The new year has begun with a grim sense that there are too many global conflicts and crises happening simultaneously, with many of the old tools of aid, diplomacy, and multilateralism blunted. Every January, Foreign Policy runs “10 Conflicts to Watch,” an essay compiled by the International Crisis Group, an independent body that speaks to all sides and tries to offer advice on preventing and resolving war.
I sat down with the group’s president and CEO, Comfort Ero, to discuss some of the conflicts that get less attention—Sudan, Haiti, and Myanmar, as examples—and to try and understand why it seems the world is less able to deter leaders from escalating crises into war. Subscribers can watch the full discussion on the video box atop this page or listen to the FP Live podcast. What follows here is a lightly edited and condensed transcript.
Ravi Agrawal: In your essay, you wrote, “Things are bad and poised to get worse. … The slide into lawlessness looks set to continue.” When you look at the state of war and the consistent rise in global military spending, how do you rank the current moment?
Comfort Ero: Crisis Group was born in 1995, in a hopeful period when there was a sense that the liberal order could come together under the banner of multilateralism to tackle post-Cold War conflicts. That world has disappeared. Starting in 2012 with the Arab Spring, it’s been about big-power rivalry.
But what makes this period exceptional, or rather, worse, is that the multinational systems that we usually rely on, like the United Nations or the African Union, all appear to be failing. The U.N. especially has been curtailed in its mandates of peace and security. Countries normally depended on to be the influencers or apply pressure points do not necessarily have that capacity, or they have been outflanked and outranked by new, previously dormant players. Because of that, you’re seeing a rise in adventurism—a willingness to use force because you can get away with it.
RA: I want to turn now to the conflicts you list. Let’s start with Sudan, which simply does not get enough attention. The numbers are staggering. What is going on there? Is there any sense that 2025 could be better?
CE: When you rank it alongside all the world’s conflicts, it’s the most devastating. Just in terms of the raw data, at least 12 million Sudanese, or more than a third of the prewar population, have lost their homes. More than half face acute food shortage. Darfur, which 20 years ago was the heart of international attention, is also facing a famine-type situation, as well.
There are two warring factions in this conflict: the Rapid Support Forces, the paramilitary force that was effectively the mercenaries of the ousted Bashir regime, and the official Sudanese army. These two are locked in an existential fight. They want power. They want to govern Khartoum. And coupled with that, you’ve seen former Darfur militias and other military militias fighting behind both sides. So there’s been a mushrooming of the conflict throughout the country. The civilian harm is quite significant. And tied to that, we’ve seen concerning developments throughout the region, particularly in Chad.
What gives this particular conflict further life is the meddling of outside powers, whether it’s Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, or other players in the Gulf region backing one side or another. So both sides have reason to continue fighting. It would be a mistake to think that, in 2025, we could find some magic bullet to end the conflict because neither side shows an appetite to stop the fighting.
RA: Just on that, the Biden administration has now decided to term the rebel group’s actions as genocide. Does that move the needle at all? And what will that mean for the next administration?
CE: You have to ask yourself, why now? Why decide, on the eve of the transfer of power to the Trump administration, to label the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces as having committed genocide?
There’s no disputing the heinous crimes that they have committed. They’ve also imposed sanctions on RSF’s leader, [Mohamed “Hemeti” Hamdan Dagalo], and on others who played a role and who are based in the United Arab Emirates.
Given the era of impunity, given the lack of accountability, I think Washington sees this as an important signal that we undoubtedly need to address these heinous crimes. And, quite frankly, a year and a half ago, the State Department had also determined that the Sudanese Armed Forces also committed war crimes.
But the question we will ask is why now, and does it accompany any diplomatic strategy? No. It may even complicate a mediation process because by extending the sanctions regime to RSF-owned companies for their role in procuring weapons, you complicate that relationship. So it reflects an understandable desire to impose some kind of accountability on the RSF, but it injects further complexity as the [U.S. President-elect Donald] Trump’s government comes into being.
RA: I should also point out, Comfort, that many countries around the world feel that the United States has double standards in terms of how it determines what constitutes a genocide and where.
I want to jump to one other conflict now in Haiti, which was handled a bit differently. Kenya sent in troops, which the United States funded. A transitional government was installed. But gang violence has continued, killing more than 5,000 people and displacing more than 700,000. Why haven’t those efforts been successful?
