In a speech last month marking the 79th anniversary of Korea’s independence from Japanese colonial rule, South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol called for the establishment of “a unified, free, and democratic nation, rightfully owned by the people … across the entire Korean Peninsula.” He argued that Korea’s liberation remains incomplete as long as North Koreans are deprived of freedom. This was a stark difference from North Korean leader Kim Jong Un’s recent statement about the issue in December 2023, when he renounced unification and said it was no longer viable.
The two Koreas now find themselves at a somewhat awkward crossroad on the issue of unification. On the surface, Seoul’s position seems benign, while the specifics of Pyongyang’s rhetoric appear aggressive and provocative. Upon closer examination, however, Pyongyang’s stance could suggest an attempt to coexist with the South—a two-state solution—whereas Seoul’s call for a unified, democratic Korea might be perceived by the North as a denial of the Kim regime’s legitimacy and an incitement of popular uprising. This could intensify the concerns that led Kim to renounce unification in the first place.
Ever since the peninsula was divided in the late 1940s, reunification has been a shared objective for both Koreas. During the height of the Cold War, the two governments refused to recognize each other as legitimate and competed to be the government that would unify the country. South Korean President Syngman Rhee stated in 1953 that it was his duty to unify the nation by force if necessary. Similarly, in 1968, North Korean leader Kim Il Sung sought to incite a communist revolution in the South, declaring that “a revolution in the South is a struggle to achieve sovereignty, and the only way to achieve this sovereignty is through force.”
The end of the Cold War opened the door for the two Koreas to discuss peaceful unification, eventually resulting in the 2000 Joint Declaration. In this agreement, both sides committed to ending hostilities, building trust, and pursuing peaceful unification through a confederation, in which North and South Korea retain their respective autonomous governments within a single state—a one-state, two-systems model—as a transitional step toward eventual unification. Whether by force or through peaceful means, unification had, until now, never been abandoned as an official policy by either side.
Kim Jong Un’s December announcement renouncing unification was a significant shift. Shortly thereafter, North Korea demolished the Arch of Reunification, built in 2000 to commemorate the Joint Declaration. At the July plenum of the ruling Workers’ Party of Korea, Kim directed the removal of goals related to “unification” and “grand national unity” from the constitution. In no uncertain terms, these moves signaled a decisive break from any aspirations of reunification, solidifying the regime’s commitment to a permanent division between the two Koreas as separate countries.
This shift has sparked both confusion and concern. Some have interpreted it as a transformation in Pyongyang’s perception of Seoul from “a dialogue partner or a separate entity to coexist with” to an adversary to be subjugated, as Cha Du-hyeogn, a former Blue House official, told NK News. However, if North Korea’s goal were truly to subjugate the South, it would make more sense to advocate for unification rather than renounce it. Subjugating the South is one way of unifying the peninsula, after all. Others suggest that this move may be an attempt to justify the use of nuclear weapons against South Koreans—something difficult to rationalize if they were still regarded as compatriots. But using nuclear weapons against the South would lead to a full-blown war, triggering major upheaval and likely the downfall of the Kim regime, at which point the justification for nuclear use would be the least of Pyongyang’s problems.
A more compelling interpretation is that this shift is driven by Pyongyang’s recognition that it has lost the “unification competition,” or the contest to be the legitimate government to unify Korea. North Korea lags far behind the South economically, diplomatically, culturally, and even militarily—except in the nuclear domain. More importantly, this disparity is now well known to North Koreans, largely due to the widespread influence of South Korean pop culture in the North. Exposure to South Korean lifestyles through movies, shows, and music may naturally prompt North Koreans to imagine how different their own lives could be, potentially breeding grievances and resentment toward their leadership.
For that reason, Kim sees South Korean pop culture as a significant threat to his regime and has cracked down on its growing influence in the North. In December 2020, North Korea enacted the Anti-Reactionary Ideology and Culture Act, imposing harsh penalties—including the death penalty—for watching or distributing foreign media. In April 2021, Kim issued a directive urging the prevention of youth from adopting South Korean speech, fashion, and hairstyles. This January, BBC Korean reported that two teenage boys had been publicly sentenced to 12 years of hard labor for watching and sharing South Korean television shows. Despite the risks, North Koreans continue to consume South Korean content.
Against this backdrop, Kim’s stance allows him to convey two distinct messages. The first is to a domestic audience: South Koreans are no longer considered compatriots, and emulating their way of life warrants severe punishment. The second is to the South: Let’s acknowledge our different political systems, ideologies, and ways of life and agree not to interfere in each other’s affairs.
