Amid rising expectations of a negotiated end to Russia’s war in Ukraine, Russian President Vladmir Putin declared last week that “nothing has changed.” He reiterated his maximalist demands for a peace deal: Ukraine must cede additional territories to Russia, abandon all hope of joining NATO, demilitarize, and “denazify”—Kremlin code for replacing the current government. These demands, which are unacceptable to Kyiv, suggest that Putin is confident that the war is trending in his favor.
If U.S. President-elect Donald Trump is to succeed in brokering a peace deal, he must change Putin’s perspective that he has the upper hand, or Trump’s diplomacy will backfire. To go into talks with a strong hand, Trump will need to bolster U.S. and Ukrainian leverage. And he must do so quickly, without the torturous delays and self-imposed red lines that have characterized President Joe Biden’s support for Ukraine over the last three years. The Trump administration should therefore formulate a maximum pressure campaign to convince Moscow to accept a good and lasting peace deal. By keeping his promise to restore “peace through strength,” Trump can give himself the best possible chance of stopping the bloodshed for good.
Amid rising expectations of a negotiated end to Russia’s war in Ukraine, Russian President Vladmir Putin declared last week that “nothing has changed.” He reiterated his maximalist demands for a peace deal: Ukraine must cede additional territories to Russia, abandon all hope of joining NATO, demilitarize, and “denazify”—Kremlin code for replacing the current government. These demands, which are unacceptable to Kyiv, suggest that Putin is confident that the war is trending in his favor.
If U.S. President-elect Donald Trump is to succeed in brokering a peace deal, he must change Putin’s perspective that he has the upper hand, or Trump’s diplomacy will backfire. To go into talks with a strong hand, Trump will need to bolster U.S. and Ukrainian leverage. And he must do so quickly, without the torturous delays and self-imposed red lines that have characterized President Joe Biden’s support for Ukraine over the last three years. The Trump administration should therefore formulate a maximum pressure campaign to convince Moscow to accept a good and lasting peace deal. By keeping his promise to restore “peace through strength,” Trump can give himself the best possible chance of stopping the bloodshed for good.
Any diplomatic effort will have to confront some unfortunate facts. First, Putin’s ambitions extend far beyond seizing a few Ukrainian provinces and their populations. For decades, he has fought to keep Ukraine within Russia’s sphere of influence and rewrite the broader security order in Europe. No matter how the current war ends, those ambitions will persist as long as Putin remains in power—and likely well afterward, given Russia’s entrenched imperial traditions.
Second, Ukrainian forces are on the back foot, struggling to hold their lines amid shortages of manpower and materiel. While the Russian military and economy have their share of problems, Kyiv’s war effort is on a more alarming trajectory. Ukraine’s mobilization rate has dropped, while too many newly mobilized troops are suffering casualties or going AWOL, largely due to insufficient training. Moscow’s forces continue to receive more artillery shells from Russian industry and North Korea than Kyiv gets from the West, while Russia’s air force is pounding Ukrainian positions and towns with well over 100 glide bombs per day.
Consequently, Russia’s rate of advance, though still incremental, has accelerated each month since June. Russian missile and drone strikes have decimated Ukrainian electricity production as winter approaches. As long as Kyiv cannot adequately defend against or deter attacks on its critical infrastructure, Russia can continue to squeeze Ukraine’s economy and scare off Western investment in reconstruction.
Putin likely sees the West’s growing interest in peace talks as a sign that its resolve is slipping, further incentivizing him to make maximalist demands. Although the Kremlin says it’s open to peace talks, the terms Putin has put forward would amount to Ukrainian capitulation. In addition to a formal ban on Ukrainian accession to NATO, he will likely insist on further concessions, including limits on the size of Ukraine’s military.
These terms would leave Ukraine highly vulnerable to future Russian aggression, inviting another invasion after a period of rearmament. For Washington, attempting to coerce Kyiv into accepting such a deal would be foolish—not least because China will be watching. If Putin is permitted to dictate terms to Kyiv, Beijing might feel more inclined to use military force against Taiwan or other neighbors.
Campaign rhetoric and comments from some of his advisors aside, Trump has not signaled any intention of abandoning Ukraine. In fact, many officials in Kyiv appear ready to roll the dice with Trump amid deep frustration with Biden.
The challenge for Ukraine and its Western partners is finding a way to turn the tables so that they’re negotiating from a position of strength. That means stabilizing the front. While the West cannot dictate a solution to Ukraine’s mobilization issue, it can step up military aid. Kyiv needs more equipment and a steady supply of munitions to replace losses, kit out new units, defend its cities and critical infrastructure, and holds its lines. When units are under-resourced, the infantry must shoulder a greater burden, leading to higher casualties.
