War is always about choosing one risk over another. For almost three years, Europe has largely behaved as if it did not have to make that choice: It could support Ukraine’s fight against Russia and keep the European security order intact—and at the same time avoid placing its own population and military forces at risk. Considering the deteriorating military situation in Ukraine, the prospect of less military aid from Washington, and the growing likelihood of a forced cease-fire favoring Russia, however, Europe’s avoidance of painful decisions may no longer be sustainable.
The pressing question is what follows a cease-fire. Here, Europe faces two options: commit to defending a cease-fire by force if necessary or risk a more brutal conflict in the coming years that may not be confined to Ukraine.
War is always about choosing one risk over another. For almost three years, Europe has largely behaved as if it did not have to make that choice: It could support Ukraine’s fight against Russia and keep the European security order intact—and at the same time avoid placing its own population and military forces at risk. Considering the deteriorating military situation in Ukraine, the prospect of less military aid from Washington, and the growing likelihood of a forced cease-fire favoring Russia, however, Europe’s avoidance of painful decisions may no longer be sustainable.
The pressing question is what follows a cease-fire. Here, Europe faces two options: commit to defending a cease-fire by force if necessary or risk a more brutal conflict in the coming years that may not be confined to Ukraine.
An honest reckoning is vital. Without a significant Western military presence in Ukraine, any security guarantee to what remains of Ukraine will likely be ignored by Russia. U.S. President-elect Donald Trump and his team have already bowed out of sending U.S. troops, saying this would be Europe’s responsibility. That is why French President Emmanuel Macron has been drumming up support for a European peacekeeping force. He recently visited Poland to present his case but was rebuffed. Germany’s lame-duck government also looks set to refuse. Italian Defense Minister Guido Crosetto, on the other hand, said Italy would be on board. Europe cannot escape engaging in this debate unless it is willing to risk losing Ukraine and facing a larger military confrontation in the future.
As long as Ukraine has not stabilized the front line, discussions of European troop deployments are purely theoretical. Only when Russia acknowledges that it can no longer gain meaningful victories in 2025 will it consider negotiations to freeze the conflict. We might get to this point if the incoming Trump administration follows up on signals that it may be considering an “escalate to de-escalate” strategy—in other words, to increase pressure on Russia through increased weapons deliveries to Ukraine as a way to strengthen Kyiv’s bargaining power and force Moscow to settle on reasonable terms. However, there will come a moment when Trump declares that Ukraine is now Europe’s problem, and Europe needs to be ready with a plan of action.
Any idea that Europe could deter Russia from breaking a cease-fire and renewing its attack with the presence of a light peacekeeping force is fantasy; this would simply be no match against Russia’s battle-hardened mechanized formations and thus have little deterrent value. The other option is a more robust force capable of fighting and holding its ground in the event of Russian aggression—like U.S. forces along the demilitarized zone on the Korean Peninsula or the NATO mission in Kosovo.
The catch-22 is clear: Russia is unlikely to accept a strong Western force with a robust mandate at the cease-fire line, while a traditional United Nations peacekeeping force would not provide sufficient deterrence. A potential solution might be a combination of the two: Traditional peacekeepers, ideally from countries of the global south, could directly patrol a demilitarized zone along the cease-fire line, and a robust European rapid-reaction force could be stationed further back inside unoccupied Ukraine. There would be no U.S. troops in Ukraine, and it would not be under the NATO banner, potentially making it more acceptable to Russia. Regardless, the Trump administration will likely withhold direct participation to avoid what it considers European freeloading and to prevent entanglement in the conflict.
It should be clear that Europe would have to supply a robust force with a robust mandate. The concept reportedly proposed by Macron is for a coalition of European states to permanently station land forces in Ukraine. Based on the author’s calculations, this would require a minimum of five brigades—approximately 25,000 to 30,000 troops. The size of that force could translate into as many as 75,000 to 90,000 required troops because of standard rotation practice between training, active deployment, and recovery. Support personnel would raise this total even higher.
Could Europe implement such a military mission? From a military perspective, the answer is a tentative yes but with important caveats. First, given a widespread lack of readiness, European forces will need at least several months for preparations, including assembling the force, training in combined arms warfare, and instructions from Ukrainian officers with firsthand knowledge of military operations in the country.
