U.S. President-elect Donald Trump’s negotiating style is often less about winning friends and influencing people and more about wielding a big stick—though arguably, he hasn’t mastered the art of speaking softly. Late last month, Trump began using his social media platform, Truth Social, to antagonize some U.S. allies, namely Canada, Denmark, and Panama.
That rhetoric will likely complicate the role of Rep. Elise Stefanik, Trump’s nominee for ambassador to the United Nations. The New York Republican’s confirmation process is scheduled to begin with a Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing on Jan. 21.
U.S. President-elect Donald Trump’s negotiating style is often less about winning friends and influencing people and more about wielding a big stick—though arguably, he hasn’t mastered the art of speaking softly. Late last month, Trump began using his social media platform, Truth Social, to antagonize some U.S. allies, namely Canada, Denmark, and Panama.
That rhetoric will likely complicate the role of Rep. Elise Stefanik, Trump’s nominee for ambassador to the United Nations. The New York Republican’s confirmation process is scheduled to begin with a Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing on Jan. 21.
Eight years ago, Trump’s nominee for U.N. ambassador, then-South Carolina Gov. Nikki Haley, was confirmed four days after his inauguration. Stefanik’s confirmation is likewise expected to go smoothly compared with some of Trump’s other cabinet-level nominees, who have faced questions about their qualifications or integrity.
Those at the United Nations headquarters in New York will parse Stefanik’s words as she undergoes the committee’s questioning. (She seems more comfortable on the other side of the table.) Both Stefanik and Trump are deeply critical of the United Nations, and Trump slashed funding for certain U.N. programs and agencies during his first term. Some U.N. diplomats expect that if Stefanik is confirmed, she will focus on Israel’s concerns and won’t be a staunch advocate for Ukraine the way that the outgoing U.S. team has.
A sitting member of Congress hasn’t directly gone on to serve as the United States ambassador to the United Nations since 1997, when the Senate approved New Mexico Rep. Bill Richardson for the role under President Bill Clinton. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee will likely question Stefanik about her role as a member of the House Republican leadership and while serving on congressional committees, including the House Armed Services and Intelligence committees.
Some close observers hope that the senators will also delve into the incoming president’s refusal during a recent news conference to rule out the use of military force to take control of the Panama Canal or Greenland, which is a territory of Denmark. Both Denmark and Panama will serve in elected seats on the U.N. Security Council for the next two years. “Will she acknowledge that Trump’s rhetorical threats on Greenland and Panama hurt our credibility at the U.N. and undercut our values?” a former senior U.S. official told Foreign Policy.
To be sure, there is more at stake than the working relations of the Security Council. The countries that Trump has provoked all lie along critical maritime routes. Both Canada and Denmark—through its Greenland territory—are among the eight Arctic countries. (With climate change, the waters around Greenland could become more important for naval operations.) Meanwhile, China has in recent years declared itself a “near-Arctic state,” though it lies well below the Arctic Circle. This type of geostrategic risk is what the U.N. was founded to navigate through peaceful means.
Stefanik’s potential future counterparts will also pay attention to whether she is questioned about her commitment to honoring the U.N. Charter’s principle of the sovereign equality of states and about how she will handle relations with Russia on the Security Council. The council is one of the few international venues where Washington and Moscow have been talking in the wake of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, though diplomats describe the encounters in the closed-door meetings as even more volatile than in public meetings.
The Senate Foreign Relations Committee could raise the matter of a briefing this week by the U.N.’s Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine regarding its report that described the widespread and systematic use of torture by Russia against civilians and prisoners of war. Senators could even ask Stefanik about Ukraine’s persistent reminder that Russia technically sits in the permanent seat of the Soviet Union on the Security Council. (The language in the U.N. Charter was never revised after the dissolution of the Soviet Union.)
In addition to the five permanent Security Council members—China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States—five elected members join each January for two-year terms. The “E10,” as the 10 elected members are known, have taken a more active role in sponsoring resolutions as cooperation among the permanent members has broken down over the wars in Gaza and Ukraine—and more recently because of Russia’s decision to use its veto to block nuclear inspections in North Korea, which has been supplying the Kremlin with weapons and soldiers.
Though the Security Council has been notoriously dysfunctional in recent years, the situation could become even more difficult. Panama, as a new council member, is reportedly considering requesting a Security Council meeting on Trump’s threats against the country, which would place Stefanik in an awkward position at the start of her tenure. During remarks at a flag installation ceremony this month for the newly elected council members, Panama’s ambassador to the United Nations, Eloy Alfaro de Alba, described his country’s flag as flying “alone and proud over the Panama Canal” and praised former U.S. President Jimmy Carter’s “enlightened, visionary, and decent gesture of fairness” in the 1977 treaty that ultimately transferred full control of the canal to Panama.
Although the five permanent Security Council members can use their veto to block resolutions, they generally prefer to round up enough votes to avoid casting a veto because doing so requires them to stand at the General Assembly podium and explain their veto to all 193 U.N. member states. This is a relatively new rule that was instituted in April 2022 in response to Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, but last year, the United States was often at the podium defending its veto regarding the war in Gaza.
If the cease-fire announced this week in Gaza is approved and goes ahead as planned, Stefanik may not be required to explain her veto to the General Assembly as often as her predecessor. But some U.N. diplomats say she will chiefly focus on Israel’s concerns, possibly starting with the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees (UNRWA), which Israel has banned from operating in territories that it claims. Less than two months before Trump announced her nomination, Stefanik wrote an opinion piece for the Washington Examiner titled “If the United Nations continues its antisemitism, the US must withdraw support.”
Stefanik’s confirmation hearing might also explore how reinstating the first Trump administration’s cuts to U.S. financial contributions to the United Nations—or possibly even greater reductions—could affect China’s position within the world body. Stefanik has established a reputation in Congress as a China hawk. She was a member of the China Task Force, which became the Select Committee on the Chinese Communist Party.
Trump, meanwhile, has a record of slashing U.S. funding for certain U.N. programs and agencies. During his first term, the United States withdrew from the Paris Agreement and from UNESCO, the latter over perceived anti-Israel bias. Trump also eliminated U.S. funding for the U.N. Population Fund because of abortion policies and reduced funding for the World Health Organization, accusing it of mismanagement and saying that China wielded too much influence over the agency. The United States also reduced funding for UNRWA during Trump’s first term, calling the agency inefficient and in need of reform.
However, since Trump’s first inauguration, China surpassed Japan to become the second-largest financial contributor to the U.N. regular budget, which covers administrative costs and some programs, and raised voluntary contributions to other U.N. agencies and programs. Although many diplomats sense that the United Nations could benefit from greater efficiency, they also worry that if the Trump administration cuts too deeply, China will see that as an opening to exert greater sway within the U.N. system—where a citizen of the largest donor often sits in the corner office of a program or agency.
“Money equals influence at the U.N. If the U.S. doesn’t pay its dues or if it lowers its voluntary contributions, China will use their dues to insert more Chinese nationals at the U.N.,” the former U.S. official said.
Last month, as Trump’s threatening social media posts began circulating, the word that U.N. diplomats most often used to describe their mood about the incoming administration was “trepidation.” It is noteworthy, though, that despite Stefanik’s direct and occasionally confrontational style in congressional committee hearings, some diplomats described her as a pragmatist whom they hoped they could work with even when she advocates policies that might go against the grain at the United Nations.
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