CE: Haiti has come up every year since 2022, which shows you just how grave we see it as a conflict that international actors must keep an eye on. The situation hasn’t improved since 2021, when President [Jovenel] Moïse was assassinated, and the gangs effectively control core parts of Haiti. The Transitional Presidential Council, which has representatives from all the major political parties and the social forces, welcomed the Biden-backed Kenyan force, but it hasn’t been able to bring that calm that many had hoped for.
In fact, what you’re seeing is classic Haitian politics playing out: politicians squabbling, corruption, scandals. All of these give the various gang leaders a fresh impetus to control much of the country’s landscape, rural and the capital alike. Efforts to try to come up with a political agenda have been shunted aside. The Kenyan force itself is too small to make any effective gains on the ground. The Western officials were not surprised that, despite the pushback from Russia and China, there are now calls for peacekeeping forces in Haiti. But given the checkered history of the U.N. in Haiti, given concern about how that force would serve in a gang-like situation, and given the poor state of overall U.N. peacekeeping, there’s sufficient skepticism.
The question is what Trump himself will do. Trump’s instinct would be to keep migrants at bay. But the key place for Haiti is Florida. And with Marco Rubio lined up to be the secretary of state, he will surely have a view as to the fate of Haiti. And given Republicans’ antipathy for U.S. presence there, we’re lined up to see some important conversations on Haiti under this administration very quickly.
RA: I’ve been very deliberate in beginning this program with Sudan and then Haiti. We have done entire shows on Ukraine and the Middle East, many times already. And so it’s really important to center some other conflicts in this conversation.
For many of us, Syria felt like a relative bright spot after the ouster of [President] Bashar al-Assad. Although Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) has taken control, it has, at best, a fairly loose hold on power. I’m curious what indicators you’ll track in 2025 to see whether Syria can emerge from more than a decade of strife.
CE: I don’t want to speculate. We have to take HTS leader Ahmed al-Sharaa, formerly known by his nom de guerre [Abu Mohammed] al-Jolani, at his word. We have to assume that he’s speaking from good faith. He sounds confident when he’s speaking to international journalists or Western diplomats. But we have to also hold him to his word. He recognizes that plenty could go wrong. He recognizes the immediate danger, which is already playing out, of disorder. We highlighted this in making Syria the country of focus in the December CrisisWatch.
Another challenge is governance and minority rights. Some of the forces would like to impose cultural limitations, but we’ve also seen important pushback against those efforts, especially at the effort of Islamic educational curriculum, as well. There are concerns about women’s rights, as well. But the dangers are not just internal, Ravi. There’s a sense that each external player— whether it’s Turkey, Iran, Russia, or Israel—all have a stake in the Syria that they want to see. So this is a dangerous moment as we attempt to manage the players inside and outside of Syria.
RA: Let’s talk about Iran. It hasn’t had a good 2024. The Axis of Resistance has been decimated. Iran lost a president. It is now trying to keep a low profile. In Israel, there is open talk of bombing Iran’s nuclear facilities while Tehran is weak. But Israel needs U.S. assistance here, and we’re not sure where Trump is on this question. He does, after all, talk about ending forever wars. Crisis Group is an organization that gets to speak to all sides. What is your sense of how this plays out?
CE: Although it was Trump himself who crafted the maximum pressure line in his first administration, he’s also a leader that doesn’t want to see the United States dragged back into any war. So, knowing that, what does a Trumpian policy look like vis-à-vis Iran? Despite what Israel may desire, despite some of the more hawkish elements that may be in a Trumpian cabinet, it is clear that the Middle East today is radically different than the region Trump left behind in 2020. Iran is on the back foot. Israel appears today to be having the unipolar moment, given how it disabled the Axis of Resistance. Israel fancies taking on Iran, but it would be a mistake. It would be a miscalculation. It would result in the very thing that Trump, who himself is pro-Israel, wants to avoid: being dragged into the kind of war that he campaigned against. So how do you then begin to manage Tel Aviv? How do you also make sure that Iran itself begins to think through the opportunities it has with a Trump government, with a president-elect who wants to strike a grand bargain, who wants to be able to say, “I was the one who brought peace to Ukraine or a deal with Iran.” But one has to be clear-sighted about what negotiation would mean for Iran, which has various strains internally and some very hardline leaders who question the utility of negotiating with anybody at the moment.
