Emma Ashford: Hi, Matt. I hope you’re having a good Christmas. This year is almost over! It’s been a pretty eventful year, all told, for foreign policy, and I’d like to see if we can recap the roller coaster of the last 12 months and try to make some sense out of it.
Let’s jump right in: What surprised you most in 2024?
Matt Kroenig: There are many candidates for an answer to that question. It was an eventful year, as you point out, but I think the most important—and most surprising—development of the year for me was the smashing of Iran’s “Axis of Resistance.”
For years, we’ve heard that Iran could hold Israel and other targets in the Middle East at risk with its vast missile and drone arsenal and its ability to activate terror proxies like Hamas and Hezbollah. This was all backed by like-minded states, like Russia and the Assad regime in Syria.
Now, nearly all of those threats have been decimated or proved ineffectual. Iran launched two massive missile and drone salvos on Israel in April and then again in October, but U.S., Israeli, and partner air and missile defenses shot almost all of them down, resulting in minimal damage.
Through a series of audacious and stunningly successful attacks starting in September, Israel has decapitated Hezbollah and forced it into a ceasefire. The war in Gaza presents many remaining humanitarian and reconstruction challenges, but Israel has essentially eliminated Hamas as a security threat.
Russia has its hands full in Ukraine and is unable to provide its previous levels of military support to its partners in the region. And, largely due to these developments, the Assad regime in Syria collapsed.
Almost none of this was on my bingo card on Jan. 1, 2024. These are significant developments that set the foundation for a transformed Middle East.
EA: Wow, I was expecting an answer, not an essay!
MK: Sorry! That was lengthy. And I’m afraid this concludes this week’s column.
EA: Ha, nice try. It is a big development, no doubt. Iran had always relied on the deterrent effects of many of the militant groups it backs throughout the region. When push came to shove, it turned out that Hezbollah, in particular, was far weaker than it might have seemed from the outside. I would still caution against reading too much into all of this, though. The Houthis in Yemen are still going strong despite a U.S. bombing campaign, and regional U.S. allies—like the Gulf Cooperation Council—are still engaged in conciliation with Tehran. And, of course, with the death of the nuclear deal, if the regime in Tehran feels more directly threatened, they may simply decide to go ahead and weaponize their nuclear program. Yes, Iran has been weakened, but I’m not sure it’s going to herald a transformed Middle East the way you suggest it is.
For me, the biggest surprise was the collapse of the Assad regime. To be honest, I need to issue a mea culpa: In our last column, I argued that Assad wouldn’t fall swiftly. He was gone three or four days later! So much for my assumption that he continued to have some base of support inside Syria. But there’s a lot to play out there in terms of how a post-Assad Syria will look. Reportedly, both Russia and Iran gave consent to his ouster, and Russia may even get to keep its Syrian bases.
Sticking with the Middle East for a moment, though, I do think we should discuss the way in which Israel’s war in Gaza has metastasized over the course of 2024. At the start of the year, it was still a fairly narrow intervention in response to the Oct. 7 attacks. Now, it feels like the Israelis are starting wars left, right, and center in the region. What do you think of all of this?
MK: I was surprised both that Israel decided to take on all comers and more so that they were so remarkably successful and incurred so few costs as a result.
But, if I could back up for a moment, what was the biggest or most surprising development or theme for you for the year?
EA: I think it was the extent to which America lost the battle for its image globally. I know that sounds vague, but bear with me. This was the year in which U.S. support for Israel became an albatross around its neck—even U.S. allies argued that the war in Gaza included war crimes. In 2024, it became apparent that U.S. support for Ukraine was not going to do the job, and that there would have to be some less-than-ideal armistice or negotiations. And it was also the year when Joe Biden visibly—and memorably—declined, in front of the cameras, ushering in the return of Donald Trump, all while proclaiming that America was indispensable. Whatever America’s image—or role in the world—will be in 2025, it’s certainly not the indispensable, invincible “arsenal of democracy” that the Biden team tried to sell during their four years in the White House.
MK: Count me skeptical. People have been predicting the decline of the United States for decades, and then it always finds ways of renovating and rejuvenating itself.
In many areas this year, the United States increased its standing. Its share of global GDP rose to 26 percent—its highest share in two decades. The U.S. share of global stock market capitalization has climbed for the past decade and a half and now stands at more than 60 percent. The United States increased its clear lead in major technology areas, including advanced microchip design.
The U.S. global alliance system was expanded and strengthened as Sweden joined NATO in March. And so on.
