Earlier this week, Foreign Policy featured 10 conflicts to watch in 2025. Here, we are focusing on those international disputes that have been flying under the radar but could emerge as full-blown conflicts in the coming year.
This list is not intended to be predictive; rather, it is a warning from FP’s columnists and contributors that there are a number of flash points—from Manipur to Mindanao—that deserve more attention than they have received from experts on geopolitical risk.—Sasha Polakow-Suransky, deputy editor
U.S. Military Strikes Targeting Mexico’s Cartels
By Emma Ashford
During U.S. President Donald Trump’s first term, one often heard that his statements should be taken “seriously, but not literally.” Therefore, it’s surprising that so many people ignore the risk of conflict in one area where Trump has threatened the use of military force both literally and seriously: his threat to invade Mexico.
More precisely, during the 2024 presidential campaign, Trump repeatedly proposed the use of special forces, drones, and other tactics commonly used against terrorist groups for Mexican cartels to inhibit the smuggling of drugs and humans across the U.S. border. This is not a new idea: former Secretary of Defense Mark Esper wrote in his 2022 book that Trump once asked whether he could launch missiles into Mexico to destroy drug labs—and whether such strikes could be kept secret.
The idea has only grown more popular in conservative media and foreign-policy circles. Vice President-elect J.D. Vance, for example, has argued that the U.S. government should have the power to deploy troops to Mexico to restrain the flow of fentanyl. Trump’s incoming National Security Advisor Mike Waltz introduced a bill in 2023 that would have authorized the use of military force against the cartels, and an anonymous source recently told reporters that plans to send U.S. special forces to assassinate cartel leaders were being widely discussed within Trump’s transition team.
It might sound patently illegal—or even ridiculous—to suggest that the United States wage war on its neighbor, but the truth is that during the global war on terror, drone strikes and targeted assassinations of the kind that killed Osama bin Laden and Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi have occurred in a legal gray zone. Presidents from both political parties have authorized missions that clearly violate the sovereignty of other states in the name of counterterrorism.
If the U.S. military can conduct drone strikes inside Pakistan, Yemen, or Somalia without permission from their governments—so the logic goes—then why not Mexico? Many of the justifications already emerging from Trump’s circle sound like those advanced during the war on terror: The cartels do pose some direct threats to U.S. national security—whether from drugs, migrant flows, or other concerns—and Mexico has been unable to entirely control actors within its own territory.
Washington probably wouldn’t succeed either. Research suggests that targeted so-called decapitation strikes tend not to degrade terrorist groups, and the cartels have grown stronger in recent years even as several key leaders have been captured or killed. The United States struggled for years to contain the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) using similar methods. More worrisome is the risk that as further targeted or hands-off attacks fail, the more pressure the Trump administration might feel to move toward a larger-scale U.S. military role in Mexico.
If the incoming president’s statements and inclinations mean anything, the possibility that the Trump administration will engage in military action in Mexico in 2025 is a threat to be taken both seriously and literally.
The Moro Islamic Liberation Front Destabilizes the Philippines—Again
By Nic Aspinwall
Geopolitical analysts who worry about the Philippines tend to focus on the contested South China Sea, where the Chinese coast guard and navy have attacked Philippine vessels in numerous clashes that the United States has called “unlawful” and “dangerous.” Manila, backed by Washington, has emphasized a shift to external defense and away from the internal conflicts with communist and Islamist insurgents that have preoccupied its military for decades.
But in the southern island of Mindanao’s Bangsamoro region, a historic election scheduled for May 2025 threatens to reignite a deadly conflict the country hoped it had left behind.
In 2014, the Philippine government and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) signed a peace agreement that ended a 50-year insurgency and eventually led to the creation of the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao. The region was legally established in 2019, but its inaugural elections were delayed when the COVID-19 pandemic disrupted the process of decommissioning rebels, raising concerns of election violence.