RA: You mentioned that Trump likes to be seen as someone who can strike a grand bargain and put his name on agreements. This makes me think of his first term, where he pulled out of the so-called Iran nuclear deal. But there was one other leader that he was quite keen to be seen as close to, and that was Kim Jong Un in North Korea. What is your sense of how a Trump presidency plays into what had already been a simmering conflict in the Korean Peninsula? How will tensions either calm or boil over in 2025?
CE: The world that Trump came into in 2016 is very different to the one that he is coming into now. I think a key difference, also, is this alliance that you see building up between Moscow and North Korea, with North Korea now providing troops for deployment to support Russia against Ukraine. And then you’ve got this botched coup attempt by South Korea’s own leader. The reason why we put it on the list is that we find that the peninsula is set for an edgy moment in 2025. Can Trump strike the same deal that he attempted when he was first in power? I think that the dynamics are very different now with Kim’s impact on Moscow. The military balance on the Korean Peninsula with [Russian President Vladimir] Putin changes those calculations. I don’t think Kim would really risk some kind of war. But the U.S. intelligence is pretty clear to suggest that Putin himself has promised Kim fighter jets that could help the country with its own ballistic technology.
But there is another country here that we shouldn’t ignore, which is China. And although China has kept quiet about Russia and North Korea’s closeness, it’s also concerned, suspicious, and worried about this mutual defense pact and fears the sway that Putin will have over North Korea and whether that undercuts its own influence. It’s not just Trump that we should consider here but also Beijing.
RA: Beijing keeps cropping up in some of these conflicts that we’re discussing and certainly Washington does, as well. The U.S.-China conflict is on your list as a potential thing to keep an eye on, not only in terms of trade and tariffs, but also Taiwan. But, if I were to zoom out a little bit more, how much of what we’re seeing around the world has to do with relative American decline—not absolute, but relative American decline—and China’s rise, in that it creates a sense of flux that countries and leaders might be trying to exploit?
CE: The Crisis Group is not declinist about the United States. I think the United States is still relevant in a number of important theaters. The three most important being Europe, the Middle East, and Asia. I think the core thread of the 10 conflicts this year is Trump, and the return of Trump, in the midst of big-power rivalry and competition. While in 2016 you were dealing with many unknowns and unknown factors around Trump—around his own policies, and his entrance appeared more sort of chaotic—this time, the excesses of this first term will be managed and will be curtailed. This time, he appears more prepared, and it’s very much worth noting that the 10 conflicts—with the exception maybe of Sudan and Myanmar—are very much influenced by Trump’s return. Here is where we think Trump’s policy could make the biggest difference: Ukraine, Israel-Palestine, Iran, Syria, the Korean Peninsula, and U.S.-China. And there, the key will be trade. A question that I asked myself and Crisis Group is whether trade and tariffs itself, if properly deployed, can be a conflict prevention tool. Now, can you accommodate and can you strike that deal? Of course, Trump is a win-lose person. Win on his side and lose on the other side. But can [he] strike a deal that averts the potential of other strains in a region that is already facing high-stakes tension? When you balance this out and look at this within the Asia region, if you can strike that kind of deal between the United States and China, can it help tamp down other high-stakes flash points around the South China Sea with Taiwan and with the Philippines, as well? It’s hard to tell, but one of the positive notes that came out of the Biden era was this return to military talks and communication. [Chinese President] Xi Jinping and [President Joe] Biden met on the sidelines in at the APEC summit, and that led to numerous talks between [Secretary of State Anthony] Blinken and his counterpart, and [National Security Advisor] Jake Sullivan and his counterpart, as well. So, if Trump can strike the right deal, by itself, at the trade level, that could enable less tensions. But that is just speculation because China wants a situation where it is the dominant hegemon in the region and not having to kowtow to U.S. alliances. And the United States, under Biden, has struck up quite a complex network of alliances in the last four years, which are quite important in shaping China’s own calculations.
