Doubts over sustained U.S. support for Ukraine long predated Donald Trump’s victory in the presidential election, and they have raised concerns over Kyiv’s ability to sustain its defense against Moscow’s war. These concerns have overshadowed another important dynamic in an already complicated conflict: the increasing involvement of East Asian powers in a European war. Besides the recent arrival of at least 10,000 North Korean soldiers on the Russian side, the evolving roles of China, Japan, and South Korea raise the question of whether a widening proxy war is being fought in Ukraine. By all indications, the answer is yes: The war is setting a new precedent for Indo-Pacific nations to compete for their interests on the global stage.
A proxy war is when two countries fight each other indirectly—by supporting warring participants in a third country. Classic examples from the Cold War era include the Congo crisis in the 1960s and the Angola crisis in the 1970s, when the Soviet Union and United States each backed warring factions in a civil war with money, weapons, and sometimes troops from yet other countries but never got directly involved in combat themselves.
Doubts over sustained U.S. support for Ukraine long predated Donald Trump’s victory in the presidential election, and they have raised concerns over Kyiv’s ability to sustain its defense against Moscow’s war. These concerns have overshadowed another important dynamic in an already complicated conflict: the increasing involvement of East Asian powers in a European war. Besides the recent arrival of at least 10,000 North Korean soldiers on the Russian side, the evolving roles of China, Japan, and South Korea raise the question of whether a widening proxy war is being fought in Ukraine. By all indications, the answer is yes: The war is setting a new precedent for Indo-Pacific nations to compete for their interests on the global stage.
A proxy war is when two countries fight each other indirectly—by supporting warring participants in a third country. Classic examples from the Cold War era include the Congo crisis in the 1960s and the Angola crisis in the 1970s, when the Soviet Union and United States each backed warring factions in a civil war with money, weapons, and sometimes troops from yet other countries but never got directly involved in combat themselves.
Not all proxy wars look alike or follow the standard pattern. Sometimes, an outside power’s support for one side leads that power to intervene directly. Think of the United States’ gradual involvement in the Vietnam War or the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan to prop up the embattled government there. Even as the military efforts of their proxies waned, the United States and Soviet Union maintained their participation in an attempt to prevent a victory by the other superpower’s proxy.
Russia’s war against Ukraine has all the trappings of a proxy war. The Kremlin has clearly articulated its view that Ukraine has no agency as an independent state and that the target of its invasion is the West—specifically, the United States. Members of NATO and several other Western-aligned countries, in turn, are supporting Ukraine with weapons deliveries. The West’s intention may be Ukraine’s defense, but its efforts are necessarily directed at Russia. By forcing Putin to fail in his goal of subjugating Ukraine, Western support for Ukraine undermines Russia. U.S. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin suggested as much, admitting that “we want to see Russia weakened.”
But what about East Asian states’ involvement on each side of this war? Is this a proxy war for them, too? If so, to what end?
Start with Russia’s supporters. Despite China refraining from overtly providing Russia with weapons, it has worked to ensure Moscow’s ability to continue its war. Not only has it opposed Western sanctions, but it has also used its diplomatic connections in the global south to prevent a broader condemnation of Russia. Importantly, China has stepped in to prop up the Russian economy and defense industry to ensure that Russia can withstand Western sanctions and supply its military. Russia now imports most of its battlefield goods and critical components from China; according to U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken, China now supplies Russia with about 90 percent of its microelectronics imports and 70 percent of machine tool imports. According to customs data, Beijing ships more than $300 million worth of dual-use goods to Russia every month. As if to fire yet another warning in NATO’s direction, China this year participated in military exercises in Belarus, only a few miles from the Polish border.
North Korea has taken a far more direct approach. It was one of only five countries that voted against the U.N. General Assembly resolution opposing Russia’s aggression, and last week Pyongyang ratified a military alliance that pledges either country to aid the other in case of attack. North Korea has provided Russia with artillery shells and ballistic missiles to support dwindling munition stockpiles. But the most escalatory step occurred last month, when North Korea sent about 10,000 troops to Russia, some of whom are now reported to be fighting the Ukrainians in Russia’s Kursk region.