But the Bangsamoro region’s deep regional, ethnic, and ideological fissures have yet to heal, and violent incidents are rising ahead of the 2025 elections, according to a report from crisis group Conflict Alert. Violence in the Philippines spiked during the 2022 national and 2023 regional elections, and the report warned that political feuds between families and clans will “contribute to the anticipated deadly nature” of the 2025 elections. Several local politicians have been killed or targeted in ambushes in recent months.
Plans for a peaceful vote took another hit in September when the Supreme Court ruled to exclude the region of Sulu from the Bangsamoro, rendering Sulu Gov. Abdusakur Tan—a leading candidate for Bangsamoro’s chief minister—ineligible to run for the post. Allies of Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. recently introduced legislation to postpone elections yet again to 2026, citing Sulu’s exclusion. But further postponement could produce even more violence, as the path to a functioning autonomous region becomes hazier.
“Time is running out for completion of the roadmap set out by the 2014 [peace] agreement,” the International Crisis Group warned in January, citing feuds between former rebels and local politicians, along with the presence of jihadist groups that oppose the peace agreement. In December 2023, Islamic State-inspired militants killed four people in Marawi, a city that was all but destroyed during a siege in 2017.
At a time when Manila and Washington are desperate to leave internal conflicts behind and focus on countering China, a resurgence of violence throughout the Bangsamoro region would be a stark reminder of the fragility of peace in the Philippines.
Norwegian Fishermen Take on the Kremlin
By Elisabeth Braw
During the Cold War, the friendly Norwegians even managed to maintain workable relations with the Soviet Union (granted, from a safe position underneath NATO’s protective umbrella). But these days, things are more tense. Russia is very interested—for not so friendly reasons—in the pipelines and undersea cables that dot the seabed off the Norwegian coast, and it’s equally interested in Norway’s military installations on the coast.
That means more Russian activity in the waters that Norwegian fishermen depend on for their livelihood, and they’ve already demonstrated that they won’t ignore threats to their bottom line.
The fishermen may decide that they need to stand up for themselves, because naval exercises with live fire mean people have to vacate the waters for safety—and such exercises scare fish away.
In recent months, astute journalists at NRK have been documenting all manner of mysterious maritime Russian visits to Norwegian waters. There have been fishing vessels with communications equipment going far beyond what a fishing boat needs. There have been ships loitering near Norwegian military installations and others hanging around Norwegian pipelines and communications cables.
In August 2023, Russia launched a naval exercise in the Barents Sea. The body of water, part of the Artic Ocean, is divided into a Russian side and a Norwegian side. The exercise was going to cover the Norwegian side, and it was going to be a major undertaking that involved 20 warships, support vessels, submarines, and some 8,000 military personnel. Because the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) doesn’t ban countries from conducting naval exercises in other nations’ exclusive economic zones (EEZs), there wasn’t much Oslo could do.
Norwegian fishermen, who fish in the Barents Sea, were aghast. Even though they were aware that foreign countries were allowed to conduct these exercises, they knew they would lose income as a result. Taking a page from their Irish brethren, who managed to get Russia to move a planned exercise in Ireland’s EEZ back in January 2022, they stayed put.
Things ended peacefully, but they may not go so well next time. Norway’s fishermen are understandably determined to continue plying their trade along their country’s coast, while Russia is likely to keep sending military vessels and civilian ones with mysterious capabilities to the very same waters.
If Russia launches another exercise and some fishermen decide to stay put, the Kremlin may conclude that withdrawing, as it did in Irish waters, would send a message of weakness. Then Norway would face the prospect of its citizens harmed by Russian ammunition in Norwegian waters. Countries have far fewer rights in an EEZ than in territorial waters, so Norway and its NATO allies would face a difficult choice: how to respond.
