With Republicans controlling the White House and both the House and the Senate, Democrats are feeling despondent about 2025. They understand that, since the 1970s, periods of united government have been extraordinarily important in moving public policy forward in new directions. Presidents who have a keen understanding of the dynamics of partisan power have deployed control of both branches of government to attempt big legislative agendas—which President Joe Biden succeeded in pushing in 2021 and 2022—before those windows of opportunity close.
But in these moments, the minority party is not powerless. Under effective leaders, the party that is out of power has found ways to block some of the most threatening initiatives and force presidents to retreat from signature legislation. Doing so has not been easy, requiring leadership that can prevent the minority from splintering as pressure intensifies to cut some sort of deal. Democrats’ own party history in the 21st century offers important models for the year ahead.
With Republicans controlling the White House and both the House and the Senate, Democrats are feeling despondent about 2025. They understand that, since the 1970s, periods of united government have been extraordinarily important in moving public policy forward in new directions. Presidents who have a keen understanding of the dynamics of partisan power have deployed control of both branches of government to attempt big legislative agendas—which President Joe Biden succeeded in pushing in 2021 and 2022—before those windows of opportunity close.
But in these moments, the minority party is not powerless. Under effective leaders, the party that is out of power has found ways to block some of the most threatening initiatives and force presidents to retreat from signature legislation. Doing so has not been easy, requiring leadership that can prevent the minority from splintering as pressure intensifies to cut some sort of deal. Democrats’ own party history in the 21st century offers important models for the year ahead.
After President George W. Bush won reelection in 2004 against Massachusetts Sen. John Kerry—a dispiriting time for Democrats that left many in the party making jokes about moving to another country—he vowed to spend the “political capital” he had earned on reforming Social Security by privatizing it. With reports emerging about problems with Social Security’s long-term solvency, Bush was prepared to defy the conventional wisdom put forward 50 years earlier by fellow Republican President Dwight Eisenhower who said, “Should any political party attempt to abolish Social Security, unemployment insurance, and eliminate labor laws and farm programs, you would not hear of that party again in our political history.” President Ronald Reagan had backed away from his effort to tamper with the so-called third rail of American politics in 1981 and 1982; Bush was the first Republican since then to seriously take on the program. Given that his own approval ratings were only at about 52 percent—despite his reelection—this was a high-risk maneuver.
The president’s privatization plans had deep roots in the idea that had been circulated by Republican think tanks such as Cato based on overseas experiments with social insurance (particularly in Chile under the military dictator Augusto Pinochet). “As we fix Social Security, we also have the responsibility to make the system a better deal for younger workers,” Bush said in his 2005 State of the Union address, “and the best way to reach that goal is through voluntary personal retirement accounts.” Although the details were fuzzy, the private accounts would allow individuals to divert a percentage of their payroll tax into a personal fund and to make their own decisions—while accepting the risk—about how to invest the funds. The plan would take money away from the collective pool of payroll funds used to pay for retirees and individualize the risk to retirees rather than guaranteeing standardized benefit levels. The president undertook a “60 stops in 60 days” to sell the plan.
Republican Sen. Charles Grassley, chair of the Finance Committee, warned the administration that, in the Senate, “nothing gets done that’s not bipartisan.” In the House, the Republican majority was 232 to 201 (with one independent); in the Senate, 55 to 44 (with one independent).
Most Democrats perceived the proposal as a dangerous threat to one of the most consequential social safety net programs, from Franklin Roosevelt’s presidency. Since its establishment during the New Deal, Social Security provides retirement benefits to the elderly paid for by tax contributions from working Americans. The taxes and benefits were universal so that every citizen would become invested in the program in a similar manner. Privatization undermined this foundational structure.
After waiting for the president to put forward a legislative proposal that she knew would be unpopular with large portions of the public, Minority Leader Nancy Pelosi (D-Calif.) made it clear that Democrats would not support this initiative. Pelosi understood that party unity would be essential to blocking the Republicans, who had narrow majorities. “House Democrats are focused and united on making sure people know the facts about the Republicans’ proposal and its impact on Americans,” said Pelosi spokeswoman Jennifer Crider. If Democrats stood firm, any breaks within the GOP would undermine the president. Pelosi leaned on any member who felt pressure to cut a deal with the Republicans for fear that Bush had a mandate after his reelection. In the Senate, Minority Leader Harry Reid did the same. Avoiding the perennial pressure in Washington to embrace bipartisanship, House and Senate Democrats remained true to their party. According to Congressional Quarterly Almanac, House Democrats were more united than at any other time in the previous half century; Senate Democrats had only been as much in unison in 1999 and 2001.
As Democrats continued to spread the message that Bush and the GOP were threatening a popular federal program that working Americans depended on, getting specific about benefits that would be lost, some Republicans started to see clearly that the electorate was not with their party. Moreover, the handful of moderate Democrats such as Max Baucus of Montana, who had toyed with the idea of a compromise, saw how deeply unpopular the proposal was among voters. According to an ABC News/Washington Post poll that May, 58% of Americans reported that the more they heard about the plan, the less they liked it. As was often the case, the public might have hated government, but it loved Social Security.
