It is often assumed that far-right parties do well in areas with many new immigrants. This is supposedly because housing prices rise, traffic jams get worse, crime and employment can become an issue, and the arrival of newcomers with different habits and religions creates friction with local residents—who then proceed to vote for anti-immigrant parties. The implication of this presumed link between immigration and the rise of the far right is that far-right parties listen better to the frustrations and complaints of “ordinary people” and that other parties have somehow “lost touch with reality.”
But what if this link does not really exist? What if far-right parties aren’t so much listening to the wishes and demands of ordinary citizens in immigrant areas, and then translating them into policy proposals, as they are scaring them and pitting them against newcomers in their neighborhood so they end up voting in their favor?
It is often assumed that far-right parties do well in areas with many new immigrants. This is supposedly because housing prices rise, traffic jams get worse, crime and employment can become an issue, and the arrival of newcomers with different habits and religions creates friction with local residents—who then proceed to vote for anti-immigrant parties. The implication of this presumed link between immigration and the rise of the far right is that far-right parties listen better to the frustrations and complaints of “ordinary people” and that other parties have somehow “lost touch with reality.”
But what if this link does not really exist? What if far-right parties aren’t so much listening to the wishes and demands of ordinary citizens in immigrant areas, and then translating them into policy proposals, as they are scaring them and pitting them against newcomers in their neighborhood so they end up voting in their favor?
That is exactly the conclusion of a recent study conducted by four researchers from Bocconi University in Milan and the ETH in Zurich: The Free Movement of People and the Success of Far-Right Parties: Evidence from Switzerland’s Border Liberalization, just published in American Political Science Review. In light of the current hysterical anti-immigration discourse in Europe, it is a compelling read. It provides a convincing explanation for at least part of the political turbulence in France, Romania, the Netherlands, and other countries.
The success of anti-immigration parties, the authors argue, cannot be explained by cultural, economic, or political problems that citizens experience with immigration. Instead, they found it is rather the other way around: It is “political elites” in far-right parties who are responsible for such votes. They decide to focus their election campaigns in areas with immigrants. These campaigns are often hard-hitting and confrontational, using slogans like “full is full” or “stop migration” and cartoons depicting immigrants as black sheep or thieves who do harm and need to be expelled. Instead of citizens complaining of immigrants of their own accord, they are often incited by far-right political entrepreneurs—whereafter they start complaining about immigration and voting for the far right.
The Swiss and Italian researchers studied the correlation between immigration and the success of the far right in an unusual place: the mostly well-off border towns and villages of Ticino, Switzerland’s Italian-language canton. They focused on the period after 2000, when Switzerland and its EU neighbors first opened their borders to enable citizens to live and work freely in each other’s countries. In the period studied, immigration in Ticino rose by 14 percent, and support for the far right increased by 32 percent.
While the link looks strong at first glance, the researchers could not prove it. “We find limited evidence that the standard economic, cultural and security explanations are driving this rising anti-immigrant sentiment,” they write. What their report does show is this: From the moment the borders with France, Germany, Austria, and Italy were opened, Swiss political elites on the far right began campaigning aggressively in those areas, advancing narratives of overcrowding, crime, and “density stress,” meaning increasing pressure on public transportation, housing, parking, health care, and other collective facilities.
The researchers consistently use the term “political elite” in their article to emphasize that the success of the far right is orchestrated from above (top-down), rather than coming from citizens themselves (bottom-up). Far-right politicians often claim they speak on behalf of “the people,” who are fed up with “the elite.” But these politicians, the researchers argue, are themselves part of the elite.
The cultural disruptions caused by immigration in Tricine are minimal. Nearly all immigrants in Tricine come from Italy, oftentimes from just across the border. Most are white, Catholic, and educated. They speak Italian and eat pasta. Culturally and socially, they do not cause much friction.
Economically, too, problems are rare. On the contrary: According to the study, Ticino’s economy has grown since the borders opened for immigrant workers. Employment picked up and salaries rose slightly. Traffic jams did get worse, the researchers observed. But that also happened in parts of Ticino a little further from the border—areas that were used as the control areas in the study—where immigration increased but the support for the far right did not.
The explanation for this, they found, is simple: In these control areas, far-right politicians did not run anti-immigrant campaigns as they did in the areas closer to the border. “Our analysis suggests that political elites target their hostile rhetoric at border regions, and that it resonates more strongly with persuadable voters exposed to immigration.” The voters were “persuadable” because they were in a new situation that they had to adapt to; the far right recognized the potential to give that situation a negative spin by portraying immigrants as troublemakers, freeloaders, or criminals. In the control areas, where voters found themselves in a similar situation, there was no such spin. There, the vote for the far right did not increase.
Politicians in Ticino’s parliament coming from border areas were also found to be more likely to propose anti-immigrant legislation than their colleagues from control areas a little further from the border. Those politicians tabling anti-immigrant legislation mostly came from the far right, and in a few instances also from center-right parties trying to curry favour with voters who were supposedly fed up with immigrants.
This study is important. It confirms findings from internationally renowned political scientists such as Larry Bartels, whose book Democracy Erodes From the Top makes the same point, and Nancy Bermeo, whose study Ordinary People in Extraordinary Times analyzes breakdowns of European and Latin American democracies in the 20th century. Both argue that it is not voters who determine the political direction of a country and, ultimately, the fate of democracy, but the political elites who make calculated decisions to offer voters only certain options.
It would be good if centrist politicians, who all too often ape what their far-right colleagues (or rather rivals) do, finally understood this crucial point. The future of our democracies depends on it.
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