On March 11, Syrian farmer Ali Ahmad Barakat was driving a tractor to his fields in the fertile rebel-held lands of the Al-Ghab plain, just a few miles away from the front line with Assadist forces. For years, Al-Ghab’s farmers had refused to let the violence scare them away from working their fields.
But Barakat was about to become the next victim of a terrifying new Syrian Army-piloted weapon: a dirt-cheap, kit-built suicide drone.
Attacking civilians with drones isn’t new, but until recently, the vast majority of these attacks were carried out by more expensive long- and medium-range drones specifically designed for military purposes—characteristics that limited them to a small number of actors worldwide.
Armed groups such as the Islamic State began to experiment with small, cheap, off-the-shelf and custom-built drones in the 2010s, taking advantage of the consumer drone boom, but their attacks were largely focused on military targets and objectives.
Now, the picture has changed.
Small, inexpensive drones have become an indispensable tool on modern battlefields, as combatants come up with ever more creative ways to use these tiny flying robots. Inspired by these tactics, some fighters in conflicts from Myanmar to Syria are starting to use drone warfare techniques recently refined in the Russo-Ukrainian War, such as the use of tiny and ultra-fast suicide drones crafted from cheap hobby racing kits, as well as consumer camera drones rigged to drop explosives, to target, kill, and terrorize civilians.
And we don’t know how to stop them.
Since Russia first invaded Ukraine in early 2022, I’ve been monitoring the crucial role of small drone technology in the conflict, motivated by the hope that better understanding drone warfare tactics might make it easier to protect civilians from their dangers.
This March, the Syrian White Helmets civil defense group contacted me. According to their information (which has been published in a recent report), more and more civilians in the rebel-held front-line areas were getting attacked with small suicide drones. According to a number of sources, Russian military specialists had recently begun training Syrian Army forces to use both first-person-view (FPV) suicide drones and anti-drone guns. Russia’s drone warfare techniques were beginning to spread.
The attacks have shocked even hardened medics. One White Helmets volunteer, Ali Obied, was in the first group of medical workers to arrive on the scene after Barakat was killed. “When we reached the site, we saw how the suicide drone attacked the driver directly—it killed him and slaughtered him into pieces. We collected the pieces of the driver one by one,” he said. They were forced to withdraw quickly from the scene when, over a walkie-talkie, a spotter informed them that other drones were hovering nearby.
Another volunteer, Walid Abdeen, responded to an attack on April 16 that hit multiple civilian cars and a public market, injuring five people. He was confident that a suicide drone was the culprit, an observation backed up by other witnesses who saw the drone in the air before impact. “When suicide drones explode, nothing remains from it, just small pieces—but the sound of the drone is the same as those drones used by journalists,” Abdeen said.
The volunteers agreed that this similarity to peaceful drones was a problem. “It’s difficult for civilians to differentiate between them in the sky, and all of a sudden, they attack someone—a house, a center, or a car,” said Ismail Alabdullah, a media coordinator and volunteer for the White Helmets.
“Those drones, if they want to kill someone who is walking to his school, or even the White Helmets, if they’re returning to their [medical] centers—the drones can find individuals, attack the centers, kill directly,” Alabdullah added. “We have experience with mortars, rockets, and artillery shelling attacks. But this new weapon is incredibly dangerous because it is so precise and cheap to develop.”
White Helmets representatives say dozens of these FPV drone attacks are happening each week. Thanks to the terror spread by these relentless attacks, civilians who have hung on in Syria’s border regions for years are finally beginning to leave.
These drone-powered mechanisms for spreading mass civilian terror aren’t restricted to Syria: They are also on the rise in Ukraine. Targeted attacks by Russian drones on Ukrainian civilians rose dramatically this summer. And while top U.N. officials condemned this uptick in attacks to the Security Council in March, the onslaught shows no signs of stopping.
From July 1 to 21 alone, I collected 34 separate cases of alleged attacks on Ukrainian civilians by Russian drones, drawing from open-source information posted by official sources in the Ukrainian government. As in Syria, most attacks in Ukraine seem to be taking place near the front lines, where relatively short-range FPV racing and consumer drones can reach, and with the same goal of spreading terror.
On July 2nd, a Ukrainian woman was reportedly injured by an FPV drone while she stood in her backyard in Berislava. Days later, on July 11th, authorities reported that two female volunteers were injured after a Russian FPV drone hit a humanitarian aid delivery point in Stanislav. Then, on July 18th, Kherson Oblast’s governor reported that a 74-year-old man in Oleksandrivka was killed by a Russian drone attack – one of a number of older civilian victims.