In the Senate, the filibuster required Republicans to come up with 60 rather than 50 votes. Social Security is not considered within the normal federal budget so using the reconciliation process—which prevents filibusters—was not feasible. As long as Democrats were all on the same page, Bush would not be able to pass the bill. While many Democrats did not like the filibuster and saw the process as a tool of obstruction, as long as it was on the books, they would lean on the rule as a wall against GOP success.
By the summer, Republicans were starting to splinter, and by season’s end, Bush was forced to admit that his program was dead on arrival.
Twelve years later, Democrats faced another moment of truth when President Donald Trump, along with the Republican Congress, wanted to repeal—and replace, though never defined with what—the Affordable Care Act. The ACA (aka Obamacare) had constituted a bold expansion of federal health care policy. The program had survived political and legal attacks, including in the Supreme Court, and had slowly become an entrenched component of health care in states red and blue. Trump sensed that going after Barack Obama’s signature legislation would constitute a huge legacy-making victory for his administration. “We have to get to business,” Trump told the New York Times. “Obamacare has been a catastrophic event.”
Though deflated and still stunned by Trump’s victory, congressional Democrats mobilized. Republican majorities were slim. In the House, Republicans enjoyed 240 seats to the Democrats’ 194; in the Senate, the breakdown was 52 to 46 (with two independents, both of whom caucused with the Democrats).
Like Bush and Social Security, they sensed that the new president was overplaying his hand by attempting to dismantle a program that had become increasingly popular since its passage in 2010. Once again, Democrats made the decision to stick together. Rather than succumb to the seduction of Washington bipartisanship, Pelosi and Reid kept their members on the same page, echoing a resounding no. After the House Republicans passed the package without Democratic support, Pelosi warned her GOP colleagues: “You have every provision of this bill tattooed on your forehead. You will glow in the dark on this one.”
Democrats continued to warn voters of the implications of Trump’s proposal by speaking of specific benefits that would be taken away should Trump succeed. Americans under 26 would no longer be covered by their parent’s health insurance. Companies would be able to discriminate, as they had done in the past, against persons with preexisting conditions. States that were enjoying increased Medicaid funding would see those dollars cut. Healthy people would no longer be required to purchase insurance, which would raise overall cots, and government subsidies for insurance would be gutted.
Since Democrats remained united, they forced a showdown in the Senate. Unlike in the case of Bush’s Social Security legislation, Senator Majority Leader Mitch McConnell was able to put the ACA repeal proposal into the reconciliation process. This meant that it was filibuster-proof, and lowered the votes that Republicans needed to 51 rather than 60—increasing the vulnerability of the ACA. Yet Democrats succeeded. Since no Democrats would vote for the legislation, the small breaks that emerged among Republicans who were looking at the poll numbers hurt Trump’s cause. The most famous moment was when the late Sen. John McCain walked up to the podium in July 2017 and gave the bill a dramatic thumbs down, giving Trump one of his most devastating defeats.
On July 18, a defeated Trump complained about his colleagues. “For seven years,” the president said, “I’ve been hearing ‘repeal and replace’ from Congress, and I’ve been hearing it loud and strong. And then when we finally get a chance to repeal and replace, they don’t take advantage of it. So that’s disappointing.”
In the coming year, Democrats will inevitably suffer some major defeats, since Republicans do have the votes to succeed.
But Democrats are not helpless. House Minority Leader Hakeem Jeffries and Senate Minority Leader Chuck Schumer can create effective roadblocks for Trump in his second term, as long as they can keep their members in line and use the procedural and financial tools available to party leaders to prevent defections. In the case of both Social Security and the ACA, the party remained united, with leaders offering a clear and compelling message. The party also used the legitimate legislative process in responsible ways to prevent passage. Democrats can do so again with judicious decisions about timing and priorities.
The Republicans have power in the House and Senate, but barely. Their majorities are even narrower than those the GOP enjoyed in 2005 or 2017: In the Senate, Republicans have 52 seats Democrats have 45, and there are two independents. In the House, it’s even closer: The GOP has 219 seats and Democrats have 215. With numbers like these, any break within the Republican Party has the potential to quickly bring down a Trump proposal—as it did with the nomination of former Rep. Matt Gaetz for attorney general. Since the filibuster remains on the books, to the consternation of many Democrats who still see the rule as a big problem, Republicans will need 60 votes on any measure that remains outside the reconciliation process.
Democrats need to embrace the power of responsible partisanship rather than run away from it. Strong parties, operating within the boundaries of legitimate processes and political tactics, have been an enormously effective tool in blocking aggressive presidents making bold moves. Without engaging in the kind of destructive hyper-partisanship that has characterized Republican politics, leaders like Pelosi have demonstrated repeatedly how effective a team that remains united can be even in the most trying of times.
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