Second, Europe will need a clear exit strategy. The force would not be permanent; rather, its deployment would enable Ukraine to rebuild and strengthen its forces as a deterrent against another Russian attack.
Third, given the poor state of European military capacity and readiness, trade-offs will be necessary. Nations unwilling or unable to send troops to Ukraine could be persuaded to take on greater responsibilities in European military missions in the Western Balkans or Africa, freeing up other countries’ troops. It may also mean pulling European forces out of current U.N. peacekeeping missions in the Middle East and elsewhere, as well as temporarily reassigning some NATO forces from the Baltic states.
Fourth, U.S. support will be absolutely crucial, even if Washington declines to provide troops. This includes help with mission planning, logistics, intelligence, and the delivery of additional firepower. Even if it does not deploy forces, the United States could back up the Europeans with additional deterrence, possibly by redeploying or threatening to redeploy its multi-domain task force—equipped with the new Strategic Mid-Range Fires system and hypersonic missiles—from Germany to Poland. Positioning the task force closer to potential targets in Ukraine and Russia’s Kaliningrad exclave would offer added deterrence and send a strong signal to Russia.
Finally, Europe will need to have a clear understanding of what such a mission entails and what the specific rules of engagement are. This operation would not be comparable to European deployments in Afghanistan or Iraq. European forces would need to be prepared for high-intensity, large-scale combat operations against Russia, not small-scale operations against lightly armed insurgents. This includes having a clear plan to respond to inevitable Russian provocations, including sabotage behind the cease-fire line or “accidental” missile strikes that kill and injure European personnel.
What would such a force look like? The European brigades would need to be mechanized, incorporating main battle tanks, armored personnel carriers, infantry fighting vehicles, and self-propelled artillery. Additionally, they would require critical support capabilities like air and missile defense systems, electronic warfare tools, and combat engineering equipment to establish solid defensive positions in case hostilities resume. The operation of European combat and other aircraft within Ukrainian airspace would also be necessary.
Another question to answer well ahead of any deployment is whether European forces would remain separate or integrated with Ukrainian combat formations. One could envision a symbiotic training relationship: Ukraine would be integrated even faster into NATO military doctrine, while European forces would learn from Ukraine’s military, which has the most experience in fighting the Russian war machine.
Let’s assume all the above can be done. The biggest question remains: Would the Europeans actually fight Russian forces to enforce the cease-fire line? Above all, war is a contest of wills. What if European politicians lack the will to fight? If Russian forces attack, will European leaders spend weeks politely asking Russian President Vladimir Putin to stop as they decide what to do, while pleading for U.S. support? What if one country is ready to fight but another is not—and unliterally withdraws its forces? Could Putin just ignore the European troop presence and order his troops to go around their bases? What happens if he lobs missiles at Ukraine over the heads of the Europeans just to test their response? These and many more questions need to be gamed out and answered before any actual deployment.
As always, Putin can bet on the European disunity he has helped foster. France is embroiled in a political crisis, while Germany’s recently collapsed government faces elections, in which the issue of German support for Ukraine is already being manipulated by political extremists and factions in the traditional parties. War fatigue is a prevalent sentiment in Europe. In the coming months, a concerted effort by Kremlin propagandists, supported by their European sympathizers, may aim to portray Russia as the true seeker of peace, content with claiming parts of Ukraine.
Countering this narrative requires, first and foremost, achieving clarity on Ukraine’s true significance for Europe’s security architecture. If Ukraine is indeed pivotal, it’s crucial to explain to Europeans that this war isn’t solely about Ukraine’s future, but also about Europe’s ability to maintain secure borders and preserve peace across the continent. Simultaneously, Europeans need to understand that a decisive Ukrainian victory that liberates large parts of Russian-occupied Ukraine might no longer be feasible in the short to medium term. That’s not defeatism but realism—and it’s a view shared by many Ukrainians aware of the realities on the ground.
Next year could be pivotal in reaching a new status quo for Ukraine and Europe. If the Europeans want to avoid the next war, they must be ready to engage directly in Ukraine—despite the obvious risks involved. The likelihood of Russia honoring any paper commitment is slim to zero, a lesson the West has hopefully learned. It comes down to choosing between known and unknown threats: facing a weakened Russian military now, with a chance of deterring it from further attacks, versus the high likelihood of a war with a strengthened Russia in a few years’ time. Military actions carry risks. Not acting may, however, be an even bigger risk for Europe’s security.
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