Someday, probably later rather than sooner, Israel and Hamas will stop shooting at each other. Relieved U.S. officials could claim there is a cease-fire and the worst is behind us, even if limited violence continues. More good things might follow. The Houthis would be reluctant to fight a war on behalf of Hamas that Hamas itself is not fighting, returning their focus to Yemen. The fighting in Lebanon, which surged after Israel killed Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah, might eventually subside.
All this would be a dramatic improvement over the deadly and devastating conflict in Gaza. Yet even a successful cease-fire would not put the Middle East back on the path it was on before Hamas’s attack on Oct. 7, as dismal as that seemed at the time.
Someday, probably later rather than sooner, Israel and Hamas will stop shooting at each other. Relieved U.S. officials could claim there is a cease-fire and the worst is behind us, even if limited violence continues. More good things might follow. The Houthis would be reluctant to fight a war on behalf of Hamas that Hamas itself is not fighting, returning their focus to Yemen. The fighting in Lebanon, which surged after Israel killed Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah, might eventually subside.
All this would be a dramatic improvement over the deadly and devastating conflict in Gaza. Yet even a successful cease-fire would not put the Middle East back on the path it was on before Hamas’s attack on Oct. 7, as dismal as that seemed at the time.
Predicting the future in the Middle East is usually a fool’s game; nevertheless, I’ll propose five major changes that will shape regional dynamics—for the worse, of course—in the years to come.
First, Israel will likely have less tolerance for risk from Hamas, Hezbollah, Iran, or other enemies. Israelis have long known that a variety of states, militant groups, and in-between organizations that combine aspects of both—like Hamas and Hezbollah—see Israel as anathema and will target its people and institutions around the world. Before Oct. 7, however, the Israeli government could confidently tell its people that the Hamas leadership in Gaza seemed deterred, that Israeli intelligence could detect any large-scale attack emanating from there, and that the Israeli military could easily defeat any Hamas incursion into Israel. All three assumptions were proven wrong on the day Hamas attacked a year ago—a painful intelligence and policy failure.
Past intelligence failures are never dead—they’re not even past. The risk of another surprise attack looms over Israel, and it will be hard for future Israeli leaders to promise that, this time, the military and intelligence services will detect and stop any danger, whether the foe is Hezbollah, Hamas, or someone else. Intelligence agencies will be less confident in their own assessments, particularly those predicting peace, and the Israeli people will trust them less. As a result, the Israeli government is more likely to act with limited information, fearing that a failure to do so could result in another surprise attack. Similarly, it will be less tolerant of what would have been limited provocations in the past. Israeli leaders will also feel the need to restore deterrence, which they believe, probably correctly, was damaged by Hamas’s success on Oct. 7. The assault showed that Israel could be hit hard by a determined organization. Restoring deterrence means doing your own hitting before any threat can manifest.
Second, the Palestinian Authority, which, in theory, governs part of the West Bank, is even less relevant than it was before Oct. 7—and that is a low bar. Before Hamas’s attack, the PA was widely seen as corrupt and ineffective, but PA security forces played a critical role in keeping Hamas down in the West Bank. The PA was also at the center of any vision for a two-state solution. Even as the idea of negotiations became more and more of a farce, no U.S. official was quite willing to claim the peace process was completely dead.
Since the attacks, support among Palestinians for Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas and his Fatah organization have fallen even further, going from low to abysmal, although this hasn’t led Abbas to step down. Israel’s military operation in Jenin and other West Bank areas in September illustrate that it no longer trusts the PA as a partner for security. The Israeli attacks and the rampant settler violence against ordinary Palestinians further discredited the PA, creating a vicious cycle, and violence on the West Bank is likely to continue at high levels. To further complicate this mess, Abbas is 88 years old, and he has no clear successor. A power struggle, even a peaceful one, would further weaken the PA.
As a result, Israel will no longer have a partner for security and negotiation in the West Bank. The latter is of little concern in the short-term—no one expects peace talks to resume anytime soon—but it may matter over time. U.S. pressure on this issue may increase, and countries like Saudi Arabia have claimed they will not formally make peace with Israel until there is a Palestinian state. The lack of a Palestinian security partner is an even bigger blow. This will require Israel to conduct more raids in the West Bank and impose more border crossing and other restrictions, all of which are probably less effective than Palestinian self-policing and more costly to Israel.
Third, Hamas may have new allies in future wars—or at least Israel must worry it will. The Hezbollah-Israel, Iran-Israel, and Houthi-Israel conflicts that grew out of the Hamas war all stretch Israeli forces, create dangers and headaches for the United States and its Arab allies, and otherwise worsen an already dangerous situation. In a future conflict, Hamas may expect these allies to join in again, at least in a limited way, making it more likely for the group to attack because these allies serve as a force multiplier. Even if Hamas is mistaken and these potential allies intend to do little, Israel may fear that they will attack, creating incentives for preemptive strikes. Thus, future versions of the more minor Israel-Hamas conflicts that marked the time before Oct. 7 may involve more actors and be a constant regional headache.
One caveat to this point: Oct. 7 and the Israeli response were off the charts compared to past Israel-Hamas clashes in Gaza, so it is possible that Hezbollah and the Houthis may choose to ignore smaller-scale conflicts, declaring solidarity with Hamas but doing little in practice. But the risk of regional escalation by design or accident is high.
Fourth, Gaza is likely to be a failed state. All the proposals for governing Gaza after a cease-fire, ranging from PA control to a return of Hamas rule to long-term Israeli occupation, seem to be nonstarters. Some are unacceptable to Israelis or Palestinians, while others, such as an Arab or international force to serve as peacekeepers, are largely infeasible. The default result is that no one really governs Gaza, which would at best have a few pockets of stability but also areas of constant violence. In such a scenario, Hamas would wage a low-level insurgency against Israeli forces and their local allies, and Israeli forces would repeatedly strike Hamas leaders and fighters to prevent the group from reconstituting (and, while doing so, kill many civilians). The likely result is that Gaza will be a perpetual source of regional strife, with frequent small crises and low-level violence. The people of Gaza would continue to suffer, though with less international attention, while the humanitarian situation ranges from bad to disastrous.
Fifth, the United States will need to do more in the Middle East to enhance stability but is likely to do less. To prevent small conflicts from becoming regional wars requires energetic training and aid programs to bolster the PA, diplomatic intervention to help secure new and competent leadership as Abbas leaves power, pressure on Israel to avoid unnecessary preemptive strikes, and other difficult steps. These are time-consuming and politically difficult, and many will fail even with the most skilled officials and high-level attention. Not surprisingly, few administrations will be eager to try to shape the region, and crisis management will be the order of the day.
None of these possible changes are certain, and, at times, crises and horrible conflicts can lead to caution and peace. The 2006 Israel-Hezbollah war’s end was inconclusive, and the situation seemed rife for renewed conflict. In fact, although both sides prepared for war, they preferred to avoid another round of disastrous conflict, leading to almost 20 years of shaky but real stability—an eternity in the Middle East. As we hope for the best, we should prepare for the worst. The risks of renewed war and worsening regional conditions are real, and even if a cease-fire is reached, we should temper our hopes for a return to normalcy in the Middle East.
The post More Wars, a Failed State, and a Step Back by the United States appeared first on Foreign Policy.
