You may have never heard of the National Nuclear Security Administration, but its work is crucial to your safety—and to that of every other human being on the planet. If Elon Musk’s Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE) hasn’t yet come across the NNSA, it surely will before too long. What happens after that could be alarming.
As recently as yesterday morning, Musk made clear that DOGE will go line by line through the government’s books looking for fat targets for budget-cutting, including those that are classified. Especially those that are classified. DOGE employees are bound to notice NNSA, a 1,800-person organization that sits inside the Department of Energy and burns through $20 billion every year, much of it on classified work. But as they set out to discover exactly how the money is spent, they should proceed with care. Musk’s incursions into other agencies have reportedly risked exposing sensitive information to unqualified personnel, and obstructing people’s access to lifesaving medicine. According to several nuclear-security experts and a former senior department official, taking this same approach at the NNSA could make nuclear material at home and abroad less safe.
The NNSA was created by Congress in 1999 in order to consolidate several Department of Energy functions under one bureaucratic roof: acquiring fissile material, manufacturing nuclear weapons, and preventing America’s nuclear technology from leaking. It has all manner of sensitive information on hand, including nuclear-weapon designs and the blueprints for reactors that power Navy ships and submarines. Even the Australian Navy, which has purchased some of these submarines, is not privy to their precise inner workings, said James Acton, the co-director of the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
So far, the people who work for DOGE have not wished to be slowed down by cumbersome information-security protocols. Late last week, they reportedly demanded access to a sensitive Treasury Department system that controls government payments. When the most senior civil servant at the Treasury raised security concerns, DOGE engineers were undeterred, according to The New York Times. They were happy to blast ahead while he resigned in protest.
The employees at DOGE are reportedly working seven days a week, on very little sleep. This slumber-party atmosphere isn’t a great fit for the sober and secretive world of nuclear weapons, where security lapses are hugely consequential. I spoke with three former officials and nuclear experts about what might happen if DOGE were to take a too-cavalier approach to the NNSA. None believed that Musk’s auditors would try to steal important information—although it is notable that not everyone at DOGE is a federal employee, many lack the security clearance to access the information they are seeking, and Musk had to be stopped from hiring a noncitizen. Nuclear-security lapses don’t need to be intentional to cause lasting damage. “When access to the NNSA’s sensitive systems is not granted through proper channels, they can be compromised by accident,” the former senior official at the Department of Energy, who requested anonymity to discuss internal matters, told me. “You could stumble across some incredibly sensitive things if you are coming at it sideways.”
DOGE employees might try to avoid file systems that are known to contain nuclear-weapons designs. But they could still create some risk, simply by inquiring into the ways that the NNSA spends money abroad, Acton said. (Overseas expenditures have been a focus for DOGE.) The NNSA helps other governments keep highly enriched uranium secure within their own borders, and also arranges for them to ship it to the United States for safekeeping. The details of these agreements may include information about the degree to which a country’s uranium is enriched, its precise whereabouts, and the nature of the security systems that protect it—all of which are very sensitive. If one of Musk’s recruits were to access this information on their personal laptop, they could expose those secrets to hackers or spies.
A terrorist in possession of such information could find it easier to steal material for a nuclear device, Acton said. Even the mere perception that DOGE was not minding proper security protocols could hinder the NNSA’s relationships with other countries, which are essential to its nonproliferation work. These countries may not feel like they can trust the U.S. during a security breach or other kinds of emergencies.
One nuclear-security expert with more than 10 years experience told me that he’s worried that DOGE employees will poke around in personnel records at the NNSA, as they have at other federal agencies. (The expert did not wish to be identified, because he has previously worked with the United States government and governments abroad.) As part of a larger inquiry into which employees are most productive, and who gets paid what, they could potentially access the “SF-86” forms that federal employees fill out when applying for a security clearance. Those may contain information about a person’s vulnerabilities that would be useful to the hostile foreign governments that hope to recruit NNSA employees to their cause.
On a Monday-night conference call for concerned federal workers organized by Representative Don Beyer of Virginia, a federal contractor that works with the Energy Department asked what to do if DOGE demands access to classified nuclear data. They wouldn’t be able to complain to the inspector general. Donald Trump reportedly fired the one who oversees the Department of Energy on his fourth day in office. On the call, they were told to speak with security officials at their agency. But this is cold comfort: When DOGE employees tried to access a secure system at USAID that included personnel files, John Voorhees, that agency’s director of security, confronted them. The DOGE employees threatened to call the U.S. Marshals, and in the ensuing standoff, DOGE prevailed. Voorhees and his deputy were placed on administrative leave.
None of this is to say that the NNSA should be exempted from questions about its budget. The agency likely overspends on some things, as any bureaucracy will. But nonexperts will struggle to determine what is essential and what is excessive in its highly specialized and technical realm. Building nuclear weapons is not like making widgets. DOGE can try to root out waste, but it should take its time, and avoid the break-it-to-rebuild-it approach that Musk tends to prefer. A tech-start-up mindset might be dangerous, the former official told me. “That doesn’t work with nuclear weapons.”
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