In contrast, Yoon has put forth a markedly different vision for the future of the peninsula, which could be interpreted by Pyongyang as endorsing the eventual absorption of North Korea into the South. Contradictory to the 2000 Joint Declaration, Yoon’s vision for unification is not through consultation with Pyongyang but through encouraging the North Korean people to pursue liberal democracy—against the wishes of the Kim regime. North Korea’s democratization implicitly cannot occur without overthrowing the regime, since Kim is unlikely to give up power voluntarily. This vision can be more clearly understood alongside Unification Minister Kim Young-ho’s op-ed from April 2019, in which he argued, “Only when the Kim Jong Un regime is overthrown and North Korea is liberalized, bringing both Koreas under a unified political system, will the path to unification truly open.”
In order for North Korea’s liberalization to happen, Yoon pledged during his National Liberation Day speech to establish a government fund to support civic groups promoting freedom and human rights in North Korea, along with efforts to expand North Koreans’ access to external information via radio and television to “make them aware of the false propaganda and instigations” spread by Pyongyang. Yoon added: “If more North Koreans realize that unification through freedom is the only way to improve their lives and are convinced that the Republic of Korea will embrace them, they will become a strong, friendly contingent to support a freedom-based unification.”
Although its rhetoric may seem benign, this approach to unification is highly risky. Pyongyang is notoriously sensitive about the kinds of information tactics Yoon is promoting, and intensifying such campaigns will only exacerbate tensions and increase the risk of military confrontation.
Instead of encouraging revolt in North Korea, which could have catastrophic consequences for the peninsula, South Korea could consider a two-state solution of its own to ease North Korea’s fears of absorption and help reduce inter-Korean tensions. This would involve, in the immediate term, refraining from promoting unification by absorption and accepting the current reality of two separate states and, in the longer term, establishing diplomatic relations with the North and fostering cooperation, mutual understanding, and peaceful coexistence as neighboring states.
Admittedly, there are valid reasons that a two-state solution is not acceptable for many South Koreans. As some point out, the pursuit of unification is not only a policy preference but a constitutional obligation. Article 3 of the South Korean Constitution defines the territory of the Republic of Korea as encompassing the entire Korean Peninsula and its surrounding islands. Article 4 further stipulates that the “Republic of Korea shall seek unification and shall establish and implement a peaceful unification policy based on the principles of freedom and democracy.” Article 66 says in no uncertain terms that the president has a constitutional duty to pursue peaceful unification. These clauses remained unchanged through nine constitutional amendments since their inclusion in South Korea’s first constitution in 1948.
The issue of unification is also deeply emotional. Support for unification has declined, especially among younger generations who prefer a status quo due to fears of economic burdens and social disruption, but it remains significant. According to a recent survey, only 46.5 percent of South Korean millennials believe that reunification with North Korea is necessary. The majority of other age groups, however, still support reunification, with more than 73 percent of those who lived through the Korean War expressing strong support. The belief in a “unitary nation” that is “ethnically homogeneous and racially distinctive” is deeply ingrained in the national identity. Case in point, South Korean children grow up singing a song called “Our Wish Is Unification.” For many, abandoning the goal of reunification just doesn’t feel right.
On a more practical level, many argue that if Seoul renounces the goal of unification and permanently recognizes North Korea as a separate country, South Korea will forfeit its legal claim over North Korean territory and lose any standing to lead the reunification and rebuilding process in the event of a North Korean regime collapse.
However, this reasoning may not hold up to scrutiny. Even if North Korea were to collapse, South Korea’s refusal to recognize North Korea as a separate country would have no bearing on international law. The two Koreas joined the United Nations in 1991 as distinct countries, and the international community recognizes them as such. A total of 157 countries maintain diplomatic relations with both Koreas, clearly indicating they do not have a “one Korea” policy. This contrasts sharply with countries’ “One China” policies, as no country maintains formal diplomatic relations with both China and Taiwan. If South Korea were to enter the North following a regime collapse, it could be viewed as an illegal foreign intervention in violation of the U.N. Charter. Legally speaking, South Korea has no greater authority over the fate of North Korea than any other state, regardless of whether it refuses to recognize North Korea as a separate country.
Pursuing unification by encouraging regime collapse offers no tangible benefits and only heightens tensions on the Korean Peninsula. Given the risks of escalation, an official two-state solution is worth considering. However unappealing this may seem, it could be the least bad option in the long run. As long as there is only “one Korea,” each side will claim to be the sole legitimate representative, making the other a target for elimination. In such a scenario, mutual coexistence is impossible. As distinct countries, the two Koreas could coexist—not necessarily amicably but coexist nonetheless.
The views expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the U.S. Defense Department or the U.S. government.
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