Two years ago, U.S. intelligence analysts concluded, in unusually emphatic language, that a mysterious and debilitating ailment known as “Havana syndrome” was not the handiwork of a foreign adversary wielding some kind of energy weapon. That long-awaited finding shattered an alternative theory embraced by American diplomats and intelligence officers, who said they had been victims of a deliberate, clandestine campaign by a U.S. adversary, probably Russia, that left them disabled, struggling with chronic pain, and drowning in medical bills. The intelligence report, written chiefly by the CIA, appeared to close the book on Havana syndrome.
Turns out, it didn’t. New information has come to light causing some in the intelligence community to adjust their previous conclusions. And a new report reopens the possibility that a mystery weapon used by a foreign adversary caused Havana syndrome. At the White House, senior Biden-administration officials are more convinced than their colleagues in the intelligence agencies that Havana syndrome could have been the result of a deliberate attack by an American foe. The geopolitical consequences are profound, especially as a new president prepares to take office: If Russia, or any other country, were found culpable for violent attacks on U.S. government personnel, Washington would likely feel compelled to forcefully respond.
Starting about a decade ago, a small number of Americans, mostly federal employees and many of them working in intelligence, reported similar experiences in Havana. In an instant, they heard a painful ringing in their ears, followed by intense pressure on their head and disorienting vertigo, which was often followed by nausea. Some of the victims developed long-term problems with fatigue or mobility. Other officials later reported similar symptoms while in Russia and other foreign countries, and many concluded that they had been the victim of a deliberate attack with some kind of acoustic weapon.
Early signs of a fracturing consensus on Havana syndrome emerged this past November, when half a dozen victims—all current or former intelligence personnel—gathered in the White House Situation Room at the invitation of senior staff members on the National Security Council. The officials hosting the meeting had read the same intelligence that underpinned the earlier assessment, published in 2023, and thought that the authors had been too quick to rule out a deliberate attack. They also felt that the victims had been maligned, misled, and not given adequate medical care for their ailments, which had caused some of them to stop working, several people who attended the meeting told me. In a sign of respect, the hosts invited one man, regarded as the first known victim of Havana syndrome, to sit in a chair at the head of the Situation Room conference table, which is normally reserved for the president.
The ostensible purpose of the meeting was to help write a guidebook for the incoming Trump administration on cases of “anomalous health incidents,” the anodyne label that the intelligence community has adopted for the syndrome. But the officials also had an update to share: New intelligence undercut the 2023 assessment and would leave the victims feeling “vindicated,” Maher Bitar, a senior NSC official responsible for intelligence matters, told the attendees, according to some people who were present.
The attendees stressed that Bitar never disclosed any classified information, nor did he specify exactly what new intelligence had been discovered. The White House officials didn’t explicitly say a foreign power was responsible for Havana syndrome. But the victims felt that the president’s team believed that this was possibly the case, and that they intended to push the intelligence agencies to reconsider their position.
Marc Polymeropoulos, a CIA officer injured in Moscow in 2017, who attended the meeting, praised the NSC as “a long-standing champion” for victims, and credited them for their doggedness. Part of what had led to the intelligence community’s earlier, decisive conclusion about Havana syndrome was the assumption that the existence of an energy weapon—a device that could cause the kind of injuries Havana-syndrome victims suffered—was implausible and not supported by evidence. But the officials and victims assembled in the Situation Room considered whether this assumption was really valid. An independent panel of experts, convened by the intelligence community, had suggested that an energy weapon could use “pulsed electromagnetic energy, particularly in the radiofrequency range” to cause these symptoms. Some NSC officials have long believed that the experts’ opinion didn’t get enough attention and was unduly overshadowed by the CIA-led report.
I was briefed on that intelligence report when it was released in 2023, and at the time I was struck by how unequivocal the analysts were in their judgments. In my experience, analysts are reluctant to draw definitive conclusions and try to leave some wiggle room. The analysts in this case were more declarative than any I’d ever heard.
However, they did allow that the intelligence community remained open to new ideas and evidence that might emerge. For example, if a foreign adversary were seen making progress developing an energy weapon, or the technology to build one, that might change analysts’ thinking.
That appears to have happened. Today, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence released an update to the 2023 report. The intelligence agencies aren’t saying a foreign actor is to blame for Havana syndrome. But they are no longer so confident that one is not.
Two intelligence agencies have now “shifted their judgment to reflect a greater possibility” that a small number of cases indeed were “caused by a foreign actor,” an intelligence official told reporters in a briefing. The agencies have examined new information that “foreign actors”—he didn’t say which—“are making progress in scientific research and weapons development.”
One of these intelligence agencies—again, he didn’t name them—determined that the chances that a foreign actor has used some novel weapon, or a prototype, to harm a small number of U.S. government personnel or their family members are “roughly even” with the odds that one had not. The other agency identified a “roughly even chance” that a foreign actor has developed a weapon that could have harmed people, but determined that any such device was unlikely to have been deployed yet.
This change may seem subtle. But it is significant. To move from the earlier position that no weapon existed, and no deliberate campaign targeted American personnel, to a 50–50 chance that these things might have happened, is a remarkable if narrow development. Five of the seven agencies that contributed to the report did not change their position, so the shift reflects a minority opinion. Sources close to the issue told me that one of the agencies that changed its tune is the National Security Agency, suggesting that intercepted communications may have revealed something about this “foreign actor’s” research efforts.
White House staffers and a few intelligence agencies aren’t the only ones who think there’s more to the Havana-syndrome story than previously understood. Last month, Republican Representative Rick Crawford released another report following an investigation by the House Intelligence Committee. The intelligence agencies’ conclusion that “foreign adversaries aren’t responsible for targeting U.S. personnel [is] dubious at best and misleading at worst,” the report said.
The Trump administration will have to decide how to respond to the new analysis, if at all. Concern about foreign attacks, and particularly care for victims—regardless of who or what made them sick— has broad bipartisan appeal. But in the closing days of the Biden administration, intelligence officials are making clear that they aren’t all on the same page.
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