In the early hours of Dec. 8, the Assad dynasty’s more than half a century of brutal rule in Syria came to an end.
With Bashar al-Assad fleeing the country, not only did Syria’s domestic political order change overnight—so too did its geopolitical identity. It is no longer part of Iran’s “axis of resistance” or one of Russia’s longest-lasting allies in the Arab world, where Moscow had its most profound strategic footprint in the form of both air and naval bases.
Many are busy declaring winners and losers of this pivotal moment. Drawing a list of losers at this stage is relatively easy. The regime itself, Iran, Russia, and Hezbollah are among them. However, drawing a list of winners is not as straightforward. Although Assad’s fall has significantly boosted Turkey’s influence and stature in Syria and in broader regional geopolitics, HTS—Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, the rebel faction that led the offensive that toppled him—is not a Turkish proxy. That said, Ankara remained committed to the Syrian opposition groups during difficult times and now has significant influence over HTS and the ability to affect its actions and decisions.
That commitment ultimately bore fruit with the removal of Assad, marking a pivotal shift in the regional landscape. In northern Syria, opposition forces—bolstered by years of military and administrative experience and assistance from Turkey—emerged with enhanced governance capabilities.
This transformation became evident not only in the group’s cohesive execution of the operation that led to Assad’s downfall, but also in the disciplined and methodical approach that it adopted in the aftermath. These developments signal a substantive evolution in the Syrian opposition’s capacity to govern, reflecting both the dividends of sustained external support and the intrinsic adaptability of these actors in navigating Syria’s fraught and ever-shifting political terrain.
However, HTS and other rebel groups may soon discover that building a new Syria might prove more cumbersome and challenging than bringing it down. We know what collapsed in Syria, but we do not know what awaits it. A concerted effort by Syrian, regional, and international actors is needed to prevent further bloodshed, fragmentation, and proxy wars in the country.
That effort must begin with a nonsectarian interim government in Damascus and a new regional and international bloc to help with the political process, reconstruction, and rebuilding—a bloc that replaces the old pro-Assad power brokers in Moscow and Tehran with a group including Turkey, Syria’s Arab neighbors, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia—as well as the European Union and the United States.
Within Syria, one of the gravest dangers would be if regime collapse turns into a state collapse, as was the case in Libya. Such a collapse would only lead to more chaos and a bleak future for the country. Therefore, the Syrian state’s institutions and mechanisms need to be maintained.
Political transition and government formation are interlinked, but they can be separated. The political transition is an arduous and time-consuming process. Yet a new interim government is needed immediately to provide essential services, preserve state institutions and functions, and prevent a power vacuum and chaos from emerging.
In this respect, the recent decision by HTS to convene its first joint cabinet meeting with ministers from the Assad era suggests a commitment to a transition process and can be interpreted as a promising development. The attainment of stability in Syria is not merely a local imperative but a regional one as well.
Appointing a caretaker prime minister tasked with putting an interim government in place just one day after the fall of Damascus was a step in the right direction. As the group that led the march on the capital, HTS will have a significant say in the political transition and government formation. Yet, to gain societal legitimacy and international acceptance, this new government should be inclusive and reflect the country’s diversity. It cannot be HTS’s previously Idlib-based “salvation government” writ large.
Similarly, in a conflict context, grievances usually produce militias, violence, and radicalism—not least if these grievances are identity-based. Syria’s next-door neighbor, Iraq, is a textbook case of this. The toppling of Saddam Hussein’s Sunni regime in 2003 led to the emergence of a new power configuration in Baghdad that was led by Shiites and Kurds. Such exclusion and grudges toward the broader Sunni community fueled waves of extremism in Iraq and beyond, from the emergence of al Qaeda in Iraq to the Islamic State.
To fend off such a prospect in Syria, there must be no marginalization or criminalization of the Alawite or Shiite communities. Preventing communal grudges is not only crucial for an orderly political transition and more legitimate government in Damascus, but also crucial to curb Iran’s influence and communal networks in Syria.
At the regional and international levels, rather than the U.N.-led and Western-supported Geneva process, the Astana process—launched in the closing days of 2016 and led by Turkey, Russia, and Iran—has mainly charted the course of the conflict in Syria. The Astana format was effectively about freezing the conflict, not facilitating a political transition, while helping Ankara, Moscow, and Tehran manage their interests in Syria.
However, the Astana process has now run its course—not least because two of its major members backed a regime that no longer exists, and their presence in the country is now dramatically reduced. In other words, Moscow and Tehran no longer have the clout—or the legitimacy—to play a major role in Syria’s future. In the short term, Russia may maintain a degree of influence over developments in Syria. However, this influence will be on shaky ground. Iran’s position is even more precarious.
For some time, the Astana trio might want to maintain this platform not only for convenience, but also for Turkey to partially manage the discontent of Tehran and Moscow over the toppling of Assad. However, this platform is unsuitable for discussion and consensus on the internal political transition and process.
A political transition will require a different set of actors around the table. The new platform needs to include Syria’s key neighbors and have Arab ownership. Iraq, Jordan, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia are well-placed to join this bloc.
Their inclusion is vital for two reasons. First, the Astana trio was made up of non-Arab states. Since Syria is an Arab-majority state, the new format must have Arab ownership and agency. Second, as they watch what is unfolding in Syria, regional Arab autocrats are probably terrified. Despite the contextual differences, they see the two main features of the Arab uprisings being present in Syria: the regime being toppled and the main protagonists being Islamists. This will trigger paranoia and fear in these states about their own regime security.
Turkey and the Syrian opposition groups should aim to alleviate these leaders’ concerns and push them to cooperate more for an orderly political transition in Damascus by making them part of such an inclusive regional platform. Similarly, the EU and the United States should nudge Arab states to be cooperative, rather than disruptive, during this political transition.
Without a regional consensus, we are likely to see the emergence of a broad coalition of Arab states that will try to undermine any sort of democratic political transition—as was the case after the Arab Spring uprisings in the early 2010s—the Gulf-engineered coup in Egypt being a case in point. Unless well-managed, it would be no surprise to see Iran and many Arab states similarly opposing the new order in Damascus.
Syria could become a test for the regional normalization process that has unfolded in recent years, including between Turkey and the Arab states as well as Iran and the Gulf states. The Syrian transition should underpin rather than undermine the ongoing process of regional normalization.
Finally, the EU should not remain a bystander—as it has been—or indifferent to the transformation of Syria. Early engagement with HTS; rebel groups; and key regional actors, starting with Turkey, is essential to help the transition process. It should incentivize an orderly transition through different aid and reconstruction packages. To do this, Turkey, the EU, the United States, and key Arab states should hold regular and structured dialogue on the political transition, reconstruction, and rebuilding of Syria.
Most of the time, what many call the “new reality” is merely a snapshot of a moment in time. The dramatic scenes in Damascus could lead to a more chaotic situation—or they could create a new government that enjoys genuine legitimacy in Damascus. Close cooperation between Syria, Arab states, and international powers is essential to prevent a chaotic outcome and allow for the construction of a new, legitimate government in Damascus.
This is a watershed moment. The U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003 broke the old Middle East, after which Iran and its regional axis were ascendant and the Arab powers were in retreat. The Arab Spring uprisings of 2011 further eviscerated this erstwhile regional order. In contrast, after the start of the Israel-Hamas war and Assad’s fall, Iran and its regional network are in decline, and the balance of power is shifting significantly.
Forging a consensus around Syria could serve as the foundation for a new regional order.
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