Through nearly 16 months of war in Gaza, politicians and analysts debated competing proposals for the territory’s postwar governance, but no clear direction emerged while the fighting continued.
Now, as a fragile cease-fire holds and as Israel and Hamas prepare for negotiations to extend the truce, four rival models for Gaza’s future have begun to take shape.
Hamas, weakened but unbowed, still controls most of the territory and is trying to entrench that authority. Under the terms of the cease-fire, Israel is meant to withdraw gradually from Gaza, but its troops still occupy key parts of it. Right-wing Israeli leaders want their forces to expand that control, even if it means restarting the war.
A group of foreign security contractors offers another model. At Israel’s invitation, they are running a checkpoint on a crucial thoroughfare in northern Gaza, screening vehicles for weapons. Some Israeli officials say that activity could develop into international stewardship of a much wider area, involving Arab states instead of private contractors.
And in the south, representatives of the Palestinian Authority began over the weekend to staff a border crossing with Egypt, working with European security officials. The authority, which lost control of Gaza to Hamas in 2007, hopes that it could, in time, replicate those efforts across the entire territory.
For now, it’s unclear which template will emerge as the dominant model. The outcome will likely depend in large part on President Trump, who is set to discuss Gaza’s future on Tuesday in Washington with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu of Israel. And Saudi Arabia could tilt the scales if it agrees for the first time to forge formal ties with Israel — in exchange for a particular governance structure in Gaza.
Here’s what the models entail and how likely they are to succeed.
Hamas rule
When releasing hostages in recent weeks, Hamas has made a point of showing that it remains the dominant Palestinian force on the ground. Hundreds of masked Hamas militants have assembled at each release point, projecting the sense that the group, though battered by 16 months of war, is still in charge.
Hamas security officials have also re-emerged to assert a semblance of order across the territory, stopping and screening vehicles and trying to defuse unexploded ordnance. Municipal officials have also started shifting rubble.
For most Israelis, Hamas’s long-term presence is unpalatable. Some might accept it if Hamas agreed to release all the remaining hostages held in Gaza. Others, particularly on the Israeli right, want to resume the war, even if it costs the lives of some of those captives, to force Hamas out.
If Hamas does stay in power, it will be hard for the group to rebuild Gaza without foreign support. Because many foreign donors will most likely be wary of helping unless Hamas steps down, it is possible that the group might willingly cede power to an alternative Palestinian leadership, instead of continuing to preside over an ungovernable wasteland. In talks mediated by Egypt, Hamas’s envoys have said they could hand over administrative responsibilities to a committee of Palestinian technocrats, but it’s unlikely that the group would willingly disband its armed wing even if it stopped running Gaza’s civilian affairs.
Israeli occupation
When the cease-fire began last month, Israel retained control of a buffer zone along Gaza’s borders that is several hundred yards wide. To end the war and secure the release of all the hostages in Gaza, Israel eventually needs to evacuate this territory. But that is unthinkable to important members of Mr. Netanyahu’s coalition, meaning that he may extend Israel’s occupation, or even expand it, to avoid the collapse of his government.
To do that, however, Mr. Netanyahu would probably need the support of the Trump administration, which has signaled that it wants to see the cease-fire extended to allow for the release of every hostage. Returning to war would also scupper any short-term chance of a deal between Israel and Saudi Arabia — a major international achievement that Mr. Netanyahu has long coveted.
An international force
When Israeli troops withdrew last week from much of the Netzarim Corridor, a strategic area that connects northern and southern Gaza, they allowed a cohort of foreign security contractors to fill the void. Led by Egyptian security guards, the contractors screen northbound traffic for weapons, hoping to slow Hamas’s efforts to rearm its militants in northern Gaza. Two U.S. companies are involved in the process, but it is unclear what role they play on the ground.
For now, the process is a small-scale trial that lacks the formal involvement of Arab countries other than Egypt and Qatar, the two states mediating between Israel and Hamas. But some Israeli officials say that it could be expanded — both in terms of geography and responsibility — to encompass administrative roles across a wider area, backed publicly and financially by leading Arab states like Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.
Neither is likely to seek a formal role without the blessing of the Palestinian Authority.
The authority, which Hamas forced from Gaza in 2007, still runs part of the West Bank and is considered the only serious Palestinian alternative to Hamas. But Israeli leaders see the authority as corrupt and incompetent and have dismissed the idea of giving it a major role in Gaza, at least for now. The Israeli right also opposes empowering the authority, lest it emerge as a credible state-in-waiting.
The Palestinian Authority
That said, the authority’s representatives quietly began working in another part of Gaza over the weekend, suggesting that parts of the Israeli leadership may in practice be more flexible about the authority’s involvement.
Israel allowed officials from both the European Union and the Palestinian Authority to restart operations at the Rafah crossing — a checkpoint on the border between Gaza and Egypt. The crossing had been closed since Israel invaded the Rafah area last May.
Publicly, the Israeli government downplayed the authority’s involvement at the checkpoint, partly to avoid angering members of Mr. Netanyahu’s coalition.
But the operations at Rafah have fueled speculation that Mr. Netanyahu, under pressure from Mr. Trump and Arab leaders in the Gulf, might grudgingly tolerate a wider role for the authority, perhaps in partnership with foreign peacekeepers or contractors.
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