Nearly one month ago, on July 28, Venezuela’s authoritarian president, Nicolás Maduro, stole an election. After a campaign period in which opposition presidential candidate Edmundo González consistently led polls, authorities quickly announced on election day that Maduro had won the race. They have yet to make official precinct-level results available for audit, as is required by Venezuelan law.
In response, the opposition gathered more than 23,000 vote tally sheets, representing nearly 80 percent of the country, and published the results online. In Venezuela, these tally sheets are normally made available to poll watchers. The opposition mobilized across Venezuela to ensure that they gathered evidence of the results, in some cases standing up to security forces and government supporters to do so.
Its planning paid off. The results gathered at polling locations indicate that González won more than twice as many votes as Maduro, rather than the narrow 51 percent victory that Maduro claimed. Independent exit surveys and media analyses support the opposition’s conclusion, and the evidence is so overwhelming that the United States and at least a dozen U.S. allies have issued statements recognizing González as the winner. On Aug. 22, however, Venezuela’s Supreme Court—stacked with Maduro loyalists—declared him the victor.
Although the election is over and Maduro remains in power, he looks weaker than at any point in recent years. He is leaning heavily on police and security forces to carry out a targeted repression campaign, which so far has resulted in more than 2,400 detentions and 24 deaths, according to Venezuelan human rights group PROVEA. Maduro is also taking his repression to the airwaves, shutting down Venezuelans’ access to X and encrypted messaging site Signal. These do not appear to be the actions of a strongman who feels safe and secure in his position.
The United States now has a crucial opportunity to push for a democratic opening in Venezuela. The Biden administration can do this by identifying key figures inside the government who may support a transition and applying pressure on them, while continuing to seek credible negotiations between figures in Maduro’s coalition and the opposition.
González and fellow opposition leader María Corina Machado appear to be working toward such a strategy. Their goal is to negotiate a peaceful transfer of power in exchange for certain guarantees or a potential amnesty for Maduro and his henchmen. They recognize that this is no easy task: “There are groups who are clearly willing to negotiate and press for that to occur, and others who are not,” Machado told reporters recently.
So far, the White House is keeping its cards close. In response to Venezuela’s stolen election, the administration has focused on carrots rather than sticks. The Wall Street Journal reported that Washington was offering to lift indictments on Maduro and other key ruling party figures if they enter talks to guide a transition. The United States is so far reticent to impose new sanctions on Venezuelan oil.
That may change if Maduro’s repression campaign continues with no sign of a transition. The White House should be taking stock of the available options to effectively press for a transition. Some in Washington are already demanding drastic action: A recently proposed bipartisan resolution co-sponsored by 30 members of the House of Representatives calls on the United States to “employ all available diplomatic and economic means to pressure the Maduro regime.”
The United States has a track record of offering sanctions relief for concessions from Maduro. Last October, the White House temporarily lifted some oil sanctions, and Maduro signed an agreement with the opposition to hold competitive elections. Although the United States partially snapped back these sanctions once it became clear that Machado would not be able to run, that deal ultimately facilitated last month’s election—which clearly demonstrated Venezuelans’ overwhelming rejection of Maduro and desire for change. It also allowed for the release of Venezuelan fugitive Alex Saab from U.S. prison in exchange for the freedom of all wrongfully detained Americans in Venezuela.
The United States continues to hold significant leverage over Venezuela. While it has provided licenses to U.S. and Western oil companies to continue operating in the country, Washington has kept a broader sanctions framework in place that limits the Venezuelan oil sector and its financial connectivity with the global economy. These licenses permit a Western footprint in the country—home to the planet’s largest oil reserves—while reducing the ease with which Maduro can divert oil proceeds through corruption.
For the Biden administration, the challenge will be to strike a balance between targeted and effective pressure on Venezuela’s elites, who back Maduro, while preventing Venezuela’s drift further into Russia and China’s orbit. Some policymakers in Washington worry that a return to the “maximum pressure” sanctions strategy of 2019 would push Maduro closer to U.S. geopolitical rivals that have recognized him as the election winner.
