Welcome to Foreign Policy’s South Asia Brief.
The highlights this week: Nepali Prime Minister K.P. Sharma Oli visits Beijing, Bangladesh-India tensions deepen in the wake of the arrest of a Hindu activist in Dhaka, and Pakistan moves forward with plans for a China-style internet firewall.
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Nepali Prime Minister K.P. Sharma Oli is in China this week for a four-day visit—his first trip abroad since beginning his fourth term in July. Beijing held a welcome ceremony for Oli and his 87-member delegation with a Chinese army guard of honor. Oli’s trip includes meetings with Chinese President Xi Jinping and senior officials, a speech at Peking University, and engagements with China’s business community.
By opting for a trip to China first, Oli risked upsetting two of his most important partners: his main coalition ally, the Nepali Congress party; and India, which is historically Nepal’s closest friend. With his political partners, he appears to have played his cards right and avoided a tiff. But relations with New Delhi—which had been tense before this trip—will remain a challenge for Oli.
Oli and his CPN-UML party have long differed with the Nepali Congress on how to approach China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Beijing and Kathmandu have frequently discussed BRI investments, but no project has yet materialized in Nepal. China is increasingly keen to move forward, since Nepal’s parliament ratified a $500 million infrastructure grant from the U.S. Millennium Challenge Corp. in 2022.
The Nepali Congress argues that because of Nepal’s precarious economic state, it should not agree to Chinese loans and should focus instead on grants. The CPN-UML, however, has argued that Kathmandu should pursue loans—Beijing’s preferred financing mechanism—because of its immediate infrastructure needs.
Oli and his allies repeatedly insisted that the issue wouldn’t cause a spat—but given the fractiousness of Nepal’s coalition politics, there was good reason to be skeptical. But last week, Oli said he wouldn’t sign any loan-related agreements while in Beijing, seemingly preempting a possible crisis.
The publicly announced deals during Oli’s trip so far include memorandums of understanding and other informal arrangements related to trade, infrastructure, technology, and cultural exchange.
In New Delhi, Oli’s visit will be viewed with some concern. The Nepali leader bucked tradition by not making his first foreign trip to India. But Oli—whom Indian officials already view as pro-China—also hasn’t received a formal invitation to visit India, perhaps a reflection of the tensions that have crept into the bilateral relationship over issues including overflight rights and border disagreements.
Some of Oli’s previous moves, including signing earlier partnership accords with Beijing and resuming joint military drills that were suspended during the COVID-19 pandemic, have also sparked anxiety in New Delhi. The Nepali leader’s objective to move closer to operationalizing the BRI in Nepal—he inked a BRI cooperation framework accord on Wednesday—won’t sit well with India, which has categorically rejected the initiative.
To be sure, tensions between Nepal and India should not be overstated. Oli met Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi on the sidelines of the U.N. General Assembly summit in New York in September. According to Nepali officials, Modi said he hopes to visit Nepal soon; Oli formally invited him in August.
Each side also holds leverage that ensures a continued strong partnership. For India, it’s the extensive financial and development assistance on which Nepal relies heavily. And Nepal’s government knows that China’s growing influence in the country—both economic and political—gives New Delhi incentive to double down on the bilateral relationship with Kathmandu.
Oli’s visit to Beijing and broader outreach to China should be seen as expressions of his intent not to join the China camp but rather to exert more strategic autonomy by better balancing Nepal’s relations with India and with China. (This is a similar position to that taken by new governments in the Maldives and Sri Lanka.)
Nepal-India tensions—while limited—are nonetheless real. They also include long-standing Nepali concerns about India, from its periodic economic blockades to public perceptions that New Delhi harbors high-handed views of Kathmandu. Oli must carry out two delicate balancing acts: one with his political allies and one with India and China.
India-Bangladesh tensions deepen. Tensions between New Delhi and Dhaka have been festering since Bangladeshi Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, a close Indian partner, resigned under pressure in August. They boiled over this week after dramatic developments in both countries.
Last week, Bangladeshi Hindu activist Chinmoy Krishna Das was detained on sedition charges, leading India to express “deep concern” and reiterate demands that Bangladesh ensure the safety of Hindus in the country. India alleges that Bangladesh’s Hindu community has faced rising security threats, including from Islamist hard-liners emboldened by Hasina’s departure.
Bangladeshi reports have identified hundreds of attacks on Hindus, but inflammatory social media campaigns about threats to Hindus in Bangladesh have intensified anger in India. On Monday, a mob stormed the building housing Bangladesh’s Assistant High Commission in Agartala, India. Students at Dhaka University—some of them Hindus—staged anti-India protests in response.
