More than 11,000 troops from North Korea, with possibly many more to come, are fighting in Russia’s war against Ukraine. Many commentators speculate that the situation worries China, North Korea’s nominal ally, because it could risk sullying Beijing’s reputation by association; entangle security on the Korean Peninsula—China’s doorstep—with a raging European war; and lead to North Korea conspiring with Russia behind China’s back. For those reasons, some imagine that Beijing might be convinced to throw a spanner in the works of the Moscow-Pyongyang coalition.
These conjectures are misguided. Beijing is unlikely to oppose, much less do anything to stop, North Korea’s military support to Russia. China has made it clear, both rhetorically and through its actions, that it wants Russia to prevail in Ukraine or at least avoid what Russian President Vladimir Putin has called a “strategic defeat.” China’s motivations are multilayered. They include Chinese President Xi Jinping’s investment in deepening relations with Putin personally and Russia generally.
More than 11,000 troops from North Korea, with possibly many more to come, are fighting in Russia’s war against Ukraine. Many commentators speculate that the situation worries China, North Korea’s nominal ally, because it could risk sullying Beijing’s reputation by association; entangle security on the Korean Peninsula—China’s doorstep—with a raging European war; and lead to North Korea conspiring with Russia behind China’s back. For those reasons, some imagine that Beijing might be convinced to throw a spanner in the works of the Moscow-Pyongyang coalition.
These conjectures are misguided. Beijing is unlikely to oppose, much less do anything to stop, North Korea’s military support to Russia. China has made it clear, both rhetorically and through its actions, that it wants Russia to prevail in Ukraine or at least avoid what Russian President Vladimir Putin has called a “strategic defeat.” China’s motivations are multilayered. They include Chinese President Xi Jinping’s investment in deepening relations with Putin personally and Russia generally.
Beijing also supports the principle of Moscow defending its “legitimate security interests” (sometimes translated as “concerns”). That phrase shows up in official statements articulating Xi’s Global Security Initiative. What China means by legitimate security interests is the right of major powers to assert a veto over the political and security relationships of its neighbors, and to enforce them militarily if necessary. Beijing displays this attitude through its military pressure toward Taiwan and India, as well as its relentless efforts to undermine U.S. alliances in East Asia, such as those with Japan and the Philippines.
China has given Russia colossal amounts of economic assistance and technical support. China is also continually testing the limits of what type and scale of military support it can provide Russia before the United States and European allies take steps to punish it. It is only fear of Western reprisals, such as tighter export controls, sanctions, or a complete rupture of relations, that prevents Beijing from directly providing traditional overt military assistance to Russia.
North Korea’s military assistance to Russia—first in the form of artillery shells and missiles, and now troops—has aided Moscow’s war effort at a critical juncture. North Korea has thus done what China would likely have done if it didn’t fear the diplomatic, financial, and military costs.
Beijing wants to ensure that Kim Jong Un’s regime remains stable. Russia’s remunerations to North Korea in the form of food, fuel, and potentially technical military assistance on space, satellites, and missiles bolster the government in Pyongyang. China also provides food and fuel to North Korea, occasionally in violation of Western and even United Nations sanctions. So having a partner step in to aid Xi’s objectives and shield China from scrutiny is all upside for Beijing.
On a broader level, North Korea’s assistance helps prolong the war in Ukraine, thereby occupying scarce U.S. strategic attention and resources that might otherwise be directed toward China. In addition, U.S. President-elect Donald Trump’s return to the White House will create momentum for a cease-fire based on freezing the current battle lines. North Korean troops helping to retake Russia’s Kursk Oblast from Ukrainians frees up Russian forces to focus on defending and expanding their position in Ukraine prior to Trump’s return.
Russia coming out of its war with Ukraine with significant territorial gains will be key to the perception that Moscow has “won.” For China, that outcome will be a signal to Taiwan that major powers can seize territory, even in the face of intervention from democratic partners, if the invading power simply sticks it out long enough to triumph.
Beijing hopes that will help convince Taipei that resisting unification is futile and that it is “inevitable,” as Xi has put it, the two will be combined. Taken together, North Korea sending troops to Russia represents a geopolitical exchange of mutual benefit—and the rising tide of Russia-North Korea relations raises China’s boat, too.
Admittedly, those who, like this author, engage with the community of Chinese international relations experts often hear them express dismay at North Korea stepping in to help Russia in Ukraine amid deeper Moscow-Pyongyang cooperation across the board. Those Chinese voices, however, tend to hail from the more Western-facing networks in China rather than the authoritarian-friendly cadres that typically carry the day with Xi.
Western analysts must therefore be aware of what is at best a sampling error and, at worst, wishful thinking. Some in China’s leadership compound of Zhongnanhai are probably pointing out the drawbacks, but those voices are likely to be in the minority. Beijing’s official response that Russia-North Korea military cooperation is “their own matter” and has nothing to do with China is telling. Chinese interlocutors sometimes also profess dismay as a way to entice U.S. and European officials to implore China to intervene, as U.S. officials reportedly did in Washington last October and President Joe Biden discussed with Xi in November. Such entreaties give Beijing diplomatic leverage and an opportunity to demand something in return.
China might be underestimating the diplomatic and reputational costs of its position, including the risks of motivating European countries to take a greater interest in Asian security through initiatives like NATO’s Indo-Pacific Quad. But those risks rarely seem to determine policy during Xi’s time in office. For him, “bloc confrontation” with the United States and its democratic allies is already a reality of world politics because Washington initiated it. The primary question is how to respond.
This is not to say Russia-North Korea cooperation can never extend to activities China opposes, because it could. One possible concern is that Russia provides North Korea with certain advanced military technologies. Russia has reportedly already assisted North Korea with a satellite launch that could improve Pyongyang’s missile program. Putin could go even further by providing reentry vehicle or submarine technologies, both underdeveloped parts of North Korea’s nuclear delivery vehicles and platforms. But Moscow has a natural interest in withholding its crown-jewel technologies as long as possible.
During the Cold War, there was a time when China would have been paranoid about Russia and North Korea conspiring behind its back. Those worries, however, are now relics of a bygone era characterized by a radically different balance of power among this authoritarian triangle. Suspicions and backbiting are certainly present in those relationships behind closed doors. But Xi probably worries little about his partners circumventing him in meaningful ways given his close relationship with Putin and, more importantly, the fact that China is the senior partner in relations with both Russia and North Korea. Putin and Kim might test the boundaries of China’s position on some issues, but neither dictator can afford to act in ways that Xi would consider a blatant transgression.
Instead of beseeching China to step in, efforts from the United States and its allies would be better spent trying to identify and exacerbate natural friction points between North Korea and Russia. North Korea might be offended if its troops suffer high casualties, and it perceives they were used as cannon fodder. (Not that Kim cares about them on a human level, but this would be seen as a signal of disrespect for North Korea generally and squandering of its military assets.)
North Korea probably also worries about cultural contamination of its soldiers amid reports that they are “gorging on pornography” alongside the often-undisciplined Russian forces. Russia, meanwhile, might grow frustrated by often-dodgy North Korean military equipment. Moscow could also eventually see calling in North Korean forces as a mistake if it prompts South Korea to provide military assistance to Ukraine.
Western attempts to get Beijing to restrain its most pugnacious partners are understandable—they are just unlikely to work. For now, at least, China sees the North Korean troops fighting in Ukraine as a feature, not a bug, of closer authoritarian cooperation with and among Moscow and Pyongyang.
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