For decades, Russia has been trying to rebuild its influence in the Middle East. But after the rapid collapse of the Assad regime in Syria, the Kremlin is scrambling to salvage whatever it can.
President Vladimir V. Putin sought to spin events in Syria as a success for Russia, which provided crucial military support for President Bashar al-Assad during the country’s long and brutal civil war, and received two important military bases in return.
“We came to Syria 10 years ago to prevent the creation of a terrorist enclave there,” he told a marathon news conference on Thursday. “We have achieved that goal, by and large.”
The reality of Russia’s situation is quite different from Mr. Putin’s rosy assessment, according to military experts, political analysts and a U.S. government official. If the rebel factions that are now leading Syria decide to expel the Russian forces from the two bases, Moscow will be left without the resources or the real estate to maintain a significant military presence in the region, they said.
One veteran Russian military analyst, speaking anonymously out of concern for the safety of his relatives still in Russia, called Moscow’s current maneuvering “diplomatic dancing” that did not comport with reality.
Syria once served three goals for Russia
After Mr. Putin decided to intervene militarily in Syria in 2015, the Russians built an air force base at Hmeimim, near the northern city of Latakia, and expanded a Soviet-era naval fueling station at the Mediterranean port of Tartus into a full-fledged base.
That presence achieved three main goals, experts said.
First, since Russia was internationally isolated after it annexed Crimea in 2014, its military presence in Syria pushed the United States, Israel and Turkey, and the region at large, to engage diplomatically with Moscow. Its naval presence at Tartus, including three large warships and a submarine, forced NATO military planners to take notice.
Second, it showed authoritarian leaders around the world that Russia could shore up their regimes with overwhelming force. Its carpet bombing of opposition positions in Syria helped to preserve Mr. al-Assad’s rule.
Third, Syria — a geographic pivot point in the region — created a vital logistics hub, a warm-water port on the Mediterranean and an air base to ferry weapons and ammunition to Russian forces in Africa and elsewhere in the Middle East.
Influence and logistics are at risk
Those goals are now all in jeopardy. Washington is in the midst of a presidential transition, so its Syria policy is in flux, though President-elect Donald J. Trump made his disdain for engagement pretty clear during his first term by referring to the country as “blood and sand.”
Turkey wants to supplant Russia as the dominant foreign ally in Damascus. Israel, which used to limit its attacks in Syria to avoid conflict with Russian forces, has been bombing military sites with impunity and occupying new territory in the Golan Heights, which it captured from Syria in 1967.
The speed with which the Kremlin dropped its support for Mr. al-Assad at the end surely dented its reputation as a reliable protector of authoritarian regimes.
As for a logistics hub, it is unclear whether there is a viable substitute for Syria. The Russians may be looking at increasing or diversifying their presence in countries such as Libya, Sudan and Yemen, according to an American official. But all of those countries come with their own downsides, including civil wars and partners who are keen to extract a large price. Expanding Russia’s presence in those places could happen, but not quickly, the official said.
It has the most substantial presence in Libya, home to an estimated 1,200 Russian mercenaries. But geographic distance is a challenge: Flying heavy military loads to Libya from Russia without refueling is a serious challenge.
“If they lose Syria, it would be very difficult for them to reroute logistics through Libya,” said Gleb Irisov, a former air force officer and military analyst for the TASS news agency. “They will be flying there on vapors.”
Can Russia keep its Syrian bases?
Russian diplomacy has already pivoted to cultivating Syria’s new rulers.
Russian state propaganda, in the hours after Mr. al-Assad fled to Moscow, switched from calling Hayat Tahir al-Sham, the main rebel faction behind his overthrow, “terrorists” to the “armed opposition.”
“The terrorist label was completely dropped in this pragmatic move to secure a modicum of influence in Syria, especially the bases,” said Hanna Notte, a Berlin-based expert on Russian foreign and security policy at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies.
Russia has tried to engage with the new rulers in Damascus, Mr. Putin said, adding that the bases might be used to provide humanitarian aid. Russia has implemented such volte-face policy decisions before, welcoming delegations from the Taliban in Afghanistan that it once labeled terrorists.
At first glance, it might seem that the Syrian opposition movement, having suffered through the bloody carpet bombing of its village strongholds by the Russian air force, would be eager to expel it.
But Russia is not without leverage. It can offer various incentives, from financial payouts to military equipment to oil, though its resources have been stretched thin by the war in Ukraine.
It can also offer legitimacy by recognizing the new Syrian government. Western governments currently designate H.T.S., which has roots in Islamic State and Al Qaeda, as a terrorist organization. The United Nations has done the same, but Russia, with its seat on the Security Council, could help get that designation removed.
Russia has started shifting some of its forces and their equipment out of Syria, analysts said. But advanced systems, like the S-400 air defense units used to protect the military installations, seem to still be in place.
Movement so far appears to involve mostly military police units and hundreds of troops stationed in small outposts around Syria, analysts said. Poll data show that about 7,465 soldiers stationed in Syria voted in Russia’s presidential elections last March.
Depleted by the invasion of Ukraine
During the Cold War, Russia had wide influence in the Middle East, with a heavy military presence in Iraq, Syria, Egypt and Algeria. After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, Russia largely abandoned the region, lacking both resources and interest.
Mr. Putin initially thought of the Syria deployment in 2015 as a means to reverse that decline, analysts said, and reassert Russia’s role as a global power. The Kremlin followed up with arms sales to some Arab capitals like Baghdad and Cairo, which were disenchanted with the United States.
But no major deals have been announced since Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, experts said. Russia now has few surplus military resources available to sell or deploy overseas.
“Ukraine changed everything,” said the veteran military analyst. The war there limited Russia’s ability to play what he called “games” in the Middle East and Africa. “They put all their resources into Ukraine, and they have no other resources to play these games.”
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