U.S. President-elect Donald Trump claims to have ideas for quickly settling the Russia-Ukraine. Whether or not that’s true—and there’s plenty of reason to think it’s not—it’s likely the Trump administration will soon halt its bankrolling of Ukraine’s war effort. On the campaign trail, Trump derided U.S. funding of Ukraine, which currently amounts to more than $60 billion—around half of Ukraine’s total military support from abroad—and has given every indication that he would discontinue it.
This would plunk the problem of support for Ukraine squarely in Europe’s lap. The continent is still not prepared for that reality. The fear of a Russian rout of Ukraine, however, could motivate Europe to try assuming responsibility for supporting Ukraine on its own—beginning with a recognition that ramping up its support is not beyond its ability.
The possibility of U.S. disengagement from Ukraine hasn’t caught Europe completely by surprise. Although Trump didn’t disclose specifics while on the campaign trail, he presented an outline of a plan to end the war: U.S.-led negotiations would stop Russia where it is on the battlefield, cede the territories that Russia occupies to it, and then lift international sanctions against Russia in exchange for the termination of military hostilities toward Ukraine. There would be no NATO or other Western security guarantee but rather, according to Vice President-elect J.D. Vance, a demilitarized zone along Ukraine’s new borders with defensive fortifications robust enough to prevent another Russian invasion. Most important to Trump seems to be jettisoning the U.S. financial commitment to Ukraine.
Europe’s own contribution to Ukraine’s cause so far should not be underestimated. According to the Kiel Institute for the World Economy, the European Union is the largest provider of aid to Ukraine, having allocated a total of $133 billion since Russia’s full-scale invasion. (In total, the US has shelled out nearly $91 billion in combined military, economic, and humanitarian assistance.) The EU states have come up with more than $45 billion in military aid for Ukraine’s defense, including large volumes of weaponry and munitions. The bloc’s offer of membership to Ukraine and money for reconstruction and recovery—all directed toward fulfilling membership criteria, as well as rebuilding—buttress the country’s resilience and fuel its democratic aspirations. And at home, member states are accommodating 4 million refugees and have dramatically cut their fossil energy imports from Russia.
The losses, however, should the United States really step back, would be egregious in terms of leadership, money, and weaponry. Europe’s leaders remain convinced that maintaining Ukraine’s independence and halting Russian aggression is vital to the entire continent’s security. But there’s also a recognition that Europe’s effort alone is likely not enough to hold Ukrainian lines on the battlefield, much less serve Russia a knockout blow.
Germany was never a convincing candidate for leadership on the military front, and now that Chancellor Olaf Scholz is heading up a minority coalition until new elections early next year, it will enjoy even less clout. In France, even though President Emmanuel Macron has aspired to leadership—and obviously understands what is at stake for Europe—he is politically weak and facing tough elections soon, too. And the United Kingdom’s new prime minister, Keir Starmer, is fresh in office and already engulfed in struggles.
Thus, the task could fall on the shoulders of European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and her foreign policy chief, Kaja Kallas, if they accept it. Even though she doesn’t command a single battalion, von der Leyen has already shown what she can do as point person when the occasion demands it: When the COVID-19 pandemic broke out in Europe in 2020, she organized the EU-wide response like a seasoned field marshal, and then immediately on its heels, the quick pivot of Europe’s energy imports away from Russia. Simultaneously, the EU wasted no time imposing sanctions on Russia. And though only by a hair’s breadth, the EU recently outbattled Russian President Vladimir Putin in Moldova, where it helped fend off an onslaught of Russian disinformation, thus helping to reelect a liberal-minded president who is committed to democracy.
If the United States really bows out of the Russia-Ukraine war, however, von der Leyen is going to have to assume an even greater burden—leading a truly global military effort. The EU has allies beyond the bloc in countries like the UK, Japan, Australia, Canada, South Korea—all of which are pitching in for Ukraine but require a point person to look toward and to coordinate their support. This war was internationalized long before Russia put 10,000 North Korean troops on the ground, and the maintenance of a global pro-Ukraine front is vital to success.
Von der Leyen’s first hurdle, though, will be rallying the entire EU to the cause, and two members—Hungary and Slovakia—are pushing Trump-like “solutions.” Moreover, Russian-friendly populists are surging just about everywhere in the bloc.