So, yes, America isn’t perfect, but it remained the single most influential country in the world in 2024; its lead in many areas seems to be growing, and no other country—not even China—offers an attractive alternative for global leadership.
EA: Yeah, I definitely said “image,” rather than “weakness.” You’re absolutely right that the United States remains powerful—and, frankly, in a better economic state than many of its closest allies. But I still think we’ve seen significant shifts in perception about the United States this year and whether it’s really a force for good. I also think you’re wrong about there being alternatives to the United States. It’s true, I think, that no one wants to live in a Chinese-dominated world.
But I spent time in the Gulf recently among U.S. allies, and almost everyone I spoke to is horrified about the Israeli war in Gaza, thinks the U.S. government has been applying double standards when it comes to Israel and Ukraine, and is quite comfortable with Chinese companies and technology. This year, we also saw five new member states join the BRICS, including Saudi Arabia and the UAE. States aren’t necessarily turning their backs on the United States, but they’re trying to give themselves options. I think that trend really accelerated in 2024.
What else shall we discuss about 2024? The trajectory of the war in Ukraine? A year of sometimes-troubled democratic elections and anti-incumbent bias?
MK: I think 2024 was the year in which the idea that the West should pursue near-term negotiations to end the war in Ukraine went from unthinkable to conventional wisdom.
To make a somewhat philosophical point, it reinforced for me how many foreign-policy positions are driven not by independent analysis but by political correctness. When Biden said he would fight the war “as long as it takes,” that was also the deeply held view of allies and the mainstream media. Now that president-elect Trump says he wants a negotiation, all of the positions—including in Kyiv—have shifted, and people are analyzing how best to end the war.
EA: Usually I hate the phrase “political correctness,” but I think you’re right here. A year ago, I was called names that you can’t put in print, simply for suggesting that Kyiv would probably have to negotiate a settlement at some point. Now those same people apparently agree.
I do think some of that shift has been driven by the truly dire trajectory of the war for Ukraine over the course of the last year. It is much harder for those who oppose negotiation to argue for continued unconditional support when Ukraine is losing ground fairly rapidly and the war effort is increasingly impacted by an unwillingness in Kyiv to mobilize and train more soldiers. Corruption is rearing its ugly head, too. The course of the war in 2024 has undoubtedly made it easier for Trump to call for negotiations. Whether he can turn them into something productive remains to be seen.
Of course, this shift in opinion has also been helped by the internal weaknesses and anti-incumbent bias of the population in several European states. The German government has collapsed, and so has the French government. A new British government remains supportive of Ukraine but is already wildly unpopular just six months after taking office. People are unhappy, and it’s not clear that leaders of traditional political parties know how to answer these complaints.
MK: I’m glad you got to elections. In 2024, more people went to the polls than ever before in human history, with votes held in countries that make up 60 percent of the world’s population. And you are right that there was an antiestablishment trend.
But we are almost out of time. Perhaps we should wrap up with the biggest winners and losers of 2024.
Thoughts?
EA: For sure. You were right earlier in implying that Iran was one of the biggest losers of 2024; they’re in a much weaker position than they were in January this year. Ukraine has also been a loser, going from beloved underdog to a much less popular, besieged state with growing questions about corruption, democracy, and whether the war is truly worth the cost. The corollary to this is Russia, which—despite Syria—I still see as one of the winners of 2024. Their economy may be weaker, but they’re winning the war in Ukraine and are starting to rebuild their international diplomatic profile.
What about you? Who’s winning and who’s losing?
MK: I agree that Iran is a big loser, and the corollary is that Israel was a big winner. Its security environment has markedly improved in the past year.
EA: Hmm, I’m not so sure about Israel. I think that might be a case of short-term gains, long-term losses. But go ahead.
MK: I see Ukraine and Russia as both incurring tragic costs, but holding steady. They were in a stalemate one year ago, and that is basically where they are today.
I think the biggest winner, however, is me. I get the pleasure of debating the week’s foreign-policy news with a trenchant sparring partner in this great platform that Foreign Policy has provided to curious and informed readers.
Thank you, Emma, for a great year. Merry Christmas and Happy New Year!
EA: Clearly you are ingratiating yourself in hopes that I will give you a pasta machine and some Sicilian pistachio spread (or some other fine wares from Foreign Policy’s Holiday Gift guide). Flattery will get you nowhere, Matt. But agreed: This column is definitely a win. See you in 2025!
The post Who Were the Winners and Losers of 2024? appeared first on Foreign Policy.