A Plausibly Deniable Russian War Against Europe
By John R. Deni
The sabotage of undersea communications cables in the Baltic Sea by the cargo ship Yi Peng 3 is only the latest in a series of asymmetric attacks against Western interests and infrastructure that appear to be connected in one way or another to Moscow. The Kremlin has clearly ratcheted up efforts to intimidate and coerce Europe, hoping to frustrate—and ultimately force an end to—Western support for Ukraine. But what if Putin orders his minions to turn the temperature up even more?
It could all start if Putin senses the right opportunity, such as an increasing American indifference toward Europe. Putin may seize the moment and seek to clear the Europeans from the field as well, before any new aid package materializes on the battlefields of Ukraine. Ironically, a major effort by Europeans to fill the Ukraine assistance gap created by the Americans might function as a red cape does in the bullring—goading the aggressor to charge.
To date, Russian hybrid operations against European targets have generally focused on the infrastructure, entities, and countries most closely tied to Ukraine’s war effort—an assassination plot against the CEO of Germany’s leading defense contractor sending arms to Ukraine, an explosion at a Bulgarian ammo depot owned by a company that supplies Ukraine, and attempts to sabotage Polish rail lines used to send military equipment to Ukraine.
A dramatically ramped-up Russian-organized hybrid campaign designed to convince Europeans to pull the plug on Ukraine assistance would likely consist of a far broader array of targets.
For example, an unattributable kamikaze drone or a debilitating cyber-attack against a major power plant or a critical electrical substation; the introduction of disease-spreading pathogens into a water treatment plant; or deep-fake videos depicting a centrist political candidate engaged in corrupt activities at the height of an election campaign could all cause substantial damage and disruption.
Just as wolves hunt the weakest of the herd, it’s reasonable to assume that Russia would aim an expanded hybrid campaign against the more vulnerable countries in Europe, politically or otherwise, in hopes that they would eliminate bilateral support or break consensus in NATO or the EU.
The target list might include France, where political instability is particularly acute these days; Belgium, which has a notoriously decentralized governance structure and deep linguistic fault lines; or Romania, where an annulled election—due to alleged Russian interference—has placed the country in uncharted waters and threatens political stability.
To achieve its goals, Moscow would likely need to reach beyond its own network of spies and operatives. Russia might leverage its relationship with Libya’s warlord, Gen. Khalifa Haftar, to enlist Libyan operatives to conduct a sabotage operation against a Greek port, or the Kremlin could tap into organized crime networks to assassinate media, business, or political elites on the streets of Brussels or Madrid.
Europeans need to prepare for a desperate Kremlin doubling down on hybrid warfare.
A North Korean Strike on a Divided and Distracted South
By Markus Garlauskas
The ever-present potential for renewed warfare on the Korean Peninsula has been overshadowed by South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol’s failed attempt to declare martial law in order to crush the opposition. Though the headlines are likely to remain dominated by political crisis, this would conceal the rising risk of North Korean aggression—particularly in the disputed Yellow Sea waters off South Korea’s west coast.
A prolonged period of division and uncertainty is likely in South Korea. This will make it difficult for Seoul to deter Pyongyang’s aggression and coordinate with the incoming U.S. administration
Though North Korean leader Kim Jong Un has been silent on the events in South Korea, probably to avoid bolstering hawkish conservatives backing Yoon, he is likely looking for an opportunity to exploit. Once Yoon has been replaced—or appears set to hang on—the moment will be ripe for Kim to force a confrontation.
The disputed waters of the Yellow Sea, a longtime flashpoint for limited military clashes between North and South, seem tailor-made for North Korea to initiate such a military confrontation on favorable terms, politically and militarily.
The most intense North Korean aggression there to date—Pyongyang’s submarine sinking Seoul’s warship, followed by rocket and artillery attacks on a South Korean island—killed dozens but ultimately did not escalate further. However, much has changed since 2010 to increase North Korea’s incentive and ability to strike.
