The Ukraine conflict is more than a distant spectacle to China’s People’s Liberation Army; it offers a real-time battlefield laboratory to study for its own strategic needs. From drone swarms to electronic warfare, its lessons are being methodically analyzed and adapted to reshape the PLA’s own approach to conflict—whether in Taiwan, the Himalayas, or beyond.
The Ukraine conflict has underscored the game-changing role of UAVs in modern warfare, particularly for gathering intelligence, precision targeting, and overwhelming enemy defenses. The PLA is responding by seeking to develop and improve various types of drones, including:
- Cost-effective, expendable drones for saturation attacks.
- Drones that can mimic Russian and Ukrainian successes at defeating adversary air defenses through scaled, coordinated assaults, according to a Chinese reporter at the recent Zhuhai Airshow.
- First-person-view drones, which have demonstrated tactical advantages in Ukraine, particularly for reconnaissance and close-range strikes. Analysis from PLA National Defense University’s Joint Operations College officers highlights China’s push to develop FPVs.
- Ultra-low-cost drones. The PLA Air Force recently announced a nationwide competition to design cheap UAVs capable of autonomous navigation, precision targeting, electronic warfare integration, extended-range reconnaissance, swarm coordination, and logistical support.
Chinese military commentators note that the military impact of these structured innovation efforts will be amplified by the country’s industrial strength. Many ultra-low-cost drones deployed by Ukraine originated from Shenzhen’s Huaqiangbei electronics hub. China’s dominance in commercial drone manufacturing helps give the PLA cost-effective reconnaissance and precision-strike solutions, and sets it up to dominate small drone-enabled asymmetric warfare.
This strategy aligns with Beijing’s broader goals of achieving technological superiority and operational readiness for high-stakes engagements. In particular, it supports the PLA push for “intelligentized warfare,” emphasizing drones’ role in creating a cohesive network of real-time data sharing across units. PLA UAV strategy discusses AI-driven coordination systems that will enable drones to collaborate on precision targeting and area denial without direct human input. The PLA also aims to use drones for sustained surveillance, battlefield mapping, and extending the reach of indirect fire capabilities. These efforts demonstrate a transformative approach to tactical warfare.
By demonstrating the decisive role of integrated networks in managing drone operations, electronic warfare, and precision targeting, the Ukraine war shaped the PLA’s April reorganization of its Strategic Support Force into three co-equal forces: the Aerospace Force, Cyberspace Force, and Information Support Force. The PLA aims to create a cohesive, real-time information ecosystem to increase operational agility and joint force effectiveness. Chinese leader Xi Jinping himself recently inspected the information-support force, signaling China’s intent to align its military modernization with emerging trends in data-driven, high-tech warfare.
Some lessons come not from Ukraine but Russia, which has reportedly provided tactical insights into countering advanced Western systems, such as neutralizing precision munitions via electronic warfare. And joint technological initiatives, such as the development of Shahed-style drones, show Beijing’s ability to use Russian and Iranian innovations to refine its arsenal and tactics.
On the ground
The PLA views UAV integration as key to ground forces’ lethality and survivability. This is seen in Chinese reports about the Russian ambush of a Ukrainian Leopard 2 tank; they emphasized how the situational awareness provided by drones enabled precision strikes against a numerically superior convoy. It is also seen in the VT4A1 main battle tank unveiled at this year’s Zhuhai Airshow. The tank’s vertical-takeoff-and-landing drone, with optical and infrared sensors and a 10-kilometer range, highlights the PLA’s push to for better situational awareness.
Inspired by Ukraine’s use of unmanned ground vehicles for logistics, reconnaissance, and combat, the PLA has introduced logistics UGVs whose modular payloads can haul materiel, evacuate casualties, and provide close-combat support. It is also testing armed UGVs with AI targeting systems for urban warfare and perimeter defense. Reports emphasize giving UGVs advanced sensors and communication gear so they can be integrated into broader operations with UAVs and manned assets.
An October exercise under the Western Theater Command used small UAVs and UGVs for ISR and targeting. Illustrating PLA efforts to build them into field operations. It might also signal a doctrinal shift toward asymmetrical and high-tech solutions.
When Russia turned to stand-off armor—also known as “slat armor” or “cope cages”—to fend off Ukrainian drone attacks, PLA strategists took note. Some of China’s Type 15 light tanks have been equipped with similar gear. Others, such as the VT4A1 and the Type 99A, are being upgraded with advanced active protection systems such as the GL-6, which uses radar and infrared sensors to spot and intercept drones and anti-tank missiles. This underscores the PLA’s intent to equip its armored platforms with a multi-layered defense system that combines reactive and stand-off armor, active protection systems, and integrated soft-kill defenses.
PLA commenters have suggested the PLA’s new lightweight 120mm mortar, equipped with a digital fire control system and precision-guided munitions, could be used to target drone operators—especially when paired with portable electronic-warfare devices. This proposal to combine traditional firepower with EW also reflects a broader PLA shift toward integrated defense operations.
The Ukraine conflict has drastically reinforced the importance of EW—as have India’s advancements in kamikaze drones, which have raised alarms within the PLA. China is deploying EW systems such as the J-16D electronic warfare aircraft and ground-based EW units to disrupt drone communications and GPS signals along its border with India.
Conclusion
From unmanned systems and counter-drone defenses to EW, these adaptations highlight a calculated strategy to use battlefield lessons and integrate them into an evolving military doctrine. To be sure, questions remain about the PLA’s ability to operationalize these innovations effectively, particularly under the constraints of centralized command structures and the limited real-world testing of new tactics. Yet they do indicate a serious intent to learn from others’ wars, the historic hallmark of successful military change programs.
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