The stunningly successful offensive by Syrian rebels last week accomplished what years of bloodshed by larger factions could not. Within four days, the rebel group, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, captured much of Aleppo, one of Syria’s largest cities, and now controls most of Aleppo Province and all of Idlib Province. Long-entrenched front lines held by government forces and fortified by Russian firepower crumbled.
Underlying the success of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham is a crucial development: It has evolved from being part of one of the most brutal transnational jihadist movements in modern history to positioning itself as a nationalist force — and, for many, a stabilizing actor.
The group was born as an Islamic State branch and later joined with Al Qaeda, and it remains designated as a terrorist organization by the United States and other Western countries. But after formally pivoting away from international jihad in 2016, it became the dominant force in Syria’s northwest, one of the few areas outside of Syrian government control.
Hayat Tahrir al-Sham has established a bureaucracy to oversee education, health care and justice. It has tried to signal moderation by instituting a less harsh brand of Islamic practice, and to attract technocrats. The group has displayed more discipline than many nationalist counterparts, urging its fighters to respect Christians and other minorities and meeting with religious leaders to reassure them of protection. It played a crucial role in fighting ISIS and eradicating Al Qaeda’s remnants in Syria.
The group’s leader, Abu Mohammad al-Jolani, said Hayat Tahrir al-Sham would apply its tolerant policy to Aleppo, withdraw armed fighters from civilian areas “in the coming weeks” and consider dissolving itself in place of “new institutions,” according to Dareen Khalifa, a senior adviser to the International Crisis Group. Whether the group actually follows through, Ms. Khalifa said, “remains to be seen.”
This transformation does not make Hayat Tahrir al-Sham less dangerous; it makes the group more complex and harder to root out. Its policies are often enforced through intimidation, assassination of its rivals and the murder of civil society activists. Many Syrians in areas under the group’s control express relief at the relative stability there but resentment at the group’s iron-fisted practices, reflecting the lack of viable alternatives.
Hayat Tahrir al-Sham and other groups like it, including another Islamist force in Syria, Ahrar al-Sham, or Al Qaeda’s affiliate in Yemen, or militant Islamist groups in Africa, are not the same threat the United States fought for two decades in what it called the war on terror. The new Hayat Tahrir al-Sham is a product of a post-9/11 world in which jihadist organizations have reinvented themselves as nationalist and locally focused movements, not just to survive but to thrive in the new geopolitical landscape. The Taliban is a prime example, and an inspiration for groups like Hayat Tahrir al-Sham. In their international outreach, they reassure the West that they will not allow their countries to become a launchpad for international terrorism, and will focus on local governance through Islamic law.
The war on terror, while presumably preventing another large-scale attack like Sept. 11, nonetheless failed to dismantle jihadist ideology. Instead, it compelled these movements to recalibrate their approach, moving away from cross-border terror networks to localized governance and insurgency, or in some cases, like in Libya, militants were absorbed into the government. Hayat Tahrir al-Sham has gone to great lengths to signal that it has no quarrel with the United States. Its leader, Mr. Jolani, said in a May 2015 Al Jazeera interview that Syria would not serve as a base for jihadist attacks on the West. His group set up a political office for international outreach and engaged with countries including Turkey, presenting itself as a trustworthy partner focused solely on Syria.
As a journalist born and raised in Syria until my early 20s, and someone who studies the conflict there, I believe the group’s transformation away from the brutal methods of ISIS and Al Qaeda is partly public relations, but mainly genuine. One indication of its change of direction is that training given to new recruits emphasizes the merits of country-focused jihad over the global jihad espoused by Al Qaeda, according to my interviews with members.
The localized focus and growing governance structures of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham could give it staying power in Syria akin to that of the Taliban in Afghanistan, although it lacks the international recognition or cohesive political strategy that allowed the Taliban to negotiate with global powers. Hezbollah in Lebanon could be seen as another model, at least until its missile attacks on Israel led to the Jewish state’s crushing offensive against it.
The ruthless regime of President Bashar al-Assad of Syria — already battered by conflict, sanctions and corruption — is now facing its gravest crisis in years. Its capacity to reclaim lost territory appears significantly eroded, leaving it vulnerable to further advances. With Russia distracted by the war in Ukraine, the regime has less reason to count on its ally.
For those of us who closely watch the conflict, we can see a pervasive sense of paralysis on the regime’s side. Regime supporters convey exhaustion and surrender. The last time parts of Aleppo were conquered by rebels, it took years and tens of thousands of deaths for the regime to retake the city. Doing it all over again seems unthinkable, especially with a population fully aware that post-liberation life under Mr. Assad did not improve.
As the United States shifts its focus to great-power competition with nations such as China, it leaves behind a Middle East where populations and regional countries no longer see groups like Hayat Tahrir al-Sham merely as terrorists but as political actors filling the void left by failing states.
In Syria, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham has followed a similar trajectory, consolidating its power not through terror attacks abroad but by embedding itself deeply within local structures. That approach complicates efforts to counter these groups. Their goals are no longer about global jihad but regional dominance — a strategy that makes them harder to dislodge. Western policymakers must grapple with this new reality.
Western nations have a choice: create a moderate alternative that can govern effectively, or acknowledge that such groups will continue to rule in a world that is far from perfect. The first choice involves a generational nation-building project that a China-focused America may be incapable or unwilling to do. Doing neither is the worst option.
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