Last week, Syrian rebels led by the Sunni Islamist group Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) launched a surprise offensive, capturing significant parts of Aleppo, one of Syria’s largest cities, and advancing south into Hama province. This offensive—the most substantial territorial gain by rebel forces in nearly a decade—struck at the heart of what Russia once considered its defining achievement in Syria: the 2016 recapture of Aleppo.
In December 2016, Russian airpower, in coordination with Iranian-backed forces and the Syrian army, retook the city in an operation that demonstrated Moscow’s military effectiveness and cemented its role as the decisive external actor in Syria, overshadowing other actors such as the United States, which focused narrowly on countering the Islamic State, and Turkey, which was preoccupied with containing Kurdish forces near its border with Syria. The loss of Aleppo thus represents not just a military setback but a symbolic challenge to Russia’s claim of being able to decisively shape Syria’s future.
For Russia, the loss of regime control in Aleppo reveals deeper vulnerabilities in its Syrian strategy. The degradation of key ground forces such as Hezbollah—exacerbated by Israeli strikes against their commanders, forces, and logistics in Lebanon and Syria in recent months—and the endemic weakness of the Syrian army have created military gaps that Moscow has struggled to fill due to its primarily aerial deployment in Syria.
While Russia’s airpower in Syria remains relatively consistent with its 2018 levels, the redeployment of some ground forces in the past two years to secure strategic locations such as Tartus and Latakia has reduced its flexibility to address new threats effectively. Yet with established regional influence and significant military investments at stake, Russia cannot afford to retreat from Syria despite these mounting challenges. The naval base in Tartus secures Russia’s access to the Mediterranean, a critical geostrategic asset, while the Khmeimim air base near Latakia enables Moscow to project power across the region and maintain its role as a key player in Syria and beyond.
Russia’s response to the rebel offensive revealed significant operational constraints. When HTS first struck Aleppo, the speed and surprise of the advance left Moscow little time to organize effective air support. Though not lacking in air capacity, Russia struggled with the practical challenge of rapidly generating enough sorties to counter such a large-scale offensive. By the time rebels approached Hama, Russian forces managed to mount a more coordinated air campaign, with Russian and Syrian aircraft striking rebel positions across Hama, Aleppo, and Idlib. Russian sources claimed these strikes killed HTS leader Abu Mohammad al-Julani, though this remains unverified.
The offensive also exposed embarrassing weaknesses in the Assad regime’s defenses. At Kuweires air base near Aleppo, Syrian forces reportedly surrendered without resistance, allowing HTS to capture significant military assets. The seized equipment included a Mi-8 helicopter, an L-39 combat training aircraft, and reportedly an S-200 anti-aircraft missile system, along with Strela-10 and Pantsir-S1 air defense systems. Even more concerning was the fall of al-Safira, one of the regime’s largest military-industrial complexes and a critical defense manufacturing center.
The rebel advance toward Hama now threatens Russia’s strategic position in Syria. If HTS takes Hama, it could isolate the coastal provinces, as the city of Hama lies about 50 miles from Tartus and serves as a key junction connecting the interior to the Mediterranean coast. Meanwhile, a push to the city of Homs, roughly 75 miles from Latakia and 50 miles from Tartus, would sever the land link to Russia’s Mediterranean bases at Latakia and Tartus from its limited forces in central and eastern Syria.
This geographic separation would severely hamper Russia’s ability to coordinate operations across Syria. The situation could deteriorate further if dormant rebel cells in the south reactivate, potentially fragmenting regime territory and straining Russia’s already limited military presence. Russia maintains a presence in southern Syria, particularly in Quneitra and Daraa provinces near the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights, where it has established military police observation posts to monitor cease-fires and regional tensions.
Beyond immediate military concerns, these developments expose Moscow’s growing challenges in preserving its influence in Syria. Since initiating its military intervention in 2015, Moscow’s influence in Syria has rested on several key elements: a partnership with Iran and its network of nonstate actors; coordination with Turkey, with a view to managing competing interests, such as Turkey’s concerns over Kurdish forces and Russia’s support for the Assad regime; a tenuous balancing act with Israel to prevent unintended military clashes and preserve deconfliction agreements; diplomatic outreach to the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC); and efforts to maintain a working deconfliction mechanism with the United States.
However, each of these pillars has come under strain not only due to shifting realities in Syria but due to the spillover effects of Ukraine and Lebanon.
The Russian-Iranian partnership has been particularly critical to Russia’s objectives in Syria. This relationship was forged over shared concerns about the potential collapse of the Assad regime and the threat of Sunni extremism; it combined Russian airpower with ground forces from Iran and its allied militias. Iranian-supported groups such as Hezbollah, Iraqi Shiite militias, the Afghan Fatemiyoun, and the Pakistani Zainabiyoun were instrumental in recapturing key territories. Their joint campaign helped reclaim Aleppo in 2016, a turning point in the Syrian civil war.
Russia’s approach to Iran in Syria has shifted dramatically since its invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Moscow previously balanced between Iran and Israel, exemplified by its 2018 commitment to keep Iranian forces away from Israel’s border and its silence during Israeli strikes on Iranian assets. However, following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and especially after Hamas’s Oct. 7, 2023, attack on Israel, Moscow has aligned more closely with Iran’s so-called Axis of Resistance.