North Korea’s capability to launch surprise military strikes has advanced dramatically in the last decade and a half, with new rockets, short-range missiles, and drones. These are backed by an increasingly credible nuclear threat—underscored by multiple nuclear tests, repeated intercontinental ballistic missile launches, and displays of tactical nuclear weapons—which could give Seoul and Washington pause about responding. Geography also stacks the deck here in North Korea’s favor, with the North’s mountainous Hwanghae Peninsula providing numerous launching points for attacks onto and around South Korea’s tiny and isolated northwest Islands.
Politically, Kim’s international backing has also never been stronger. His new alliance with Moscow has given him access to resources and technology in exchange for munitions, equipment, and troops. A Beijing-Washington confrontation that Kim could exploit also appears to be brewing once the new U.S. administration takes office—if Kim sees the opportunity to drive a wedge between the U.S. and South Korea.
If Kim strikes, the risk is high that Seoul would feel forced to either accede to Kim or respond disproportionately and unilaterally show strength and force Kim to back down. Either outcome could destabilize the entire region.
The Houthis Conquer All of Yemen
By Mina Al-Oraibi
Yemen’s Houthi militants targeting ships in the Red Sea made global headlines, yet too little attention has been paid to the precarious situation inside the country.
After years of criticizing the Saudi Arabia-led coalition—and refusing to get directly involved in the war to restore the internationally-recognized Yemeni government in the capital of Sana’a—the United States, United Kingdom, and several of their allies launched a military operation to stop Houthi attacks in the Red Sea in December 2023. Even so, the Iranian-backed group has managed to launch dozens of attacks this year on ships it accused of being Israeli or in aid of Israel.
Saudi Arabia and the Houthis held a number of talks last year aimed at ending the war that started after the militant group conquered Sana’a in 2014 and forced then-President Abd-Rabbu Mansour Hadi to step down in 2015. Those talks stalled in the aftermath of Hamas’s Oct. 7, 2023, attack on Israel.
Developments within Yemen are largely forgotten or ignored—at the world’s peril. The Houthis feel emboldened despite Israeli and U.S. strikes. And while the Yemeni people suffer from disease, poverty, and malnutrition—the United Nations World Food Program estimates that 17.1 million Yemenis will be food insecure in 2025—Houthi local weapons production and smuggling continues unabated.
With less and less external support for the internationally-recognized authorities in Aden, the government of Prime Minister Ahmed bin Mubarak is under increased pressure from the Houthis. The group has also been able to claim propaganda wins by standing up to Israel, whose wars in Gaza and Lebanon are deeply resented in Yemen, and surviving in the face of major military operations by Western powers.
Without serious efforts to support the prime minister’s government, the Houthis could decide to push further south into the country with the help of other militants. Arms proliferation and broken state institutions mean these threats are very real. If the Houthis were to secure power over all of Yemen, a militant and Iranian-aligned Arab state would emerge.
Such a scenario would not only mean greater suffering for the Yemeni people but also a greater strategic threat to the Gulf, the Horn of Africa, and global shipping. While the Houthis and its allies could sweep through Yemen, they would struggle to hold it, leading to greater bloodshed and internal fighting. If sectarian tension mounts, groups like al Qaeda will seek to take advantage and ignite new battles—and reignite old ones—while continued war in nearby Sudan could spill over into the country.
Russian Destabilization of Moldova
By Natia Seskuria
Moldova’s pro-Western incumbent president, Maia Sandu, recently won a closely watched runoff in the country’s presidential elections, gaining 55 percent of votes against pro-Russian candidate Alexandr Stoianoglo.
In a recent referendum, Sandu also secured a constitutional change that would enshrine Moldova’s commitment to join the European Union. Despite a large-scale Russian campaign that included election interference, vote buying, and disinformation, Moldova’s EU aspirations have prevailed for now. However, it is highly likely that the country, which is sandwiched between Ukraine and Romania and has a presence of around 1,500 Russian troops in the breakaway region of Transnistria, will remain at the forefront of Russian influence and sabotage operations.
Moscow has traditionally seen Moldova as falling within its sphere of influence, yet the country has made significant progress on its path to European integration by opening accession talks with the EU through the efforts of its pro-Western government.