Some attacks have hit moving civilian vehicles, including minibuses and personal cars—and a number of clearly marked humanitarian and medical vehicles. On Jan. 26, Ukrainian media reported that a Russian FPV drone had attacked a marked car belonging to an aid worker working with a NGO connected to the U.N. Refugee Agency’s humanitarian mission, destroying the car. A journalist who was riding in the vehicle said that it was “very likely that the operator could see the labels on the car.”
Later, on May 29, a Russian drone attack killed a Ukrainian ambulance driver and seriously injured his wife (who had been riding in the vehicle). Soon after, on June 8, Oleksandr Prokudin, the governor of Kherson oblast, reported that after a spate of shelling in the vicinity of Bilozerka, a Russian drone had attacked an ambulance that arrived on the scene to help, injuring the driver.
The tactic has spread beyond Ukraine and Syria. In Gaza, Euro-Med Human Rights Monitor reports that Israel has increasingly turned to small quadcopters to attack civilians and journalists, while Palestinian sources in Rafah told AFP in June that they lived in fear of “quadcopter drones, which mercilessly target anyone walking.” Israel has long used consumer-type quadcopters and racing drones for military purposes, including to drop tear gas on protesters in Gaza in 2018 and to counter so-called fire balloons sent from Gaza during the same period.
In Myanmar, rebel groups fighting the military junta have become adept at using small, cheap consumer and custom-built drones for both intelligence-gathering and for attacks. In recent months, Myanmar’s junta has begun to catch up: In September and October 2023, villagers in the Sagaing region said they were repeatedly attacked by bomb-dropping regime drones.
In another incident this July, the Insecurity Insight NGO reported that armed Myanmar military drones attacked a health center in the Sagaing region, killing a midwife, her two-year-old child, and at least five patients affiliated with the local resistance forces, as well as injuring at least 15. The patients who were killed reportedly had been injured in an earlier military drone attack, and had been seeking care for their injuries at the time
Mexico’s drug cartels, too, have become frequent users of consumer and DIY drones in recent years, both for smuggling and for terrorism. Like Bashar al-Assad’s forces, the cartels appear to view these sudden, shocking drone attacks as an effective way to terrorize civilians into ceding strategically valuable territory. In May 2023, more than 600 people were reportedly displaced from communities in Mexico’s Guerrero state due to cartel drone attacks, and attacks since then in the state have reportedly killed civilians and targeted local schools.
These tactics are spreading, and there is little guidance for civilians, including journalists and aid workers, on how to deal with them. Most existing writing on the subject is geared toward attacks from larger, more powerful, and stealthier long-range military drones.
Thankfully, there are some things the international community can start doing today.
National and international bodies and organizations concerned with civilian protection, such as the United Nations and the International Committee of the Red Cross, should come together to strategize around how best to protect people from small drone attacks. These groups should loudly condemn the terrorist attacks and investigate possible violations of international humanitarian law—as well as sponsoring the research and reporting needed to better understand the problem.
Russia’s war in Ukraine has led to the rapid development of new technologies for detecting drone radio signals in the air, new tools for electronically disabling drones, and a wide variety of other basic drone defense tactics (including the revelation that you can hide from thermal sensors by throwing a yoga mat over your head). Perhaps some of these tools and tactics could be adopted for civilian use.
Finally, we need more collective clarity around the legality of attacks on civilians with small drones under international humanitarian law as well as the legality of civilian efforts to defend themselves. Currently, interpretation of the law doesn’t adequately account for tiny flying robots in combat. As I wrote with my colleague Ossama A. Zaqqout in 2018 (and again in 2022), the presence of identical-looking small drones in the airspace over today’s conflicts makes it very hard for people on the ground to tell whose drone is whose.
Under international humanitarian law’s principle of distinction, combatants must distinguish themselves from civilians—but unlike manned aircraft, drones are too small to carry marks visible from the ground, and they can’t respond to radio checks. We need better solutions to avoid these cases of mistaken identity.
There’s also uncertainty around how humanitarian law might apply to civilian efforts to anticipate—and defend themselves against—drone attacks. Will civilians lose their noncombatant status if they use counterterrorism tools against small drones? Do civilians lose protection if they monitor radio waves for armed drone presence and report that information to combatants—or if they post that information online in a public place?
As is the case with so many other novel consumer technologies, we’ve swiftly figured out how to use drones both to help humanity and to hurt it. But civilians aren’t doomed to be easy targets—as long as we summon the international will to find ways to protect them.
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