states to side politically with Egypt against supposed Israeli provocations, complicating regional dynamics and buying Sisi leverage.
Simultaneously, Egypt has pivoted to Turkey as a strategic counterweight. The September 2024 Ankara summit, culminating three years of normalization efforts, solidified a partnership rooted in shared opposition to Israeli policies. Turkey’s decision to restrict trade with Israel—prompting Israeli calls for sanctions—made it an ideal partner for Egypt to signal defiance.
Behind the scenes, military collaboration has also deepened: Since 2023, Egyptian delegates have negotiated drone and advanced missile purchases with Turkey’s Defense Industry Agency, exploiting loopholes in Camp David’s restrictions.
The alliance also gives Egypt the ability to be the major player in the Horn of Africa, as it likely aims to pressure Ethiopia, an ally of the United Arab Emirates, over Nile water disputes by leveraging Turkey’s influence, which has strengthened after resolving the recent dispute over Somaliland.
For Gulf states, the prospect of a Turkish-Egyptian axis—uniting two historic rivals—poses a nightmare scenario, destabilizing their regional dominance and incentivizing restraint in confronting Sisi.
Yet these maneuvers carry risks. Israel has grown wary of Egypt’s Sinai militarization while Gulf states view Turkey’s expanding footprint as foreign and unwelcome—evoking the humiliation of the era of Ottoman rule over the Arabian Peninsula.
For Sisi, however, the calculus is clear: Obstruction and chaos are survival tools. By muddying the waters, Sisi has in the past transformed Egypt from a supplicant into a spoiler, forcing adversaries to negotiate on his terms.
Yet, if the first few weeks of Trump’s presidency have shown anything, it’s that he is a master of chaos in his own right—unpredictable, unrelenting, and often unbound by conventional diplomatic norms. Sisi’s reliance on calculated disruption may prove a double-edged sword, as Trump’s penchant for unpredictability could easily turn the tables, leaving Cairo scrambling to adapt to a game where the rules are rewritten daily.
As Trump’s second administration solidifies, Sisi’s regime faces its most precarious moment—a high-stakes game where missteps could unravel decades of careful balancing.
Whether his gambit succeeds hinges on one question: Can Sisi’s obstruction outlast Trump’s ambition?
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