Since Russia began its invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the Kremlin’s hybrid attacks have significantly increased . According to Moldova’s Security and Intelligence Service, Moscow spent around $55 million to destabilize the country—seeking to spread disinformation and manipulate election outcomes in favor of pro-Kremlin candidates. In April, Moldovan authorities seized around $1 million in cash from more than 100 passengers at Chisinau airport; the money was believed to be for vote-buying and sabotage operations through Russian proxies.
Moscow will keep investing significant resources to undermine growing pro-EU sentiment among Moldova’s population by spreading disinformation, including the idea that pursuing pro-Western foreign policy will risk a war in Transnistria. Even though Moldova is militarily neutral, Russia wants to deter the country from pursuing NATO membership by creating fear of a potential spillover from its war with Ukraine. Meanwhile, any success on Moldova’s EU integration path would be seen as a major defeat for Russia, which means the country will remain a high-priority target for Moscow.
A Russian invasion of Moldova through Ukraine remains highly unlikely. But the Kremlin will try to take advantage of weak institutions by attempting to capture them through its proxies, weaponizing its leverage in Transnistria and the predominantly Russian-speaking autonomous region of Gagauzia, and by using economic pressure, cyberattacks, and sophisticated information operations.
Manipur Violence Undermines Modi’s Regional Ambitions
By Sushant Singh
The conflict in Manipur, a northeastern state in India bordering Myanmar, is complex and multifaceted. While the crisis there—primarily involving the Meitei, Naga, and Kuki communities—may seem like a localized ethnic rivalry, the implications of this conflict could have significant geopolitical ramifications in 2025.
Manipur has been a hotspot of ethnic conflict for decades. The roots of the violence can be traced back to the controversial merger of the princely state of Manipur with post-colonial India in 1949. The recent violence, which started in May 2023 between the Meitei and Kuki communities, has resulted in at least 250 deaths, the displacement of 60,000 people from their homes, the loss of over 6,500 weapons from state police armories, social tensions, and a geographical split of the state between the two warring groups. Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi has appeared largely apathetic toward the crisis, which saw further death and destruction in November.
The conflict in Manipur is part of a broader pattern of unrest in northeast India, a region characterized by ethnic diversity and historical insurgencies. The political instability in Manipur has already spilled over into neighboring states such as Nagaland, Assam, and Mizoram, creating a broader security crisis that can reignite dormant local conflicts. That could serve as a major drain on New Delhi’s energies and resources, diverting its attention from other security challenges like the border with China or Kashmir, which has been the cause of long-standing enmity with nuclear-armed Pakistan.
The ethnic groups involved in the conflict, such as the Nagas and Kukis, have ethnic brethren across international borders in Myanmar and Bangladesh. The conflict could therefore exacerbate tensions in these countries, complicating bilateral relations and worsening an unstable regional situation. The ongoing civil war in Myanmar, which began after a military coup in 2021, has already created a volatile situation and provides a breeding ground for insurgent groups that can operate across borders.
The recent political upheaval in Bangladesh, which brought in a new government less friendly to India, complicates the picture. Anti-India sentiment and potential support for insurgent groups in the area could increase, further destabilizing the region.
The conflict in Manipur and broader instability in northeast India will hinder major infrastructure projects and trade routes that are key to unlocking the region’s economic potential and integrating it with the rest of India.
The success of initiatives like the India-Myanmar-Thailand Trilateral Highway—which will provide India with direct land access to the ASEAN region that bypasses China-dominated maritime channels—and the Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit Transport Project—which connects India and Myanmar with a network of roads and waterways to facilitate the movement of people and goods—depends on regional stability that is unlikely in the new year unless New Delhi demonstrates political will, administrative competence, and a rubric for regional diplomacy.
The post 8 Simmering Threats You Shouldn’t Ignore in 2025 appeared first on Foreign Policy.