Individual sanctions on military, political, and economic elites may be a more attractive option than broader economic sanctions, but even they have clear limits. Punitive measures on key figures can create a rally-around-the-flag effect that often bolsters a regime’s cohesion. More than 160 individuals in the Maduro government have already been sanctioned by the United States, but many of them have been honored in public ceremonies in Venezuela rather than flipping on Maduro.
Carefully and strategically mapping out pressure points inside the regime may provide an effective path toward facilitating a democratic transition. The United States should identify and engage those most likely to support democratic reform from the inside. This means empowering moderate elements and isolating hard-liners to maximize the odds of successful transition talks.
Identifying these pressure points may be less difficult than it sounds. Although the size of Venezuela’s economy is still a fraction of what it was in the oil bonanza golden years, the opposition-led Venezuelan Finance Observatory suggests that GDP has grown quarterly by an average of 5 percent since early 2022, and other independent analysts report inflation has dropped to its lowest point in over a decade.
This growth has not been felt evenly across the country, but there is a set of economic, political, and military elites that—to put it crudely—has a good thing going and doesn’t want Maduro to derail it. Maduro is desperately working to convince these elites that he can reconnect the country with the global economy, but the fact that his post-election repression has once again put Venezuela on the path to greater isolation does not work in his favor.
Some power brokers in Maduro’s coalition may wonder if this chaos is what they signed up for, which may present the biggest loyalty test that the leader has faced in years. Many elites are weary of the prospect of Maduro assuming another illegitimate term, especially if it means six more years of repression, sanctions, and economic catastrophe. The White House has an opening to liaise with such figures, making sure that ruling party elites and the military understand the potential benefits of a democratic transition. Sanctions on individuals, if they are used, should include prudent communication of the conditions necessary for those penalties to be lifted.
Every action taken by the United States and its allies should be carefully weighed against the possibility that these actions can increase rather than decrease regime cohesion in Caracas. Here, the Biden administration can examine the Trump administration’s approach to Maduro’s regime.
After the push to recognize Juan Guaidó as interim president failed to dislodge Maduro in 2019, U.S. Special Representative for Venezuela Elliott Abrams and envoy Richard Grenell engaged in behind-the-scenes conversations with key power brokers in Maduro’s coalition. The Trump State Department’s 2020 Democratic Transition Framework for Venezuela, which outlined a path for power sharing and democratic coexistence in exchange for gradually lifting sanctions, offers a potential model of how to restore democracy.
If the Biden administration chooses to build on this framework, it will require more complicated negotiations than those that led to the July election. U.S. efforts should align with the priorities of González’s campaign, given his electoral victory. Any such deal must also tackle complex issues such as institutional reforms, transitional justice, the release of political prisoners, and the terms under which both the opposition and ruling party can coexist.
The United States should also continue coordinating its response to Venezuela’s crisis with partners in Latin America, particularly Brazil and Colombia. In recent weeks, these countries have been working behind the scenes to advance an agreement that would clear the way for a democratic outcome in Venezuela. They have floated different proposals, ranging from new elections to some form of power-sharing arrangement. So far, Brazil’s and Colombia’s proposals have been rejected by both the opposition and the government, illustrating the importance of local buy-in.
Although both countries are clear that they will not legitimize Maduro’s power grab, they have given no signs that they will cut diplomatic relations with Venezuela, much less join in an international sanctions campaign. But the fact that two leftist leaders who once expressed support for Maduro’s political mentor Hugo Chávez are united in rejecting his stolen election is a major step forward.
Venezuela’s turmoil has regional implications. Nearly 8 million Venezuelans are displaced, according to the United Nations. The longer the crisis drags on, the more migrants and refugees will flee to other countries, impacting domestic politics. There is no guarantee that regional efforts to encourage a democratic opening in the country will succeed. But the fact that regional leftist leaders are using their channels with Caracas to call for change is an opportunity for all, from the Venezuelan people to the White House.
The coming weeks and months will determine the success or failure of efforts to advance a peaceful and democratic solution in Venezuela. By leveraging their influence to shape incentives among Venezuelan elites, the United States and its allies in South America have an opportunity to support the Venezuelan people in their quest for democracy and stability.
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