Upon taking office, Trump should quickly begin tapping whatever remains of Biden’s congressionally allocated drawdown authority, which allows Washington to donate weapons from existing U.S. stocks. The new administration should also obligate any remaining funds under the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative, which allows the U.S. government to provide Ukraine with new materiel procured from industry. The goal should be to surge supplies of artillery ammunition, anti-tank weapons, armored fighting vehicles, and other aid to alleviate the burden on Ukraine’s exhausted infantry.
At the same time, Trump must ensure U.S. assistance—and thus his and Kyiv’s leverage—does not have an expiration date. He should immediately lobby the U.S. Congress to pass a large Ukraine leverage package—but with much of the aid structured as a loan, similar to the Lend-Lease Act during World War II. He should firmly demand that European allies match or exceed this sum. In addition, Trump should publicly commit to fulfilling the U.S.-Ukraine security agreement struck last June, in which Washington promised to provide Kyiv with military and other aid for at least 10 years; similar agreements were struck with other Western countries. The new administration should also support the bipartisan congressional initiative to codify that agreement into law. By signaling to Putin that U.S. resolve will not waver, the United States can encourage Russia to negotiate on reasonable terms.
Furthermore, Trump should enable Ukraine to take full advantage of Biden’s belated decision to loosen restrictions on Ukrainian strikes in Russia with U.S.-provided missiles. Although U.S. dithering caused Ukraine to miss the moment when these strikes could have achieved maximum operational effect, they can still benefit Kyiv on the battlefield and at the negotiating table. However, Ukraine will need more missiles, a coherent plan for their use, and timely targeting data from the United States.
Whereas the U.S. Defense Department claims it is running out of spare ATACMS missiles to send to Ukraine, Trump and Congress would do well to press the Pentagon on whether it truly still needs its hundreds of older ATACMS that are past their service life. In addition, although the U.S. military isn’t procuring ATACMS anymore, they remain in production at Lockheed Martin, slated for export to other countries. The Trump administration could place a large order for Ukraine and bump it to the top of the list, as Washington has done for some other weapons. Biden has refused to do this for ATACMS, so this would be another pressure tactic for Trump to deploy.
Nor are ATACMS the only option. Washington has considered providing Ukraine with Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missiles (JASSM), which can be employed from Ukraine’s F-16 aircraft or integrated with its Soviet-made fighters. These missiles have a longer range than ATACMS and are available in greater quantity. Trump could also press Germany to give Ukraine Taurus missiles.
What’s more, the incoming administration should consider dropping the remaining restrictions on where and what Ukraine is permitted to strike. U.S. timidity has hamstrung Ukraine’s war effort for far too long. In particular, intensifying the threat to Russian energy infrastructure would give Trump and Kyiv more leverage to secure a deal. Even if Western governments balk at letting Ukraine use missiles directly against Russian energy infrastructure, Ukraine should be allowed to strike air defense systems anywhere in Russia. Degrading Russian air defenses could improve Ukraine’s success rate when using its own drones to strike Russian energy infrastructure.
To maximize pressure on Putin, Trump should also take the fight to Russia’s economy. Earnings from energy exports, the backbone of Russia’s state budget, should be the primary target. The harder it is for Moscow to keep its economy afloat and fund its war effort, the more likely the Kremlin will be to accept a fair deal. Even before Trump takes office, his team could announce its intention to drive down oil prices—likely involving an agreement with Saudi Arabia, which has substantial idle crude production.
In addition, the United States should expand its use of secondary sanctions to bar Russia from evading the G-7 oil price cap. This mechanism imposes a price ceiling for Russian oil exports that use Western services such as insurance and shipping. But Russia has been able to use non-Western services, including a so-called “shadow fleet” of tankers, for much of its oil exports. Washington has sanctioned only a fraction of these shadow tankers. Imposing secondary sanctions against the rest of the shadow fleet—which would make it risky for any port to receive these ships, for example—could make it harder for Russia to elude the price-cap regime. The G-7 should simultaneously lower the price cap—currently at $60 per barrel—to squeeze Russian earnings.
The Ukrainians know they need leverage to persuade the Kremlin to negotiate on acceptable terms. This is the crux of the victory plan recently unveiled by Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky. But for Kyiv to gain that leverage, its Western partners must step up—including the United States.
As the co-author of The Art of the Deal, Trump knows that one negotiates best from a position of strength. If Trump wants a good deal to end the war in Ukraine, he should seize the opportunity to maximize pressure on Russia.
The post Trump Should Make Putin Wince Before They Sit Down to Talk appeared first on Foreign Policy.