At the recent European Political Community summit in Budapest, von der Leyen and Europe’s other top officials seemed to grasp the urgency of the task at hand but stopped short of offering specific plans for a way forward. “It is in all our interests that the autocrats of this world get a very clear message that there is not the right of might, that the rule of law is important,” von der Leyen said.
One thing appears absolutely certain: Europe will have to dig much deeper into its pockets. This means domestic politicos have to make the case to their populations much more bluntly: This war is about Europe, and Ukraine’s defeat would throw into jeopardy much of what decades of integration has accomplished—and cost their countries dearly in many ways.
EU leaders have already begun shifting monies to defense-related priorities. Nearly a third of the bloc’s common budget, over $400 billion for 2021 to 2027, is allotted to cohesion funding, namely for the reduction of economic inequality between members. But, according to the Financial Times, nearly 95 percent of this budget goes untapped. This spending cannot go toward traditional military hardware but it can buy “dual-use products,” such as drones, global positioning satellites, night vision technology, thermal imaging, and some lasers. Germany, for instance, which is a transportation nexus for western Europe’s shipping for military goods to Ukraine, could call on its more than $40 billion in cohesion funds to repair its badly aged roads, bridges and trains.
A first step will have to involve pushing the third of NATO members who don’t even bankroll the alliance with the stated goal of committing 2 percent of their output to military spending. But maintaining Ukraine’s war effort will demand far more than that.
A proposal by Estonia, made before the U.S. election, deserves serious consideration. It calls for all NATO members anteing up at least 0.25 percent of their GDP for Ukraine’s defense, as the Baltic states already do. That would net for ensuring Ukraine can still purchase weapons to check Russia. The EU could also consider pursuing raising funds in this way on its own, outside of NATO.
Whether these armaments come from the production facilities of European or foreign arms-makers is beside the point. Europeans’ procurement of weaponry is already happening beyond Europe’s own defense industries. The Czech Republic, head of a multinational arms-buying initiative, tapped markets in a number of non-EU countries to supply Ukraine’s armed forces with 800,000 million artillery shells.
Denmark is trailblazing direct investment in the Ukrainian defense industry. The Danish contribution and frozen Russian assets managed by Denmark on behalf of the EU pay the Ukrainian defense industry $600 million to produce attack drones, artillery, anti-tank weapons, missiles, and naval missiles. Belgium is also working in this direction, with the idea being that every euro buys armaments (more cheaply than on the international market) and establishes a more sophisticated defense industry in Ukraine itself.
The European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR) recommends the creation of a law similar to the U.S. Defense Production Act, which grants the U.S. president powers to bolster the nation’s defense by fast-tracking the production of materials and services. It would, according to ECFR, “provide European policymakers with the tools to use the collective power of EU institutions, member-state governments, and European development banks to respond faster and more effectively to crises.” This would allow Europe to more efficiently use any additional money it commits to Ukraine, accelerating production of defensive armaments such as artillery shells and air-defense missiles, as well as medical supplies. The key would be for Europeans to do all this as one unit—not 27 separate states.
One key item that Europeans will not provide is the advanced surveillance and reconnaissance technology that the United States excels in. “All precision weapons systems today depend on this technology and no industry does it like the [United States],” said Christian Mölling, deputy director of the German Council on Foreign Relations.
Certainly, part of the European strategy must be to talk sense to Trump. A scenario to avoid at all costs would be the United States canceling sanctions or just ignoring them in return for nothing but Russian business. Europeans might point out to Trump that Russia’s two main allies are Iran and North Korea, countries that he disfavors. And perhaps, if the United States can’t be convinced with political arguments, they can find a way to interest Trump in the form of a bargain: The Europeans could agree to spend big specifically on U.S. weapons in exchange for Washington holding the Western line on Russia. The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace suggested Europe’s NATO members offer Trump the carrot that they raise defense spending to 3 percent by the end of his tenure in 2028.
Whatever happens, even in best case, it is highly unlikely that Trump will lead an alliance against Russia the way the Biden administration did. This means that Europe’s hour has arrived: It can grab the initiative and set the agenda rather than allowing the Orbans, Putins, and Xis of the world to do it their way.
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