In December, as the Assad regime was collapsing in Syria, U.S. President-elect Donald Trump made clear his view that the United States should not get involved. This happened while I was attending the Doha Forum, where, in the same building, the Iranian, Turkish, and Russian foreign ministers were scurrying to engage in an impromptu meeting to discuss rapidly advancing Syrian opposition forces.
The developments left Middle East experts to ponder how far Trump’s sentiment might extend beyond Syria in a second term—for example, would it include Iran?
For a dozen years, I spent my professional career working mostly on Middle East issues in the U.S. intelligence community, analyzing how foreign leaders’ behavior and domestic and regional politics drive their policies. I have briefed Trump in the Oval Office and seen up close the benefits and drawbacks of his trademark unpredictability on U.S. national security.
As the new administration takes shape, foreign-policy experts are trying to read the tea leaves of Trump’s cabinet and White House appointments to decipher what they might mean for his Iran policy. Instead, they should focus on his statements: Trump is in many ways the most transparent president in decades. His rhetoric often reveals his intentions, even as decisions made by both foreign adversaries and allies can influence his plans.
In an interview last October, Trump said, “I would like to see Iran be very successful. The only thing is, they can’t have a nuclear weapon.” That could portend three possibilities: a broad deal related to all issues the West has with Iran (its nuclear program, proxies, and ballistic missile program); a narrow deal related only to its nuclear program; or a military strike to eliminate the program.
What does this mean in terms of strategy? While senior officials around Trump disagree on an approach to Iran, more likely to drive his initial policy is how he prioritizes two competing instincts: the desire to strike a deal with Iran over its nuclear program versus acting on a personal grievance—Tehran trying to kill him. At minimum, the expectation should be that Iran’s assassination efforts will be forefront on Trump’s mind, even if he ultimately prioritizes a deal. The more traditional foreign-policy hawks in his administration will not let him forget it.
The path Trump chooses—dealmaking or revenge—will shape U.S. policy and reverberate across the Middle East. Both options will require Trump to significantly increase actual pressure: new sanctions and better enforcement of existing ones, ousting Iran from U.N. bodies whose purpose it consistently violates, and more joint U.S. military exercises with Israel. They will also require the threat of pressure, including working with European allies to invoke snapback provisions and reiterating explicitly that the United States will use military force to prevent Iran from achieving a nuclear weapons capability if necessary.
Those who see additional pressure on Iran as unnecessary because Tehran has already stated its willingness to engage in nuclear talks might be correct if a new deal was solely about the nuclear program, but that would be a mistake. Rather, what is needed is a broader deal that also addresses Iran’s regional malign influence—its provision of weapons as well as financial and training support to terrorist organizations—and requires a verifiable commitment to not rebuild Hezbollah or Hamas.
If Trump leans toward a deal focused solely on Iran’s nuclear program, it could alienate not only traditional Republicans, moderate Democrats, and many within his administration—such as Secretary of State-nominee Marco Rubio and National Security Advisor-designate Mike Waltz—but also Israeli officials. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said in June 2023 that “Israel will not be bound by any deal with Iran and will continue to defend itself.”
Even those who favor negotiations would likely be alarmed at a narrow focus on the nuclear program, especially as Iran faces a growing economic and energy crisis. I should know: For much of the past two years, I led an effort to forge bipartisan consensus on a new U.S. policy toward Iran, not dependent on who won the U.S. election.
Among the key conclusions was that any future deal with Iran cannot address its nuclear program alone or there will be “insufficient levers of influence and assets available for [future] negotiations regarding Iran’s regional malign influence.”
Today, the idea of a nuclear weapons-only deal that would provide Iran with renewed political, military, and financial bandwidth in the form of sanctions relief that could be used to rebuild Hamas and Hezbollah would be nonsensical. Hamas in Gaza is a fraction of the threat that it was to Israel before Oct. 7, 2023; Hezbollah’s political influence and military capabilities are diminished in Lebanon; and Iran has not been this weak since the 1979 revolution.
Israel’s successful operations against Hezbollah over the last six months helped set into motion a sequence of events that resulted in the ousting of the Assad regime in Syria and the loss of the land bridge connecting Iran with Hezbollah—all while providing the first opportunity in decades for the Lebanese state to meaningfully assert its sovereignty.
Alternatively, if Trump focuses on the personal affront of Iran’s effort to assassinate him, it might encourage him to attack Iran directly and ramp up U.S. efforts to diminish the threats posed by the Houthis in Yemen in a more strategic approach that merges with Israel’s own efforts against the group.