The Hasina era was marked by close government-to-government ties between India and Bangladesh but tensions on a people-to-people level. Many Bangladeshis, including some policymakers, have railed against Modi’s Hindu-nationalist policies and outsized Indian influence in Bangladesh.
That some of these leaders now hold power in Dhaka was bound to present challenges—not to mention recent revelations that billions of dollars were looted from Bangladesh’s central bank during Hasina’s 15 years in power. Among other factors, economic interests and border security give Bangladesh and India incentive to make their relationship work, but it is facing its greatest strain in a few decades.
Pakistan’s internet firewall. In September, Pakistani media began reporting that officials were installing a national firewall to monitor content that the government deems propaganda. Detailed reporting from Al Jazeera suggests that those plans are advancing rapidly and that the firewall uses Chinese technology.
This presents a major threat to Pakistan’s economy, with initial estimates suggesting that the firewall could lead to $300 million in losses. Pakistan’s internet will also be hit hard by slowdowns and other disruptions triggered by a firewall; its rates of fiber-optic cable use, which allows for a faster and more reliable connection, are quite low—especially relative to China.
Pakistan’s government has not formally admitted to using a firewall, but if it does, it would likely cite terrorist threats and Indian cyberattacks as justification. However, the firewall’s main focus will be throttling online dissent, especially activism from former Prime Minister Imran Khan’s party and supporters. Because many of Islamabad’s harshest critics are based abroad, its reach will have limits.
New Delhi watches U.S. transition. India has likely taken note of two recent developments in the United States. Last Saturday, U.S. President-elect Donald Trump threatened to impose 100 percent tariffs on BRICS countries if the grouping, which includes India, develops a new currency.
The point is moot: The BRICS states have no current plans to go that route, and New Delhi has said it would not support a new currency. But it is a reminder that Trump’s tough line on tariffs could cause tensions for the U.S.-India relationship, which should otherwise thrive during his second term.
Trump also announced his selection of Kash Patel as FBI director. An Indian American, Patel has expressed support for Modi’s Hindu nationalism. Such affinities could motivate Patel—if confirmed—to push for the U.S. Justice Department to scale back two investigations: one that alleges Indian state involvement in a failed assassination plot in New York and the recent indictment of Indian billionaire Gautam Adani for bribery.
Of course, if Trump wants those investigations to continue, Patel—known for his deep loyalty to the president-elect—likely wouldn’t try to resist.
One of the more intriguing storylines around last week’s protests in Pakistan—which saw thousands of people converge on Islamabad calling for the release of imprisoned opposition leader Khan—was the central role played by Khan’s wife, Bushra Bibi.
An intensely private person who was only recently released from a short jail stint herself, Bibi surfaced as a protest leader. She stood beside top officials from Khan’s Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) party and implored marchers to remain in the streets with her. In the end, she and other leaders quickly left the protest site, and the rally was stymied as authorities cracked down.
Bibi’s presence likely signals tensions between Khan and other PTI leaders. Khan reportedly didn’t trust others with fronting a protest that the government vowed to put down; indeed, many party leaders were criticized for not joining the march to begin with. But Bibi is controversial: Some Khan supporters see her as credible and authentic, while others are angry with her for abandoning protesters as they faced the wrath of the state.
Some party leaders are also unhappy that Bibi refused to accept the government’s offer to relocate the protests to outside Islamabad and insisted on following Khan’s original call to bring demonstrators to a central area near government buildings declared off-limits. As a result, the protests achieved little aside from deepening divides within the party.
In the Print, V.K. Saraswat, Prachi Priya, and Aniruddha Ghosh argue that India should not join the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, an Asian free trade agreement. “India’s path to sustainable growth lies in forging strategic trade partnerships that bolster, rather than undermine, its manufacturing ecosystem,” they write.
In the Daily Star, disability rights activist Sabrina Sultana decries the lack of progress in addressing discrimination against people with disabilities in Bangladesh. “[W]e continue to face harassment in key areas such as education, employment, healthcare, housing, property rights, family formation, allowance programs, and disability identification registration,” she writes.
A Kuensel editorial considers the impacts of Adani’s indictment on talks in Bhutan between Druk Green Power Corp. and the Adani Group on a potential hydropower deal. “Those involved in the negotiations and keeping an eye on the recent developments are confident that as long as the agreement is mutually beneficial, there should not be reasons to worry,” it argues.
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