RA: You mentioned Myanmar, which has been on my mind in the last week because, with the end of fact-checking at Meta, there is a real risk that disinformation could go unchallenged in many conflict zones around the world. And Myanmar is often cited as a case where fact-checking could have been useful and withdrawing it could lead to other problems there. What is your sense of what 2025 looks like for Myanmar? Why is it on the list?
CE: Myanmar is one of those countries, along with Sudan, that is the sort of classic bread and butter of Crisis Group. As a conflict, it is under the radar and does not gather much international attention. It is a low-intensity conflict with all of the hallmarks of human suffering. And it’s an internal conflict, but one with significant impact on fallout into the region. When we talk about Myanmar, most people think about the plight of the Rohingya.
The reason why we put it on the list this year was for two reasons. One, because midway through 2024 and through until today, we’re seeing counterinsurgencies, with various rebel groups launching effective attacks against the junta, which appears today to be a weak regime. Nonetheless, that regime has used familiar revenge tactics, even air attacks, against its own people. But that hasn’t limited or curbed the various ethnic armed groups coming together. In fact, they’ve been able to consolidate control and govern some of these homelands, as well.
The other reason why we put it on the list is that this is where China has a very important role to play. China itself, largely fearing the disorder and the collapse that will emerge in Myanmar, is now coming into the forefront. At one level, it is trying to urge the junta to go ahead with elections. But [Xi] blames the regime’s power grab in 2021 for destabilizing and damaging China’s own investments in Myanmar. And it also sees the regime has been anti-Chinese. So in a sense, [Xi] is trying to see if he can alter the balance of power, but in a way that doesn’t lead to what Beijing perceives as a Western-leaning administration taking over power. The question is whether those elections will lead to viable stability in the country or whether it would lead to violent mess. So watch this space for whether those elections will go ahead, whether China can affect the balance of power in the country, whether the insurgencies consolidate their control, and whether they can try to push the regime further in the country.
RA: Big picture, what tools are missing globally to ensure that conflicts don’t start as much as they currently are and that the ones already underway can be more quickly resolved? Are countries and leaders just less inclined to respect rules and norms because they see them as eroded? Is it that the governing structure of the international order—the U.N. and all of its related bodies—had real accomplishments across the 20th century but is no longer fit for purpose?
CE: When you stand back and look at the international arena, it’s true that this is a most inglorious moment for the U.N. But there are many parts of the U.N. Starting with the Security Council, it’s dysfunctional. The geopolitical challenges there between Russia and China, made worse since Ukraine, has meant that the Security Council is not necessarily the primary body that you go to. And, in fact, it’s even more useless because of how the United States abused the role of the Security Council in the name of the situation in Gaza. Although there are other parts of the U.N. that are credible, multilateralism has lost its own legitimacy.
You pointed to the whole issue of double standards. There are a number of question marks about the rules-based order. What rules? Whose rules? Right now, Western adversaries see an opportunity to test the United States because they have seen the vulnerability of the United States. They’ve seen that they’re able to use force and not be challenged by it. Part of the reason we said this was a “year of lawlessness” is because a number of leaders feel that they can use military force to shape facts on the ground to maintain or achieve power. We’ve seen that the arbiters and architects of international law have also been the abusers of international law. So, you can no longer lecture countries about what they can do.
A number of powers are not only creating facts in their regions, but they’re also reshaping them, redefining global politics. We can talk about Turkey, Brazil, the Gulf region, or the Asia-Pacific. A number of those countries feel emboldened and feel that they have the capacity and the leverage to shape developments in their region and beyond. They feel they can curtail the traditional powers.
Another factor that complicates the global conflict landscape is that the Western powers are vulnerable domestically at home. They’re under pressure from populism and nationalism, and they have lots of protests. Countries that traditionally are the policemen of the world can no longer play that role.
And then, as I said, the Trump factor, because Trump is not only going after his adversaries, but he’s also going after Western allies. Suddenly, they find themselves in a moment of uncertainty, not sure how to deal with somebody that they thought was a traditional ally who’s now willing to tear up the usual playbook in the name of a very narrow national interest. So it makes conflict resolution more difficult. We see today a return to the old style of conflict resolution, a balance between diplomacy and deterrence, where conflict resolution may end up taking a backseat. The question is whether this new Trump government will be able to craft that in a way that doesn’t lead to further instability in all 10 conflicts.
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