Though some might advocate for Trump to offer Iran negotiations in exchange for it halting support to the Houthis, such a strategy would be flawed. If implemented, it might delay further Houthi attacks on U.S. interests and allies in the region, but it would do little to eliminate the group, which is does not always follow Tehran’s preferences.
A direct attack on Iran might dismay Republican isolationists including Vice President-elect J.D. Vance—who in October emphasized that the United States and Israel at times have “distinct interests” and that “not going to war with Iran” is in the U.S. interest—and some Democrats in Congress who want Washington to be less militarily engaged in the region.
Trump himself has seemed to be at least rhetorically receptive to that argument, noting during his Republican nomination acceptance speech, “With our victory in November, the years of war, weakness, and chaos will be over.”
But Trump may view striking Iran to exact revenge as too good of an opportunity not to take, and Netanyahu would encourage it.
Israel views this moment as its best opportunity in decades to set back or destroy Iran’s nuclear program and to continue to decimate the regional network that Iran has leveraged to threaten Israel and regional states.
For years, Israel has been deterred from military action by the threat of a massive missile retaliation from Hezbollah and Iran. But neither Israel nor the United States views Iran and its allies as threatening today as they did one year ago. As a result, while Iran, Hezbollah, and the Houthis still have significant arsenals that could cause death and destruction in Israel and among U.S. troops in the region, the calculus has shifted when it comes to a strike on Iran’s nuclear program.
With Iran’s air defenses destroyed, the odds of a successful U.S. or joint operation against the program have increased, and it is being considered by at least some of those in Trump’s inner circle.
But a narrow nuclear-only deal and militarily destroying Iran’s nuclear program ironically both risk unsettling Gulf allies. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates—staunch advocates of Trump’s “maximum pressure” campaign during his first term—are in a fundamentally different place today.
Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman is focused on diversifying his country’s economy away from oil, which requires significant and sustained foreign direct investment. But if Iranian or Houthi missiles are raining down on Saudi Arabia in the coming years, that FDI stream is going to quickly dry up.
Saudi Arabia hoped that peace process talks with the Houthis would succeed and mitigate some of its security concerns. However, talks remain stuck, and the chances for a near-term resolution will be further diminished after Trump’s inauguration—with his administration planning to reimpose a terrorist designation on the group.
Moreover, both a nuclear-only deal and U.S.-backed military strikes on Iran—without additional defensive guarantees from Washington—risk reinforcing concerns in Riyadh and Abu Dhabi that Washington is an unreliable partner. In September 2019, the Houthis launched strikes on the Saudi Abqaiq and Khurais oil facilities. In January 2022, the group attacked oil infrastructure and a construction site for Abu Dhabi’s new airport. Officials from both countries see Washington’s reaction to those episodes as proof that the United States is insufficiently committed to their defense.
In the years since, both Saudi Arabia and the UAE determined that the best alternative to protect their homelands and avoid attacks from Iran or its proxies was to de-escalate tensions with Tehran. Saudi Arabia engaged in a high-profile rapprochement, and the UAE has advanced diplomatic and economic ties to try to tamp down tensions, an almost complete reversal from Riyadh’s and Abu Dhabi’s positions supporting Trump’s first-term maximum pressure campaign.
To convince both allies to revert to a stance of maximum pressure against Iran, Trump will almost certainly have to persuade them that the United States will provide the security that they seek. For Saudi Arabia, that could require a defense pact, probably modeled after U.S. defense treaties with Japan and South Korea. For the UAE, a similar treaty might be of interest but not as critical given that the Emiratis have demonstrated themselves to be the most capable military power in the Gulf, making a promise of support and more advanced hardware potentially sufficient.
The lack of additional defense commitments could drive both Saudi Arabia and the UAE to seek a balance: appearing supportive of a new maximum pressure campaign but not engaging in it so much that it undermines the détente both have advanced with Iran in recent years.
But it could also drive countries to continue to hedge by expanding defense ties with China instead. Saudi Arabia recently agreed to purchase Chinese-developed drones and in 2022 signed $4 billion worth of arms deals with Beijing. Last July, China and the UAE held their second joint air exercise; alarms have gone off multiple times in Washington in the last four years over reports that China was building a military base near Abu Dhabi.
As the Trump team debates its approach to Iran, it is unlikely that their advice will foster a cohesive policy. Rather, the president-elect’s prioritization of dealmaking or revenge will ultimately drive his decision-making.
Trump’s best chance for long-term success vis-à-vis Iran is to ramp up pressure to increase his leverage and ultimately secure a broad deal that addresses not only Iran’s nuclear program but also its regional malign influence. Whatever Trump’s approach, the impact will not be limited to Iran: It will also strengthen or weaken Washington’s relationships with its key Middle East allies.
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