To support Ukraine, two stalwart U.S. allies have stepped in, albeit with much smaller steps: Japan and South Korea. Early on, Japan coordinated sanctions against Russia with Western partners. Tokyo also provides direct and indirect assistance to Ukraine, including nonkinetic military equipment—including vehicles, flak jackets, and reconnaissance drones—as well as some $12 billion in other aid, making Tokyo one of Kyiv’s top bilateral donors. Japan also revised its restrictions on weapons exports, enabling the transfer of Japanese-manufactured Patriot missiles to the United States, thereby helping to ensure U.S. stockpiles remain stable even as some of this equipment is sent to help Ukraine. And diplomatically, Japan has used its connections to act as a convening power to help Ukraine. During Japan’s 2023 G-7 presidency, for example, then-Prime Minister Kishida Fumio extended invitations to various countries from the global south so that Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky could engage with their representatives at the group’s May summit.
While South Korea, too, has refrained from delivering weapons to Ukraine, it has provided substantial humanitarian aid and other nonlethal support, such as mine-clearing equipment, body armor, and helmets. It has also joined in economic sanctions against Moscow. And like Japan, it has replenished U.S. weapons stocks, supplying the United States with artillery shells and thereby freeing up Washington’s ability to send shells to Ukraine. Similarly, South Korea has greatly increased defense exports to Poland, part of which backfilled the latter’s deliveries to Ukraine in the early days of the war. Following the news of North Korean troops arriving in Russia, Seoul is now considering a greater level of support, floating the idea of directly supplying Kyiv with defensive and offensive weapons.
The motivations of these four East Asian actors have all the hallmarks of their being involved in a proxy war. Both Beijing and Pyongyang have an overarching strategic interest in seeing Moscow prevail. Both share Russia’s vision of a post-Western world order, in which the United States and its allies are weakened. Chinese President Xi Jinping and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un see Putin as an ally in a global struggle against the West, which makes supporting his war in Ukraine a strategic imperative.
Similar proxy war motivations hold for Tokyo and Seoul. As a status quo power, Tokyo has a strategic interest in ensuring that the existing order does not falter, including the post-World War II proscription of changing borders by force; as Kishida famously warned, “Ukraine today may be East Asia tomorrow.” Seoul—in addition to its concerns about the new military alliance between Pyongyang and Moscow—is also motivated by a need to thwart attempts to change the status quo through coercion. Echoing Kishida, South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol told The Associated Press last year that “the war in Ukraine has reminded us all that a security crisis in one particular region can have a global impact.” Together, their actions to help Ukraine prevail also aim to send a message to China and North Korea that any attempt to forcibly change the status quo comes with dire consequences.
Granted, the level of support we currently see from the East Asian powers will likely be a function of how committed the United States and Russia remain in the months and years ahead. Trump’s return to the White House could result in changes on the battlefield—but not necessarily in the nature of Indo-Pacific involvement. Trump has already said he could end the war in a day but has not provided details. If he can—and both sides accept the outcome—then the proxy war ends. If he cannot and the conflict continues in some manner, so does the proxy war, but the level of commitment may change. In a situation where the United States stops supporting Ukraine but European NATO members step up, it is likely that Japan and South Korea would also continue their support; their interest in pushing back against aggressors would be unchanged. However, their support could be reduced, since some of their activities have come as a request by their U.S. ally.
It is hard to see China and North Korea reducing their involvement, given that their support could help Russia succeed and advance their strategic goal of destroying the existing order. Short of a mutually acceptable end to the war, changes in the degree of U.S. involvement under a second Trump administration will not alter the fundamental proxy war constellation: All four East Asian powers are supporting a third party to undermine their competitor’s ability to undermine their national interests.
While this indicates that the security challenges in East Asia have, in part, been exported to Europe, the more concerning element is the fact that their participation adds an element of uncertainty and potential escalation to the conflict in Ukraine. Beijing, Pyongyang, Seoul, and Tokyo are supporting their respective partners on European soil in order to wage a much broader struggle over the future of the international order. This, in turn, indicates the extent to which the war has become global—and has set a new precedent for how Asian nations compete for their interests in other parts of the world.
The post Ukraine Is Now a Proxy War for Asian Powers appeared first on Foreign Policy.