Russia now openly criticizes Israeli strikes and has ceded positions in central and eastern Syria to Iranian-backed forces—ostensibly aimed at preventing rebel forces from exploiting Russia’s reduction of ground forces and private military contractors in eastern Syria.
Meanwhile, Israel has dramatically escalated its strikes against Iranian assets in Syria, moving beyond targeting weapons storage to systematically eliminating high-value personnel. The Israeli offensive in Lebanon and the decimation of Hezbollah’s leadership have particularly impacted Russia’s position in Syria. The degradation of Hezbollah, which served as Russia’s primary allied ground force in western and southern Syria, has created a significant operational gap that Russia, with its limited troop presence of approximately 2,000 to 4,000 personnel, has struggled to fill.
Recently, amid developments in Gaza and Lebanon, speculation arose that Israel might again seek Russia’s assistance in curbing Iran’s influence in Syria. However, recent events suggest that Russia lacks both the capability and, potentially, the willingness to constrain Iran. This dynamic could further strain Russia-Israel relations, which have already significantly deteriorated since the outbreak of the Israel-Hamas war in Gaza.
Meanwhile, Russia and Turkey have frequently clashed over their competing visions for Syria’s future. Their relationship hit its lowest point in 2015, when Turkish F-16s shot down a Russian Su-24 bomber near the Syrian border. Both sides eventually reconciled, but even within the Astana process—a diplomatic framework launched in 2017 by Iran, Russia, and Turkey to facilitate negotiations on the Syrian conflict and de-escalation zones—they have pursued conflicting aims: Russia supports the Assad regime’s full territorial control, while Turkey backs opposition forces and maintains a military presence in northern Syria to prevent Kurdish autonomy there.
Since the start of its war in Ukraine, Russia has sought to maintain close relations with Turkey, a NATO member and critical trade partner for Moscow. This effort, coupled with Russia’s diminished resources across various regions, has positioned Ankara in a place of relative advantage. This dynamic is particularly evident in the South Caucasus, where Turkey, through its support for Azerbaijan against Armenia, has assumed a more active role in shaping regional dynamics.
The resurgence of HTS and Turkish-backed rebels will likely force Russia to reach new understandings with Turkey in Syria. While Moscow previously criticized Ankara sharply over rebel activities in Idlib, Russia’s current military constraints and need to maintain Turkish cooperation amid the Ukraine war—specifically for critical trade routes, access through the Bosporus for its naval operations, and to discourage Turkey from supplying Ukraine with advanced arms—have tempered its response.
Instead of denouncing Turkey for failing to control HTS, Russian officials have emphasized the Astana format as a mechanism for stability, suggesting that Moscow seeks accommodation rather than confrontation with Ankara.
Russia has promoted the normalization and reintegration of the Assad regime into the Arab world. These efforts culminated in Syria’s return to the Arab League in May 2023, as the GCC sought to acknowledge the reality of the regime’s control over much of Syria while reengaging with Damascus as a way to balance Iran’s influence. Russia’s objective has been to tap into Gulf financial resources for Syria’s reconstruction and economic recovery while enhancing the Assad regime’s international legitimacy.
An indication of this normalization was on display following the HTS offensive when Bashar al-Assad held a call with Emirati President Mohamed bin Zayed, who affirmed Emirati support for Syrian “sovereignty.” Nevertheless, the ongoing threats posed by armed opposition groups underline that normalization with Arab countries, while diplomatically beneficial, has little tangible impact on stabilizing the situation on the ground.
Moscow’s strategy in Syria going forward likely will involve a pragmatic adaptation rather than a withdrawal or a complete overhaul. This may require Russia to reconcile with the reality that its reduced military influence demands greater flexibility with regional powers.
The return of Donald Trump to the White House adds another layer of complexity to Russia’s calculations. A second Trump presidency might seek a grand bargain with Moscow, potentially offering a deal on Ukraine—such as freezing military aid or even recognizing Moscow’s territorial claims—in exchange for Russia helping to reduce Iran’s presence in Syria and facilitate a U.S. withdrawal from the region.
However, such a deal faces significant obstacles. Russia’s increased dependence on Iranian military support, both in Ukraine and Syria, makes Moscow unlikely to risk this crucial partnership. Moreover, Russia’s diminished leverage in Syria raises questions about its ability to deliver on any promises regarding Iranian influence, even if it wanted to.
Syria’s future trajectory will likely create new complications. Israel, faced with Russia’s inability or unwillingness to constrain Iran in Syria, may intensify its unilateral strikes against Iranian assets. Turkey may push for greater influence in the north, leveraging Russia’s need for cooperation to expand its sphere of control.
These dynamics suggest Syria is increasingly being divided into spheres of influence, with Russia focused primarily on securing its core interests along the Mediterranean coast. Though Russia is unlikely to move ground forces from Ukraine, any threat to its assets in Tartus and Latakia would likely see a redeployment of private military contractors or attempts to curry favor with Iran in hopes of ground reinforcements.
Rather than reevaluating its commitment to the Assad regime, Moscow appears determined to preserve its Syrian presence by recalibrating its methods.
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